

ILLINOIS IN THE WORLD WAR

VOLUME I

**THE HISTORY OF THE 33RD
DIVISION, A. E. F.**

BY

FREDERIC LOUIS HUIDEKOPER

VOLUME I

SECOND EDITION

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
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ILLINOIS IN THE WORLD WAR

VOLUME I

THE
HISTORY OF THE 33rd DIVISION
A. E. F.

BY

FREDERIC LOUIS HUIDEKOPER

FORMER LIEUTENANT COLONEL, ADJUTANT GENERAL,
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MILITARY UNPREPAREDNESS OF THE UNITED STATES.'

SECOND EDITION

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
HONORABLE FRANK O. LOWDEN

THE 33rd Division, or the "Prairie" Division as we like best to call it, was composed exclusively of National Guard organizations from the State of Illinois. New York and Pennsylvania were the only other states to have divisions of their own, therefore, Illinois had a peculiar pride in this division. From the moment the different units forming it were mustered into the Army, our people followed all their movements with interest and pride. The division saw the hardest kind of service and distinguished itself down to the moment the armistice was signed. It won the praise, not only of the highest officers in our own army but equally the praise of the highest officers in the French and British armies. For it was the only division in the American Expeditionary Forces to fight with the French and the British as well as with fellow Americans. It came out of the war with the reputation of being one of the best combat divisions in the Allied Army.

Illinois is proud of the heroes of this division, not alone for their achievements as soldiers but also for their conduct as men. No scandal was ever connected with the division. Wherever it was stationed, it won the friendship of the civilian population by the fine bearing of its men. For patriotic devotion in service, for honor in camp and field, for valor in battle, for courage in the face of death, the division won glory for Illinois. Illinois, therefore, justly regards the record of the division as one of her most priceless possessions. It will ever form a notable chapter in her history.

FRANK O. LOWDEN

November 20, 1919



MAJOR GENERAL GEORGE BELL, JR.

THE 33rd Division accomplished every task assigned to it.

Not a single failure is recorded against it.

Not a scandal occurred to mar the glory of its achievements.

Duty to God, to country and to home, well done, is the highest standard humanly attainable. The officers and men of the 33rd Division did their duty superbly. Their deeds and the example which they set are imperishable. Illinois may well be proud of her sons, both the living and the dead.

GEO. BELL, JR.,
Major-General, U. S. A.,
Commander, 33rd Division

CAMP GRANT, Illinois

November 19, 1919



LIEUTENANT COLONEL FREDERIC L. HUIDEKOPER

I. ORGANIZATION AND TRAINING OF THE 33RD DIVISION AT CAMP LOGAN

On August 23, 1917, the War Department issued General Order No. 114, directing thirty-one major generals, accompanied by their authorized aides-de-camp, to proceed to certain stations and to assume command of the troops there. By virtue of these orders, Major General George Bell, Jr. was assigned to the command of Camp Logan at Houston, Texas, and on the following day special orders were issued designating the officers who were to command the brigades and constitute the Division Staff of the 33rd Division,¹ all of whom were instructed to reach Camp Logan not later than August 25, 1917, and to report to the Division Commander for duty. Telegraphic orders had been sent a few days previously to these officers, nearly all of whom arrived at Houston on Saturday, August 25, to find that place under martial law in consequence of the lamentable shooting affray on the evening of August 23.

Situated on Washington Street, about four miles from the centre of Houston, Camp Logan was at that time in a decidedly unfinished state. It was occupied by certain units—numbering 36 officers and 1,291 men, who had arrived during the preceding eight days—²forming the vanguard of the National Guard of Illinois, which was to constitute the nucleus of the 33rd Division by virtue of General Orders Nos. 95 and 101, issued by the War Department on July 19 and August 3, 1917, respectively. The preparations necessary to receive, equip, and train the large number of Illinois troops whose arrival was expected in the near future were immedi-

ately made, so far as was possible under the circumstances, by General Bell, who established his headquarters in a mess building near the Washington Street entrance on Monday, August 27. On the following morning General Order No. 1 was issued, designating the aides-de-camp of the Division Commander and the officers who were to be the chiefs of the various departments of the Division Staff.³ The extremely amicable relations which existed between the 33rd Division and the civilians of Houston for more than eight months were inaugurated at a banquet given at the Rice Hotel on August 30 by the Chamber of Commerce of Houston.⁴

September 10 witnessed the arrival of the first increment of the Illinois National Guard, and other units followed in rapid succession, although it was not until October 26 that the last of the state troops reached Camp Logan.⁵ Every conceivable effort was made by General Bell to have all the Illinois troops sent immediately to Houston and to obtain the *matériel*, equipment, and supplies needed in order to reorganize the regiments as prescribed by the Tables of Organization⁶ and to begin with the minimum delay their training, even if only to the extent that the first units of "Kitchener's Army" in England were trained. His urgings fell far short of securing the results for which he had striven and, on September 17, orders were received from the War Department directing him, accompanied by his Chief of Staff, his Aide-de-Camp, and two enlisted men, to reach Hoboken on September 23, prepared for prolonged field service. On September 19 he left Camp Logan, joined a party of American division commanders, spent his entire time in Europe in investigating personally and gathering all possible information as to the conditions and methods of warfare employed by the Allies on their western front, and did not return to Houston until December 7.

During General Bell's absence the command of the 33rd

Division devolved upon Brigadier General Henry D. Todd, Jr. of the 58th Field Artillery Brigade, as the ranking officer present. To him was intrusted the difficult task of organizing the division. The slowness with which the troops were sent from Illinois⁷ postponed the issuing of the orders prescribing this reorganization until October 9⁸ and, as a matter of fact, it could not be put into actual operation until October 16. In spite of many difficulties, some of which arose from conditions peculiar to National Guard units as they were then constituted, at the end of October, 1917,⁹ the organization of the 33rd Division was, in effect, complete. The splitting up of certain regiments,¹⁰ the reorganization of others, and the temporary confusion inseparable from such readjustment had, necessarily, not conduced to systematic or uninterrupted training of the troops. Moreover, there existed at that juncture a conspicuous dearth of the *matériel* and supplies which are indispensable to a properly equipped military force. Furthermore, during the last week of October several contingents of drafted men, numbering approximately five hundred each, were received from the 86th Division at Camp Grant, Rockford, Illinois.¹¹ This influx of recruits, many of whom lacked physical fitness for military service and some of whom were unable to speak English,¹² obviously augmented the unsettled conditions then existing throughout the command. In consequence, the telegram in cipher which came from The Adjutant General of the Army on October 31, directing that the 33rd Division be made ready to sail for France about November 30,¹³ was like a bolt from the blue. The unpreparedness of the troops for over-sea service and the actual conditions at Camp Logan at that time are described in a memorandum formulated by the Division Adjutant on November 1, 1917, for his own future reference, from which the following excerpts are taken:

The 33rd Division, temporarily under the command of Brigadier General Henry D. Todd, Jr., in the absence of Major General George Bell, Jr., in France, is composed in the main of former Illinois National Guard and numbers today 914 officers and 23,295 enlisted men, a total of 24,209, in which are included substantially 2,000 drafted men received the past week from the 86th Division at Camp Grant, Rockford, Illinois; 60 officers and 959 enlisted men belonging to the Camp troops, and 57 officers and 2,109 enlisted men of the 8th Illinois Infantry (colored). Neither the Camp troops nor the 8th Illinois will be sent abroad, according to present information.¹⁴ The actual strength of the 33rd Division proper is therefore 797 officers and 19,306 enlisted men—including 2,000 drafted men. Camp Grant at Rockford, Illinois, and Camp Dodge at Des Moines, Iowa, are still to furnish this division with 4,400 more drafted men, but, even so, there will still be a shortage of men since the Tables of Organization prescribe that a division shall consist of 27,152 enlisted men.

General Bell and most of the officers of the Divisional Staff reached Houston on August 25, 1917, and since that time have made unremitting efforts to get all the Illinois National Guard, the necessary *matériel* and supplies sent to this camp. It was not until the 16th of October that all the Illinois troops reached here and that the new organization, based upon European organization, could be properly effected, insomuch as the new organization required that the two Infantry Brigades—viz: the 65th Brigade (Brigadier General Hill) and the 66th Brigade (Brigadier General Foster)—¹⁵should consist of two infantry regiments of 3,652 enlisted men each instead of three regiments of lesser strength. The former 5th and 7th Illinois Infantry ceased to exist as such and, by virtue of the new organization, became the Divisional and Brigade Machine Gun Battalions, and the Divisional Train Headquarters and Military Police, and were included in the composition of the Division Trains.

Camp Logan itself is not finished. The plans of many buildings have been repeatedly changed, thus resulting in much unnecessary confusion and expenditures for which there can be no possible justification. Recently it has been decided to make many of them semi-permanent by the addition of windows and doors, and this work has not yet been com-

pleted. It was only today that the Division Headquarters moved into an inclosed building, with windows and a wooden floor, having thus far occupied buildings with dirt floors and open sides exposed to every particle of dust produced by six weeks of continuous drought. Many of the storehouses and warehouses are of faulty construction, and the Camp Engineer informed me yesterday that some of the roofs are sagging to such an extent that it was only a question of time before they would collapse completely. The heating facilities are meagre to a degree. The Base Hospital is without running water, except for two or three faucets put in by the Constructing Quartermaster contrary to authorization because he realized the folly of having no running water whatsoever. It has been suggested from Washington that the total absence of heating facilities be overcome by stoves in the operating rooms and by carrying heating pipes up the outside of the Base Hospital. Comment upon the danger of stoves in operating rooms where ether is used, or the inadequacy of heating pipes on the outside of a hospital is superfluous. Since the temperature of late has been quite low at night—sometimes below freezing—the sick in the Base Hospital have had increased suffering on account of the cold.¹⁶

The re-organization of the Division necessarily affected the training of the troops, but the principal factor which militated against the prompt beginning of this training was the slowness with which the Illinois troops were sent to this camp. At the present time, intensive training of the infantry regiments has not been of more than four weeks duration as a whole. The machine-gun training was not begun until October 10th. In the case of the 58th Field Artillery Brigade the situation was extraordinary. The three regiments composing that Brigade are a fair sample. The 122nd Field Artillery was formerly the First Illinois Cavalry and only within a few months converted into the 2nd Illinois Field Artillery. The 123rd Field Artillery was the 6th Illinois Infantry until after its arrival at Camp Logan. The 124th Field Artillery was the brand-new 3rd Illinois Field Artillery and was only organized in August, 1917. The training of these Field Artillery regiments has been confined to dummy guns donated to one of them, and not one single organization has ever fired a real field piece. The 122nd and 124th only had dummy guns

in Illinois; the 123rd was converted from infantry into field artillery less than six weeks ago at this camp, where no field guns of any sort or description existed until yesterday, when twenty-four three-inch guns arrived. For a long time Brigadier General Todd, commanding the 58th Field Artillery Brigade, was the only officer, Regular or otherwise, with artillery experience, but, by dint of much telegraphing, two other Regular officers were sent to assist him in training this brigade in preliminary work. Artillery ammunition is conspicuous for its paucity.¹⁷

Of machine guns there are only twelve Maxims and twenty Lewis guns. Only a very few officers have taken the course at Fort Sill and are competent to instruct in this most important work.

Although General Bell bent every effort, beginning before the end of August, to establish target ranges for small-arms and field artillery, in spite of all that could be done, these ranges are just approaching completion. Neither the artillery nor the machine gun troops have fired so much as one single round in target practice, and the same is true of the infantry without exception. . . .

There is a decided shortage of ordnance *matériel* of many kinds, including rifles and pistols.¹⁸ On several occasions I have had to lend my own Colt automatic to officers of the Military Police for expeditions when riot sticks were scarcely sufficient protection and when it was advisable for the officers to be properly armed. . . .

As a matter of fact, the real training of this aggregation has just begun in real earnest. . . . General Pershing, in a recent communication to the War Department which was transmitted to all Division Commanders, laid the strongest possible emphasis upon the absolute necessity of thorough target practice in this country before troops are sent abroad, and he gave ample warning that the conditions in France arising from many causes, including intensive agriculture, were such that target ranges were well-nigh impossible to find. For these reasons, he emphatically declared that American troops should be taught to shoot before they are sent abroad, doubly so since they will have little or no opportunity for target practice in France.

In the light of the facts enumerated above, the reader is left to draw his own conclusions as to whether the 33rd Division was ready at that time to be sent overseas.

During the first fortnight of November, 1917, contingents of drafted men, numbering as a rule approximately five hundred men each, arrived at Camp Logan at frequent intervals.¹⁹ By November 14, the 33rd Division had been augmented by 6,600 recruits, about 5,600 of whom came from the 86th Division at Camp Grant, Illinois, and about 1,000 from the 88th Division at Camp Dodge, Iowa. While the drafted men from the 88th Division were noticeably superior to those from the 86th, it was manifest that the quality of men sent by both these divisions was, with certain exceptions, by no means all that could have been desired, and that many of them were, so to speak, discards.²⁰ More than five hundred proved to be alien enemies,²¹ while those who, because of their physical condition and for other reasons, were unsuited to make soldiers, and the non-English speaking and illiterates, were in such considerable numbers²² that it became necessary eventually to discharge 2,189 of these men on "surgeon's certificate of disability."²³ The mass of correspondence and reports on the subject of these undesirables, as well as the necessity of complying with the gradations of alien-born soldiers required by the War Department, necessarily prevented the officers of the division from devoting as much time to the training of the troops as they otherwise could have done.

During the first part of November, 1917, four British and five French officers, accompanied by a number of noncommissioned officers, reported as instructors²⁴ and under their energetic and able supervision the training of the troops received an additional impetus, apart from the invaluable instruction given in the latest European methods.

On November 6, Governor Frank O. Lowden of Illinois, accompanied by several important officials of that state, arrived at Camp Logan, was given an informal reception by General Todd, and spent the afternoon visiting and inspecting some of the organizations. On the following day, Governor Lowden and Governor W. P. Hobby of Texas reviewed from the balcony of the Rice Hotel in Houston a parade composed of the majority of the 33rd Division.²⁵ On November 8, Governor Lowden again spent part of the day at Camp Logan and that afternoon he and the state officials accompanying him left Houston for Springfield, Illinois.²⁶

On November 19, instructions were received from The Adjutant General of the Army to send all general officers to Washington for a physical examination to determine their fitness for over-sea service. Although nothing further had been heard respecting the sailing of the division about November 30, as announced on October 31, the first real inkling that its departure would be deferred was contained in a telegram from the Chief of Ordnance, received on November 20, to the effect that the ordnance stores due to the 33rd Division would be shipped to Camp Logan in accordance with the priority list and that the major portion thereof should arrive within the next thirty days. In the absence of contrary instructions, all necessary arrangements had been made to have the 123rd Field Artillery horse-drawn but, as a precautionary measure, inquiries made by telegraph on November 19 elicited a response next day from The Adjutant General of the Army that the "regiment [of] Heavy Artillery will be motorized" but that "tractors will not be delivered for some months." On November 28 telegraphic orders were received from The Adjutant General of the Army to report approximately the date when the prescribed course of target practice would be finished, and also the exact number of men needed to bring the

division up to full strength. On November 29 the Commanding General was directed to report when the engineer regiment, the engineer train, the mobile laboratory, and two sanitary squads would be fully equipped and in readiness for over-sea service. The first news that General Bell had returned from France was received on November 30 in a telegram which he sent from Washington asking for exact information concerning the shortage of men, including those needed to replace eight hundred alien enemies. That he had been successful in obtaining from the military authorities in Washington a promise that the 33rd Division would receive its full quota of recruits was attested by the receipt on December 3 of a telegram from The Adjutant General of the Army announcing that the "War Department expects to send 3,500 drafted white men to your Division immediately" and asking if there were any reason why they should not be sent.²⁷

The period of slightly more than eleven weeks, during which Brigadier General Todd was the acting division commander, was replete with difficulties and required the exercise of exceptional judgment and patience in this stage of transition to an organization bearing some semblance to a properly constituted military force. Allusion has already been made to the reorganization effected in October, 1917,²⁸ which was hampered further by the influx of 6,600 drafted men received between October 25 and November 14—many of whom had to be discharged because they were unfit for military service—by the expected departure overseas scheduled to take place "on or about November 30,"²⁹ by the lack of *matériel*, equipment, clothing, and supplies of almost every sort, and by numerous other factors which need not be enumerated here. Every effort was made by General Todd and all the officers of the division to expedite the passage through this unavoidable period of transformation, to remedy the innumerable

defects then existing, to obtain the urgently needed *matériel*, clothing, and supplies,³⁰ to push the training of the troops to the limit possible under the circumstances, and to instill into comparatively green officers and men that discipline and efficiency which alone can create an effective military force. Apart from the obstacles encountered within the division itself, which were to be expected during such a period of transition, innumerable handicaps from outside sources had to be overcome.³¹ The wells in Texas constituted the principal source of supply of oil to the United States Navy, as well as a valuable adjunct to the Allies, but their operation was seriously imperiled by disturbances created by disaffected persons during October and November, 1917. Through the vigorous action and tact of General Todd, acting under the supervision of Major General Ruckman, commanding the Southern Department, any interruption in this vital supply was effectually prevented, although it involved the guarding of these oil wells by a considerable force of troops, whose training and target practice suffered correspondingly.³² Frequent changes in organization were prescribed by the War Department.³³ The establishment of a training school for officers was ordered on October 10 but, notwithstanding several inquiries by telegraph, at the end of November the requisite information concerning it had not been forthcoming.³⁴ In spite of every effort to get rid of the undesirables, especially the alien enemies, the absence of a fixed policy in the Army War College effectually prevented definite action.³⁵ The foregoing were a few of the many factors which retarded the attainment of the desideratum to which unremitting labors were devoted. The weeding out of officers not up to the standard requisite for war was, fortunately, not subjected to similar handicaps. Several boards of efficiency were created during November, 1917, and bore immediate fruit in that on December 1 a number of resig-

nations, tendered as a result of the findings of these boards, were accepted by The Adjutant General of the Army.³⁶

On Friday, December 7, 1917, Major General Bell, accompanied by his Aide-de-Camp, Captain William H. Simpson, and his Chief of Staff, Lieutenant Colonel W. K. Naylor, returned to Camp Logan. At three o'clock that afternoon, he addressed the general and field officers of the command, emphasizing the "vital necessity of unwavering discipline" and thorough efficiency as the only known method to minimize losses and to insure victory in war. He laid particular stress upon target practice, upon cleanliness and neatness in appearance as the very foundation of discipline, and upon the obligation on the part of everyone for the most strenuous work; and he announced that all incompetent officers would be eliminated and that their places would be filled by deserving men from the ranks.³⁷

The events of the few days immediately succeeding General Bell's resumption of command were scarcely encouraging to those who were striving for military efficiency. On December 8 came a notification from The Adjutant General of the Army that the departure of the division had been deferred and that all over-sea equipment received by it would at once be shipped to the 32nd Division. A vigorous protest made on December 13 proved futile and in the meantime, announcements were received that the movement of the 33rd Division had been postponed until February and that the motor transport requested could not be supplied. Instructions from the War Department on December 15 to deliver to the 32nd Division all woolen clothing with the exception of one suit per man led to protest by General Bell on the score of the detrimental effect on the health of the command and the handicap to the training entailed by depriving the men of the two uniforms indispensable to the proper performances of their duties.

The division had now been stripped of its ordnance and all its over-sea supplies, and its clothing had been reduced to an absolute minimum; furthermore, no solution had been reached in Washington as to the disposition of the alien enemies in the ranks³⁸ and no further information had been given concerning the 3,500 drafted men promised on December 3. Notwithstanding this situation, orders were received during the third week in December to prepare the division for over-sea service, inasmuch as it stood well up on the list of those destined for duty in France.

At the close of the year 1917 the various units and services of the 33rd Division were beginning to resemble a real military force in the embryonic stage. A noticeable improvement in the discipline, military courtesy, and general appearance of both officers and men was manifest. Officers not up to standard were being weeded out at a rapid rate through the medium of efficiency boards; the others showed by their work that the Division Commander's warnings had not fallen on unheeding ears. In every branch of training the utmost efforts were put forth, particular attention being paid to target practice and bayonet work as the fundamentals of a soldier's schooling, and both officers and men responded in a gratifying manner to the severe demands made upon them. For officers, noncommissioned officers, and men, schools of various kinds were established and were instrumental in effecting a marked improvement. The 33rd Division Infantry School of Arms, under the able management first of Captain John P. Lucas and later of Captain William H. Simpson, proved particularly successful in this respect. The invaluable assistance of the British and French instructors was beginning to be apparent, and both military missions, especially the French, kept in close touch with the work of their officers by means of frequent visits and inspections. As in all other matters, the highest standard

in paper-work and records was exacted by the Division Commander, who was particularly insistent that the service records of the men be kept absolutely accurate and complete to date. To that end, each service record in the command was repeatedly examined, during a period of several months, by officers specially selected for that purpose from the offices of the Division Adjutant and the Division Surgeon, and every inaccuracy was corrected on the spot.

The year 1918 opened auspiciously in some ways and quite the contrary in others. Effective progress was being made daily in the training of the troops but it was apparent that there was a long road to travel before the standard of efficiency demanded by General Bell would be attained. Nearly all the field officers of infantry and artillery³⁹ were sent to the Brigade and Field Officers' School at San Antonio, Texas, in compliance with orders, and the regimental commanders, with the exception of two,⁴⁰ were temporarily replaced by colonels of the Regular Army selected by the War Department. Four hundred and thirty-two enlisted men were sent to Leon Springs, Texas, on January 9, to attend the training camp there for candidates for commissions. Brigadier General David J. Foster, commanding the 66th Infantry Brigade, to the regret of the command, failed to qualify physically for over-sea service and on January 8 was ordered to be "honorably discharged." The dearth of officers at this stage of the training naturally exercised a detrimental effect, which was further augmented by the arrival on January 8 of 414 enlisted men from the 32nd Division, classed as alien enemies.⁴¹ The precaution was taken, however, to put them into a provisional regiment under the command of Major Abel Davis, thus keeping them separate and distinct from the division units.

Up to that time no definite policy as to the disposition of

alien enemy soldiers had been announced by the War Department but the receipt, on January 9, of orders to report the number of Austrian subjects in the division belonging to Teutonic, Magyar, Polish, Rumanian, Czechish, Ruthenian, and other consolidated races determined General Bell to take the bull by the horns. The following characteristic telegram was accordingly sent that same day to The Adjutant General of the Army:

Urgently request authorization to deal with so-called alien enemies in this Division and Camp according to my discretion in order to salvage as many as possible period Alien enemies in this camp added to those recently sent from another camp will make some twelve hundred period Out of them at least four hundred can be obtained who are eager and desire to fight against Central Powers period If thorough investigation proves sincerity of their desire it would be manifestly advantageous to utilize them period It is understood that partial or complete naturalization will not prevent their being shot if captured by Germans period Authorization described above is earnestly desired comma particularly since it would help to dispose of this hitherto unsolved question period It is understood that instructions relative to alien enemies were to be issued by War Department December thirtieth period No such instructions have yet reached this Division Request information whether they have been issued and what is their purport.

BELL.

That same day the Division Commander inaugurated a novelty by prescribing a competition for the selection of the best company in each of the four infantry regiments. When chosen, these companies were to be given special instruction in infantry work, to be designated "Model Companies," and to set the standard of efficiency for the others.⁴²

January 10, 11⁴³ and 12 were marked by the worst storm in that part of Texas since February 14, 1895—a heavy fall of snow and a minimum temperature of eleven degrees above

zero, the lowest at Houston during January for thirty-two years. The troops, being all under canvas, suffered somewhat and training had to be partly suspended on January 11. A succession of instructions from the War Department extending over several weeks had led to the separation from the division of so many officers that the progress of the training was noticeably impaired thereby,⁴⁴ and on January 15,⁴⁵ General Bell telegraphed The Adjutant General of the Army that he had received orders to hold 460 enlisted men and 140 officers, fully equipped, in readiness to precede the division abroad but that, even by stripping every organization, the full quota of these men could not be supplied.

By reason of certain wise and effective measures, the remonstrances raised in many quarters by so-called "conscientious objectors" were virtually unheard at Camp Logan, and on January 17 General Bell answered The Adjutant General of the Army's inquiry respecting these by the crisp statement that "there are none and consequently none who refuse to work or serve."

Stability in the matter of organization proved somewhat difficult to attain because of the changes directed by higher authority. Fair examples of this were the consolidation of the Personnel Office and War Risk Insurance with the Adjutant's Office ordered on January 11, and the abolition, prescribed on January 19, of all "Statistical Sections in Divisions, regiments and elsewhere in the United States," which had been in active operation since September, 1917.⁴⁶

The days from January 15 to 19, inclusive, were notable for the visit of Lieutenant Colonel R. V. K. Applin of the Royal Army, whose able handling of the British machine guns at the battle of Messines had brought him great renown. On January 15 and 16 he lectured to all the officers of the division on the subject of "Machine-Gun Tactics," and so extraordi-

narily interesting and valuable was the information given that he was induced by General Bell to prolong his stay and to deliver an address on the subject of "Discipline and Training" to all the officers and noncommissioned officers of the command on January 19. Discipline he defined as "the instant and willing obedience to all orders," and he laid the utmost emphasis upon the necessity of absolute discipline on the part of every soldier and the "duty of efficiency" obligatory upon every officer. His remarks produced so profound an impression that they were subsequently published in a small pamphlet which was distributed to every officer and man in the division.

On December 3, 1917, The Adjutant General of the Army had given notification that 3,500 drafted white men were to be sent "immediately" to the 33rd Division, but during the ensuing six weeks nothing further was heard about them. This long delay excited the interest of the state officials of Illinois, and on January 21 Brigadier General Frank S. Dickson, the adjutant general of Illinois, telegraphed to inquire the number of men needed to fill the division to maximum strength. In accordance with his request the following answer was sent him that same day by Major H. C. Castor, the assistant division adjutant:

Retel this date. There are today nine naught two officers and twenty-three thousand two hundred nineteen enlisted men in Division but enlisted strength included eleven hundred and sixty-four so-called enemy aliens who cannot go to France under present orders and about eight hundred men who will probably be discharged on certificates of disability or orders from Local Boards et cetera which makes effective force about twenty-one thousand, two fifty-five and leaves a shortage of forty-eight eighty-four to fill Division to full strength period. If six hundred and five enemy aliens who have taken oath to fight for United States anywhere be taken,

men needed would be four thousand, two hundred seventy-nine.⁴⁷

On January 24, Major General John F. Morrison, the director of training, spent the day at Camp Logan, making thorough inspections and, as did Colonel Applin, made commendatory remarks on the condition of the troops. The week ending January 26⁴⁸ was notable for the success in the "insurance drive," as a result of which the Division Commander was enabled to report that "every officer on duty with the 33rd Division has taken out \$10,000 insurance."⁴⁹

Frequent allusion has been made to the impossibility of getting rid of the alien enemies in the ranks inasmuch as no definite policy respecting their disposition had been formulated in Washington.⁵⁰ On January 27, however, there came an official announcement to the effect that subjects of hostile countries who were not desirous of serving in the army were to be discharged at once, but that an agent of the Department of Justice would have to be consulted in the case of each alien enemy whose internment was deemed advisable. The partial solution of this question, which had been a fruitful source of annoyance for months, cleared the way for the complements of men required to overcome the existing shortage.⁵¹ The Division Commander acted instantly and sent the following characteristic telegram that afternoon:

THE ADJUTANT GENERAL OF THE ARMY,
Washington, D. C.

About forty-three hundred recruits are needed for this Division and I urgently request that they be sent here at once period While I was in France Commanding General emphasized the absolute necessity of sending no troops which were not thoroughly disciplined and equipped period I do not desire to be advanced on priority list comma that is matter for War Department to determine itself comma but I should like to have two or three months in which to train men sent to raise Division to full strength period Any soldier knows that

to fill up well disciplined Division with four thousand green men necessarily decreases the efficiency greatly and I am endeavoring to avoid impairing efficiency seriously by having recruits unloaded wholesale on Division on eve of its departure overseas period Am certain that General Morrison Director of Training believes in filling up immediately all Divisions intended for France period If this is doubted comma request that you consult him by telegraph period I invite attention to fact that there are plenty of Illinois men in northern camps where they are virtually hibernating and cannot train whereas not a day has been lost in this camp period I desire to command a fighting comma or even an Assault Division but not a Replacement Division period There are plenty of others not so advanced in training as this Division which could be selected for that rôle period I desire when we reach France to be a help comma not a hindrance as I understand is the case with some other organizations already sent period The main object of this request is to render effective service comma to take advantage of the opportunities for training which are better in this camp than in almost any other in the United States or France and moreover should like to have a sporting chance when I get to France.

BELL.

Apart from the telegraphic instructions bearing on minor matters which poured into Division Headquarters in a steady stream, the first week of February, 1918, was noteworthy for five communications of major importance. The first announced that forty-one colonels and lieutenant colonels of field artillery, including those from the 33rd Division, would be sent on February 9 from the Brigade and Field Officers' School at San Antonio to the School of Fire at Fort Sill, Oklahoma. The second directed that the 33rd Division be made ready at the earliest possible moment for duty abroad and that notification be given when it was equipped and in readiness. The third ordered that a regiment of infantry be sent to Galveston, Texas, to Major General Ruckman, commanding the Southern Department; the fourth prescribed a report

on the *matériel*, competent instructors, and needs of the artillery brigade required to secure efficiency in the minimum time; and the fifth announced that all enlisted men sent abroad must be fully equipped.

Early in the second week in February, there was received a lengthy telegram from The Adjutant General of the Army, which explained the new system of assigning a number to every soldier and allotted to the 33rd Division those from 1,375,000 to 1,410,000. This numbering was accomplished in a remarkably short time but the labor involved can be better imagined than described.⁵² On February 10 a communication was received emanating from the office of The Adjutant General of the Army on February 6, and announcing that the organization of the 58th Field Artillery Brigade would be "that prescribed for the Sixth division of each corps, known in the organization project as the base and training division." This was tantamount to a declaration that the 33rd Division had been designated as a replacement division, and was followed next day by a copy of this same communication bearing a first indorsement, dated February 7, 1918, and addressed "To the Commanding Generals of all Regular, National Guard and National Army Divisions in the United States, for their information." This drew from General Bell a very vigorous protest against the judging of the division in February by conditions set forth in reports made by inspectors general in November and December, and against being "branded to the entire Army in the United States as inefficient" without an opportunity to be heard and without proper investigation by War Department inspectors.⁵³

The close of the second week in February, 1918, found Camp Logan at the top of the list of camps in the matter of war risk insurance, with a total of \$316,000,500.⁵⁴ Unusual efforts had been put forth for weeks, the officers and men had

been appealed to from every conceivable angle—family, business, personal, medical, logical, sentimental, and otherwise—and the results speak for themselves.

On February 18,⁵⁵ a report from Major J. M. Willis, commanding the base hospital at Camp Logan, announced that 2,189 men had been discharged from the 33rd Division on surgeon's certificate of disability.⁵⁶ At five o'clock that afternoon all officers of the division, other than those of infantry and the machine gun battalions, assembled and were addressed by General Bell. After reading a letter from an American general commending the division and telling them of the flattering comments made by Colonel Applin and Major Thenier of the British and French Military Missions, he declared that a marked slackening in the work had become apparent. This state of affairs, he announced, must be overcome; the 33rd must be made one of the best divisions; he wanted the officers to do their part; and those who were not willing to do their utmost he advised to hand in their resignations and to go to their homes.⁵⁷

More than eleven weeks had elapsed since anything had been heard of the 3,500 recruits promised on December 3, 1917,⁵⁸ but at 9:08 P.M. on February 21, 1918,⁵⁹ a telegram was received from The Adjutant General of the Army respecting the existing shortage. Twelve minutes later the following response was en route:

Retel today relative to number of men required to fill this Division to authorized strength period Actual vacancies now existing five thousand one hundred and twenty-four comma but owing to large number of prospective vacancies about six thousand men should be sent to this Division.

BELL.⁶⁰

The last day of February, 1918, was marked by the first of a series of general inspections of the entire division which

took place at varying intervals during two months. This initial inspection revealed a marked improvement in the troops but, at the same time, disclosed a number of defects, and stringent orders were given by General Bell for their immediate correction. The month of February was characterized by a gratifying progress in the appearance, discipline, training, and general efficiency of the division. The work of former months was accelerated to a noticeable degree, and the response on the part of officers and men was distinctly encouraging. The stage in which the training could be intensive in the fullest sense of the word had at last been reached, and the various schools were worked at full blast. The indolent and the shirker, of whatever rank, were dealt with in a summary fashion, and the weeding out of incompetents continued unabated. Every effort was made to develop both practical skill and initiative, and, to that end, particularly intensive training was given in gallery and target practice⁶¹ and in bayonet work. The infantry was given tours of duty in a system of trenches and was subjected to gas attacks arranged by the British and French instructors to simulate as closely as possible actual battle conditions on the Allied western front. Not one whit behind the infantry was the artillery in its training; practice was now begun in the firing of live shells, shrapnel, and barrages.⁶²

Aside from the usual routine, the first week of March, 1918, was noteworthy chiefly for the arrival of Brigadier General Paul A. Wolf, who reported for duty and assumed command of the 66th Infantry Brigade, and for the visit of Representative (later Senator) Medill McCormick of Illinois. Instructions were received on March 4 to send to Washington all general officers, including the Division Commander, who had not been physically examined. Three days later Major General Ruckman, commanding the Southern Department, re-

quested that a battalion be placed at the disposal of the Commanding Officer of the 57th Infantry, so as to comply with a direct order from the Secretary of War respecting certain guards, but fortunately subsequent arrangements obviated the necessity for this measure.⁶³

The ensuing week of March was characterized by a few occurrences deserving of notice, the principal one of which related to the shortage in men which still existed, notwithstanding the promise of 3,500 made on December 3, 1917.

The following letter was sent to Washington:

HEADQUARTERS, 33RD DIVISION, FLH-hel-bf.
CAMP LOGAN, HOUSTON, TEXAS.

March 9th, 1918.

From:— COMMANDING GENERAL, 33rd Division.
To:— CHIEF OF STAFF, U. S. Army, Washington, D. C.
Subject:— Recruits needed by the 33rd Division.

1. There are herewith attached and marked "Inclosure No. 1" copies of telegrams and other communications sent to the War Department, covering a period from December 11, 1917—almost immediately after my return from France—to February 22, 1918, regarding the number of recruits needed by this Division to expand it to its maximum authorized strength.

2. While in France, the Commanding General, A. E. F., personally declared to me that no divisions should be sent overseas unless they were thoroughly disciplined and equipped, and the attached correspondence will demonstrate that I have been, and am still doing, my utmost to conform to his wishes. I know no royal road to efficiency except through discipline and training. It must be obvious that any division, no matter how efficient, is necessarily greatly weakened by the infusion of raw recruits on the eve of taking the field. For that reason I have made every conceivable endeavor to have the five thousand men needed by this division sent here at once in order that they may be at least partially trained before our departure overseas. The Chief of Staff ought to know personally the present needs of this division with reference to recruits. If then he is in accord with the policy of delaying

the assignment of recruits until the eve of the departure of the division, I will do my utmost to carry out his wishes. If, on the other hand, such is not his desire, I recommend, in the strongest possible terms, that the recruits needed by this division be sent to it immediately. Twenty-eight recruits for the 370th Infantry passed that regiment en route and arrived here the day after its departure. Such things do not create efficiency.

3. It is requested that this communication be referred to the Chief of Staff himself and not to a subordinate. Having been a Staff officer I know only too well how important communications frequently never reach the officer to whom they are addressed.

GEORGE BELL, JR.,
Major General, N. A.

On March 11 the Division Signal Officer, Major Karl Truesdell, was relieved and ordered to Hoboken "prepared for extended field service" abroad. On the following day, after a thorough inspection of the 132nd Infantry the Regular colonel then in command of that regiment was relieved and was subsequently detached from the division. At adjutant's call that day official announcement was made of the new policy forbidding all commissioned officers of the 33rd Division to leave camp on the nights of Monday, Tuesday, Thursday, and Friday of each week. Two hours of study or recitation were prescribed for those nights and, in addition, study or a tactical walk each Wednesday from 1:30 to 5:30 P.M.⁶⁴

March 19⁶⁵ was notable for the visit of Brigadier General W. A. White, Royal Army, who was in charge of recruiting for the British in the United States and Canada, and who delivered an address that evening in Houston. A Division School of Operations was established, with sessions on the evenings of Tuesday and Thursday of each week, for the purpose of familiarizing the principal officers of the command with the fundamentals of organization, staff work, billeting, and supply.⁶⁶ By far the most important event of that day

was the receipt of a telegram from Major General Thomas H. Barry, commanding the 86th Division at Camp Grant, Rockford, Illinois, announcing that orders from the War Department directed that 2,700 men be transferred to the 33rd Division within the next eight days, and asking whether they could be received. An affirmative response was immediately telegraphed, and preparations were begun to care for this increment which had been expected for more than three months.⁶⁷

On March 22,⁶⁸ instructions were received from The Adjutant General of the Army to report at once the shortage of men in each arm of the service in the division, specifying the needs of each regiment of artillery and infantry as well as those of the other units. The Division Commander requested authorization to establish a detention camp for the new recruits but was informed two days later that such a camp was not deemed necessary, since the drafted men who would be sent would have had more than a fortnight's service in their own depot brigade or division.⁶⁹ In the meantime, the receipt of copies of the instructions sent to the Commanding Generals of Camps Grant, Dodge, and Taylor afforded the information that 2,700 drafted men would be received from the 86th Division, 2,300 from the 88th Division, and 1,000 from the 84th Division.⁷⁰

On the afternoon of March 26 the officers of the division were hastily assembled and given another straightforward talk by General Bell, who laid the utmost stress upon the necessity of subordinating all other matters to that of getting the troops into fighting condition. The existing defects, he declared, lay within the power of the officers to rectify, and the necessity for the strictest discipline was again emphasized. This meeting was supplemented by General Order No. 48, issued next day, subjecting officers and men to identical restric-

tions in respect to leaving camp at night. All soldiers were required to remain in camp on the nights of Monday, Tuesday, Thursday, and Friday, for the purpose of study. In order to overcome the existing deficiencies, night schools were established and the hours of drill were increased from seven to eight a day, divided equally between the morning and afternoon.⁷¹

Apart from the "speeding-up" of the work of the officers and men of the division, the last ten days of March, 1918,⁷² were notable chiefly for the visits of Major Thenier of the French Military Mission, Major Ragnald Hvoslef, the first military attaché from Norway to the United States, and the notification that the 108th Engineers and the 108th Engineer Train would be sent to France as soon as they were in readiness and the necessary vessels were available.

The opening week of April, 1918, was characterized by several events of more than ordinary importance. On April 2 came a notification from the Commanding General of the 86th Division that 891 enlisted men had left Camp Grant that day for Camp Logan and that they would be followed by 900 men next day and a like number on April 4. Final disposition of the alien-born in the ranks was still impossible since no definite policy respecting them had yet been announced from Washington. A few days previously a ruling had been received from The Adjutant General of the Army to the effect that officers born in enemy countries could be utilized overseas provided their loyalty to the United States was beyond question. The Division Commander thereupon inquired by telegraph whether a similar ruling would be applicable to soldiers who, although born in hostile countries, were thoroughly loyal and who had made a sworn statement that they would "serve in the United States Army anywhere and against any enemy whatsoever." The response, which settled finally this

problem that had been the source of such vexation for months, was to the effect that enlisted men born in enemy countries might be sent overseas provided they had been completely naturalized, whereas those who had not become wholly naturalized were not to be allowed to serve in Europe, irrespective of their wishes.⁷³

On April 4, some of the officers who had spent more than three months at the Brigade and Field Officers' School at San Antonio, Texas, returned to the division, and Colonel John J. Garrity was transferred from the command of the 132nd Infantry to that of the 130th Infantry, replacing Colonel Frank S. Wood, relieved.⁷⁴ On April 5 occurred the first review of the entire 33rd Division which was held at the manoeuvre grounds four miles north of Camp Logan. Beginning at 9:45 A. M., three hours were required for the troops to pass in front of General Bell and his Staff and, although certain defects were noticeable, the troops and animals showed a marked improvement since the various brigade and regimental reviews which had been held frequently in the preceding weeks.⁷⁵ That same day General Order No. 52 was issued, embodying for the information and guidance of all concerned, the numerous regulations which would govern the transfer of the division to the port of embarkation. April 5 marked the arrival of the first increment of drafted men destined to fill the division to its maximum strength. The following table enumerates those received during the course of the month:⁷⁶

DATE OF ARRIVAL	NUMBER OF MEN	FROM
April 5.....	892	86th Division, Camp Grant, Rockford, Illinois
April 6.....	891	86th Division, Camp Grant
April 7.....	814	86th Division, Camp Grant
April 8.....	1,150	88th Division, Camp Dodge, Des Moines, Iowa
April 8.....	500	84th Division, Camp Taylor, Louisville, Kentucky
April 9.....	1,148	88th Division, Camp Dodge
April 10.....	500	84th Division, Camp Taylor
April 23.....	100	86th Division, Camp Grant
April 25.....	150	Base Hospital, 88th Division, Camp Dodge
April 29.....	1,000	Depot Brigade, 86th Division, Camp Grant
TOTAL.....	7,145	

As these successive detachments reached Camp Logan, they were formed into two new organizations created for the express purpose of putting them into the best possible condition, physically and otherwise, before distributing them throughout the division, thus avoiding all unnecessary transfers subsequently. The first 3,000 recruits were incorporated into the "First Provisional Regiment" under the command of Major H. C. Ridgway, and the remaining 4,145 into the "Second Provisional Regiment" under Captain William H. Simpson, General Bell's senior aide-de-camp. They were subjected to a searching physical examination, given intensive training each day, their service records were put into perfect order, and, after a thorough examination of their qualification cards, supplemented by personal investigation, the men themselves were classified and assigned, during the latter part of April, to the various units according to the needs of each organization.

On April 6, with the object of stimulating interest in the Third Liberty Loan, the 66th Infantry Brigade, the 122nd Field Artillery, and Ambulance Company No. 131 paraded in Houston and were reviewed from the balcony of the Rice Hotel by the Division Commander.

Apart from minor matters—many of them more or less routine in their nature—training of the most intensive sort, and the arrival of five increments of recruits enumerated in the table given above, the second week of April, 1918, was noteworthy chiefly for the exchange of telegrams between The Adjutant General of the Army and the Division Commander on the subject of the shortage still unfilled in the division, the former laying particular emphasis upon the conservation of the enlisted personnel and the elimination of such men only as were manifestly unsuited for foreign service. General Bell reported that the 108th Engineers and the 108th Engineer Train were in readiness for over-sea service, but that certain minor shortages in the way of clothing would have to be furnished them at the port of embarkation. As a matter of fact, the instructions received from several sources relative to the supply of clothing for foreign service were so contradictory that information was requested as to which system was to be followed.⁷⁷

During the third week in April, General Bell reported to The Adjutant General of the Army that, inclusive of the 103 men still expected from Camp Grant, 763 recruits were needed to fill the vacancies caused by the transfer of the alien enemies out of the division. Eighty enlisted men who had failed to qualify for commissions at the training camp at Leon Springs, Texas, returned to the division as did some of the officers who had attended the Brigade and Field Officers' School at San Antonio, where six from the 33rd Division were unsuccessful in passing the final examination. Three telegrams of major importance were received from The Adjutant General of the Army: the first ordered the 108th Engineers and 108th Engineer Train to be sent to Hoboken, leaving on April 23 for Camp Merritt, New Jersey; the second directed that all alien enemies in the division who had not completed

their naturalization be transferred to the 44th Infantry at Camp Lewis, American Lake, Washington; while the third greatly reduced the number of enlisted men in the School Detail of officers and men destined to precede the division overseas for special training, and prescribed that this party be made ready to sail early in June.

The fourth week in April, 1918, opened with the return from the Officers' Training Camp at Leon Springs of 156 men of the 33rd Division who had successfully completed the course and had thus become eligible for commissions.⁷⁸ On April 22 Appendix No. 1 to General Order No. 52⁷⁹ was issued in printed form with supplementary information bearing upon the movement of the division to the port of embarkation, and about noon on the following day, to the envy of their fellow soldiers, the 108th Engineers, under Colonel Henry A. Allen, and the 108th Engineer Train marched out of Camp Logan and entrained for Camp Merritt, en route overseas. The significance of the departure of these two units, thus forming the vanguard of the division, was fully appreciated and the preparations for the expected movement, which had been systematically made for many weeks, were thereby given an additional impetus. That the signs had been correctly interpreted was attested by the fact that before the end of the week orders were received to send off the Division Headquarters, Headquarters Troop, the 122nd Machine Gun Battalion, the entire 65th Infantry Brigade, and four camp infirmaries, so as to reach Camp Upton, Long Island, as soon as possible after midday on May 2. Upon receipt of these instructions a number of telegrams were dispatched, recalling all officers on leave or absent for any reason except by orders from higher authority.⁸⁰

On the morning of April 25, 704 alien enemies—that is, aliens born in enemy countries and who had not completed

their naturalization—left Camp Logan under the command of Major John D. White, 124th Field Artillery, en route for Camp Lewis, Washington.⁸¹

Frequent allusion has been made to the repeated efforts of General Bell, beginning immediately after his return from France at the end of November, 1917, to have all vacancies filled in the enlisted personnel of the division and the necessary recruits sent promptly in order that they might be given two or three months' training before the command started overseas.⁸² As late as April 22, 1918, and within a few days after the receipt of orders for the departure of the Division Headquarters, the last increment of recruits had not arrived from Camp Grant. In response to a telegram received that day from the Commanding General of the 86th Division, announcing that he had been ordered by the War Department to transfer 1,000 men to the 33rd Division, General Bell telegraphed him that he "would like to have the one thousand soldiers mentioned as soon as possible," and two days later he again telegraphed the Commander of the 86th Division: "How soon can you send one thousand men? Should like them as quickly as possible. Please answer."⁸³ As shown in the table on page 27, the entire 7,145 recruits arrived within the month of April and the final increment did not arrive until April 29. Yet General Bell had urgently recommended on January 27, 1918, that the efficiency of the division be not seriously impaired "by having recruits unloaded wholesale on Division on eve of its departure overseas."⁸⁴

Strenuous indeed were the closing days of April, 1918, as is invariably the case during the hours immediately preceding a long journey by any considerable body of troops.⁸⁵ Aside from the preparations which of necessity cannot be made until the last moment, the arrival of such a large number of recruits at the eleventh hour entailed Herculean labor to assign them

to the various units according to the needs of the organizations and the qualifications of the men themselves. By dint of extraordinary efforts, the task was successfully accomplished⁸⁶ and, on April 30, Confidential General Order No. 37 was issued for the departure of the leading units of the division beginning on May 1. On the evening of April 30, the Division Commander, accompanied by his two Aides-de-Camp, Captains William H. Simpson and Frank Baackes, and by the Division Adjutant, Major Huidekoper, left Houston for Washington, where they spent three days on business pertaining to the division,⁸⁷ and reached Camp Upton, Yaphank, Long Island, about noon on May 6, in advance of all troops except the Headquarters Detachment and the Headquarters Troop, and the officers of the Division Staff.

Brigadier General Todd, of the 58th Field Artillery Brigade, who had been left in command at Camp Logan, had meanwhile received orders from The Adjutant General of the Army to send to Camp Upton the remaining units of the division and to ship to Hoboken the advanced detachment of 314 officers and men destined for training overseas. This operation was pushed as rapidly as possible in view of conflicting orders and the failure of the railway officials to furnish the Pullman cars allotted to three sections of the trains scheduled to leave Camp Logan on May 8.⁸⁸ As a matter of fact, the movement of the division from Texas to Camp Upton⁸⁹ and Camp Merritt⁹⁰ was effected with remarkable dispatch considering the distance and the number of troops and equipment to be moved.

Meanwhile, the Division Commander and his Staff were busily occupied at Camp Upton with the multiplicity of details attendant upon any movement of troops overseas. The various detachments arrived in rapid succession after May 6, but their stay was comparatively brief and on May 8 the exodus

of the 33rd Division began with the departure for the port of embarkation at Hoboken, New Jersey, of the advance party composed of fifteen officers and fifteen men under Major Frank W. Barber, and another party under Brigadier General Hill, followed on May 9⁹¹ by the 122nd Machine Gun Battalion and on May 10 by the Headquarters of the 65th Infantry Brigade and the major portion of the 129th Infantry.⁹² There were no departures of troops during the week-end of May 11 to May 13, and the preceding week was notable for three visits paid to the "Prairie Division" by the Honorable Frank O. Lowden, governor of Illinois, on May 6, 9, and 13. At 1:30 P. M. on Thursday, May 9, he made a very happy and stirring address to the troops of the 33rd Division then at Camp Upton, bidding them Godspeed and assuring them of the pride and deep interest of the people of Illinois in their career overseas. On Monday, May 13, at the same hour, he delivered a similar speech to the troops which had arrived in the meantime.⁹³

At four o'clock that afternoon, the Division Commander, accompanied by his two Aides-de-Camp, left for New York, and early next morning the outward movement of troops to Hoboken was resumed.⁹⁴ In the case of some of the last units, their stay at Camp Upton was limited to twenty-four hours and the preparation of the voluminous passenger lists and the numerous other papers required at the port of embarkation, coupled with the ordinary work connected with such a rapid movement, demanded the most strenuous efforts on the part of officers and men alike. The results, however, fully justified the many arduous hours spent in acquiring the habit of accuracy in the compilation of records,⁹⁵ as well as in other military matters.

The first organizations of the 33rd Division to sail were the 108th Engineers and the 108th Engineer Train, which had

left Camp Logan on April 23 and had spent a few days at Camp Merritt, New Jersey. They left Hoboken on May 8 and reached Brest on May 18. The troops which passed through Camp Upton followed on May 10, 16, and 22, the Division Commander and his Staff sailing on May 16. The 58th Field Artillery Brigade, which passed through Camp Merritt, came next on May 26, and the rear was brought up on June 4 by its commander and by the 108th Sanitary Train.⁹⁶ In nearly every instance, the transports were dispatched in convoys composed of two or more ships, and all transports were met, when about thirty-six hours from Brest, by five or more American destroyers and were escorted into port. Notwithstanding the absence of lights at night, the crowding of the ships,⁹⁷ which was imperative in view of the urgent needs of the Allies for men, and certain other unavoidable discomforts, the troops suffered no serious hardships. The strictest discipline was maintained, particular attention being paid to the health and cleanliness of the command, and boat drills took place at least once daily.⁹⁸ The voyages were devoid of important episode, with one exception: the *Leviathan*, when within sight of the lighthouse outside of Brest, faced the simultaneous attack of several German submarines. Fortunately it escaped unscathed, and it was asserted by credible eyewitnesses that two of the submarines were sunk by gunfire and that the American destroyers captured a third and towed it, crew and all, into the harbor of Brest.⁹⁹

II. TRAINING AND OPERATIONS WITH THE BRITISH ARMY

The first increment of the 33rd Division to reach France was made up of the 108th Engineers, under Colonel Henry A. Allen, and the 108th Engineer Train, which landed at Brest on May 18, 1918. They were followed five days later by a convoy with part of the 65th Infantry Brigade, under Brigadier General Henry R. Hill, and the 122nd Machine Gun Battalion. On May 24¹ arrived a convoy composed of the *Mount Vernon* and *Agamemnon*, bearing the Division Commander, his Staff, part of the 66th Infantry Brigade, under Brigadier General Paul A. Wolf, two regiments of infantry and certain other units; six days later the remainder of the infantry, the 108th Train Headquarters and Military Police, and the 108th Supply Train landed at Brest.

Upon the arrival of General Bell at Brest no information existed at the headquarters of the commanding general of the port of disembarkation as to the first station of the 33rd Division in France. That evening, however, orders were received directing the Division Headquarters to proceed "to Base Section No. 4" (i. e., Havre),² but this destination was subsequently changed to Rouen. In compliance with these orders, the Division Commander, accompanied by his Staff and by the greater part of the Headquarters Detachment, left Brest on May 25 at 3:20 P.M.; but, upon reaching Paris at 4:30 A.M. on the following day, a British staff officer appeared at the Gare Montparnasse with orders changing the destination to Oisemont. The journey was altered accordingly and Oisemont was reached that same evening. On the

next day a new destination was given and the Division Headquarters were established that afternoon (May 27) at Huppy, about five miles south of Abbeville.³ In the "Huppy area" the Division Commander was rejoined by most of his command, the headquarters of the 66th Infantry Brigade being located at Haucourt and that of the 108th Engineers at Tailly.⁴ It was not until June 2 that the 65th Infantry Brigade reached Béhen,⁵ having been delayed en route by an epidemic of scarlet fever. At this time the town of Abbeville was so severely bombed almost every night by enemy aeroplanes that slow evacuation was begun. The German preparation for their anticipated drive to the sea via Amiens and Abbeville was apparently well under way.

The first casualty in the 33rd Division occurred on the night of May 26, when a train containing the headquarters of the 66th Infantry Brigade, the headquarters troop, and a part of the headquarters detachment, was pursued and bombed by German aeroplanes near Rouen; and Sergeant Kenna of the headquarters troop was slightly wounded.⁶

Upon arrival in the Huppy area the 33rd Division became part of the IIInd American Army Corps and, by virtue of its location, passed under the jurisdiction of the Fourth British Army (General Sir Henry Rawlinson). A course of intensive training was immediately inaugurated,⁷ but it was not until June 26 that the whole division less the artillery brigade was once more united.⁸

Decoration Day, May 30, was memorable for the visit paid to the Division Commander at the Chateau Carnett, at Huppy, by Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig, accompanied by his Aide-de-Camp and by Major Robert Bacon, former ambassador to France and secretary of state. The British Commander-in-Chief was received with full honors.⁹

On June 9, 1918, the 33rd Division moved in two

marches to the Eu area, where it succeeded the 35th American Division¹⁰ (Major General William M. Wright), which had then started for the Toul sector. There was some difficulty in disposing of the American equipment and in getting for the troops the necessary British equipment, due to the decided shortage, but eventually this matter was adjusted to the satisfaction of all concerned.¹¹ By June 12, the "Program of Training (first phase)" prescribed by General Headquarters, American Expeditionary Forces, was in full operation.¹² This training, effected with the assistance and advice of the 30th British Division under Major General Williams, was of the most intensive sort, comprising problems ranging from the battalion to the division, and proved extremely beneficial.¹³ A number of officers and enlisted men were also ordered away to various schools, some in France, others in England;¹⁴ indeed, with the exception of the Chief of Staff, almost all the heads of the departments of the Division Staff were sent to school and were replaced by substitutes.¹⁵

In compliance with orders from the XIXth Corps, British Expeditionary Forces, the 108th Engineers were sent forward on June 13, 1918, to the Bois de Querrieu to work, under the supervision of the Chief Engineer of the Fourth British Army, on the intrenchments of the "Army Line" to Poulainville in the vicinity of Amiens.¹⁶ At this point the Germans were fully expected to make a mighty effort to break through in their endeavor to reach the English Channel.

On June 20-21,¹⁷ pursuant to orders from the IIInd Corps, American Expeditionary Forces, and the XIXth Corps, British Expeditionary Forces, the 33rd Division moved by bus and marching to the Long, IIIrd Corps, and Martainneville areas, the Division Headquarters being established at Molliens-au-Bois on the afternoon of June 21.¹⁸

Two days later the 66th Infantry Brigade and the 122nd

Machine Gun Battalion occupied the Vaden line for twenty-four hours as a test, but, on June 26,¹⁹ this battalion, together with the machine gun companies of the 131st and 132nd Infantry, was transferred to the Bois de Querrieu for duty with the Australian Corps, and the 66th Brigade began the construction and wiring of the "Daily Mail Line" of intrenchments.²⁰ On June 29 and 30,²¹ certain companies were ordered to commence training under the Australian Corps and certain machine gun units were sent to Pont Remy for target practice. On July 2, the 66th Infantry Brigade held a tactical exercise on the Baisieux-Warloy line and that afternoon the Commander-in-Chief of the American Expeditionary Forces, General John J. Pershing, paid a visit to the Division Commander²² and made a short speech to the officers of the Division Staff. During the period from June 13 to July 4 a number of officers and men were sent away to various schools.²³ The training was continued in a decidedly intensive fashion and every effort was exerted to bring the command up to the highest standard of military efficiency.²⁴

In the meantime plans had been initiated by the British for an operation which was destined to redound greatly to the credit of the 33rd Division and, through it, to the American army at large. General Sir Henry Rawlinson, commanding the Fourth British Army, had asked permission of the Commanding General of the IIInd American Corps to utilize certain units of the 33rd Division in an attack which he contemplated making, and his request was granted.²⁵ After being filled up to maximum strength, two companies (C and E, 131st Infantry) were accordingly sent to report to the general commanding the 11th Australian Brigade, and two companies (A and G, 132nd Infantry) to the commander of the 4th Australian Brigade, both of the Australian Corps under Lieutenant General Sir John Monash. Reaching their desti-

nations on the night of June 29–30, these four companies were given a rehearsal with the tanks on June 30 and July 1. On July 2 they were taken into the front trenches and, after a reconnaissance, moved to their proper sectors; Companies C and E, 131st Infantry, were assigned to the 42nd and 43rd Battalions (11th Australian Brigade) and Companies A and G, 132nd Infantry, to the 13th and 15th Battalions (4th Australian Brigade). One platoon was distributed to each of the four companies of these battalions²⁶ and, following the procedure adopted by the Australians, about forty men were taken out of each company, in order to form a nucleus for a new organization in case the remainder of the company were wiped out. On June 30, six companies of the 131st Infantry, constituting the rest of the 1st and 2nd Battalions of that regiment were sent under their majors to the 4th and 11th Australian Brigades respectively, but were suddenly withdrawn on the evening of July 2 as a result of a request from General Read to General Sir Henry Rawlinson. On the afternoon of July 3, the latter received instructions from the British Commander-in-Chief to withdraw all American troops from this attack but, inasmuch as the four companies of the 131st and 132nd Infantry were already in position, he replied that it was impossible to withdraw them without abandoning the entire operation.²⁷

The operation proposed had for its object the capture of the ground a few miles east of Amiens and about a mile south of the Somme, on which were situated the town of Hamel, the Bois de Hamel, and the Bois de Vaire south of it, a formidable position, which commanded the Australian trenches in this sector. The enemy's system, some seven hundred yards from the British lines near the Somme, ran southwest through the Notamel Wood and the high ground to a salient known as the "Pear Trench," about two hundred and

fifty yards from the British lines, and thence along the western edge of the Vaire Wood. In the rear of this system the enemy was known to have strong garrisons in deep dugouts at Hamel.²⁸

July 4 was the date selected for the attack which was to be made by the 4th Australian Division and by the Americans. The general plan was for the 4th Australian Brigade to capture the Vaire and Hamel Woods and to consolidate on the spur east of them, while the 6th Brigade on the right and the 11th Brigade²⁹ on the left were to carry and to consolidate the positions on either flank as far as the objective designated.³⁰ Beginning on the north the 42nd Battalion was formed on the left and the 43rd on the right, followed by the 44th, while the 41st constituted the reserve of the 11th Australian Brigade, its sphere of action being bounded on the right by a line south of Hamel. On its right was the 4th Australian Brigade, with the 15th, 16th, and 13th Battalions in the front line and the 14th in reserve. The mission of the 15th Battalion was to attack north of the Hamel and Vaire Woods, which were to be dealt with by the 16th, while the 13th attacked south of the Vaire Wood. Its right was covered by the 6th Australian Brigade. The attack was to be made in three waves, supported by a large number of tanks and protected by a lifting barrage. This was to be reënforced by trench mortars and machine guns, while 161 guns of the Australian Corps devoted themselves to counterbattery work, and the IIIrd Corps on the north and the French Corps on the south coöperated with their heavy artillery.³¹

At 3:10 A.M. on July 4, the harassing fire, which had been in operation for eight minutes, changed to a barrage and lifted for one hundred yards with the launching of the attack. On the extreme left the 42nd Battalion met with slight resistance until it reached the first objective, about

one thousand yards from the jumping-off line. South of it the 43rd Battalion, although subjected to some machine-gun fire, successfully attained the western edge of Hamel, where considerable opposition was encountered from the enemy in dug-outs, but these were quickly mopped up. On its right the 6th Brigade found the German wire only partially destroyed, encountered stiffer resistance and heavier machine-gun fire, and suffered a number of casualties from defective barrage.³² The enemy in the Pear Trench fought with grim resolution against the 15th Battalion and south of it the Vaire Trench temporarily arrested the advance of the 16th Battalion, both being additionally subjected to a heavy enfilade fire of machine guns. Spirited rushes, coupled with vigorous use of the bayonet and bombs, resulted in the capture of these two positions and in the surrender of a large number of Germans. The troops then pushed on to the first objective, where the entire attacking force made a halt of ten minutes under cover of a heavy smoke screen, the lines reformed, the tanks overtook the infantry and, in the sector of the 11th Brigade, the 44th Battalion leapfrogged into position ahead of the 43rd.

At 4:10 A. M. the advance was resumed but no determined resistance was offered by the enemy, although some casualties were suffered until the machine guns at Hamel and in the Hamel Wood were put out of action. At 5 A. M. the final objective was reached and at this point the enemy, in large numbers and from strong positions, made a determined stand. Assisted by the tanks, assaults were promptly launched against him, the strong points crushed, and his trenches thoroughly mopped up. The infantry then began to dig in, completing this operation about 7 A.M. but not without loss, inasmuch as the cessation of the Australian barrage in the rear of his trenches at 5:30 A. M. was the signal for the resumption of activity on the part of snipers, machine guns,

and artillery, which maintained a lively fire throughout the day. The morning was devoted to consolidating the positions gained and during the afternoon some of the enemy's posts were rushed. At dusk the Germans retaliated by attacking the 44th Battalion, but a counterattack, in which Company G, 132nd Infantry, participated, repulsed him with a loss of about fifty prisoners.³³

The aeroplanes on both sides were extremely active during the main engagement, dropping bombs and using machine guns against the positions of their adversaries. The Australian aeroplanes also brought up ammunition and wire, dropping them by means of parachutes. Upon the cessation of the protective barrage at 5:30 A. M., the Australian aeroplanes flew over in large formations and retained command of the air until noon, when thirty-five enemy planes appeared to dispute their supremacy. Two of the Australian aircraft were downed and that night the Germans bombed the Allied positions unmercifully.³⁴

In the action at Hamel,³⁵ three Australian brigades and one thousand American troops were employed. Every objective was attained and the capture of these strong German positions rid the Australian lines of the menace and annoyance to which they had long been subjected. Forty-one German officers and 1,431 men were made prisoners, and *matériel* was captured amounting to 171 machine guns, 26 trench mortars, and two 77-millimeter pieces. The Australian casualties were less than eight hundred,³⁶ while the American losses were confined to 24 enlisted men killed, 8 officers and 123 men wounded, and 21 men missing.³⁷

The action at Hamel, while of minor importance from a military standpoint, exercised an incalculable influence.³⁸ Amiens was generally considered at that time to be the danger spot on the entire western front. All signs indicated

that the great German drive, which was expected at almost any moment, would be aimed at England by way of Amiens and the valley of the Somme to the Channel. It has since been discovered that such was the German plan at that time. The action at Hamel took place on the Fourth of July, a date particularly full of significance to Americans. It was the first time that American troops had coöperated with troops of the British Empire in a battle of any magnitude, and it demonstrated to the British and French that in all the American troops—National Guard and National Army as well as Regulars—they possessed allies upon whom they could depend in any military operation, no matter how difficult.³⁹

That very day the Division Commander received from General Sir Henry Rawlinson the following telegram:

July 4, 1918.

33RD AMERICAN DIVISION.

I have much pleasure in forwarding the following message just received from the Commander-in-Chief, Begins: "Will you please to convey to Lt. Gen. Sir J. Monash and all ranks under his command including the tanks and the detachment of the 33rd American Division my warm congratulations on the success which attended the operation carried out this morning and on the skill and gallantry with which it was conducted.

DOUGLAS HAIG."

From General RAWLINSON.

On the following day the Commander of the Fourth British Army telegraphed:

GENERAL BELL, 33rd Illinois Division.

July 5, 1918.

Am anxious to express to you, General Bell, and to all ranks of the 33rd (Illinois) Division, my warm thanks for the gallant part taken by portions of your division in the attack at Hamel and Vaire Wood on Independence Day. I hear nothing but praise of the manner in which your units fought the enemy and my only regret is that I was not permitted to

employ a larger portion of your fine division. Perhaps later on there may be another opportunity.

General RAWLINSON.

That same day came the following letter :

AUSTRALIAN CORPS.

CORPS HEADQUARTERS,
5th July, 1918.

MY DEAR GENERAL,

I desire to take the opportunity of tendering to you, as their immediate Commander, my earnest thanks for the assistance and services of the four Companies of Infantry who participated in yesterday's brilliant operations.

The dash, gallantry and efficiency of these American Troops left nothing to be desired, and my Australian Soldiers speak in the very highest terms in praise of them. That Soldiers of the United States and of Australia should have been associated for the first time in such close co-operation on the battlefield, is an historic [event] of such significance that it will live forever in the annals of our respective Nations.

Yours very sincerely,

JOHN MONASH,
Lieut.-General,
Commanding Australian Corps.

MAJOR-GENERAL BELL,
Commdg. 33rd American Division.⁴⁰

On July 5, 1918, the 129th Infantry was reviewed by the Premier of Great Britain, the Right Honorable David Lloyd-George,⁴¹ and on the following day the companies of the 131st and 132nd Infantry were relieved in the trenches and sent back to their respective organizations.⁴² The next four weeks were comparatively devoid of notable events except for the inspection made on July 22 and 23 by the IIInd American Corps for the purpose of determining whether the 33rd Division was fit for active service.⁴³ Nevertheless, during the entire period from July 13 to August 9 there was no cessation in the intensive training given to officers and men alike, and there were constant inspections and frequent shiftings of the

various units with the object of insuring to each one the maximum amount of instruction of every sort possible under the circumstances.⁴⁴ Every organization was given at least one tour of duty in the front lines; reliefs were effected; complete systems of defense were constructed; constant target practice was made obligatory; schools of every kind were instituted or attended; and no stone was left unturned to learn everything in military matters which could be taught by the British instructors.⁴⁵

Allusion has already been made to the German drive to the English Channel⁴⁶ which was expected at any moment to take place through Amiens and the valley of the Somme. The Germans instead of striking at Amiens drove for Paris. The Allies, after stopping them, counterattacked and about the middle of August the counterattack gradually spread north toward the British positions, with the result that August 9, 1918, proved another memorable day in the history of the 33rd Division.

About fifteen miles east and slightly north of Amiens, the Somme, always tortuous in this region, makes a succession of sharp bends. North of the river and in one of these U-shaped bends lies the village of Chipilly on a ridge bearing the same name. Northwest of this village and resembling an irregular letter "G" is the Malard Wood, the base of which touches the edge of the Somme and terminates north of Chipilly. Directly north of Chipilly Ridge is Gressaire Wood, roughly forming a right angle and terminating at the road from Corbie to Bray, its axis lying in a northeastwardly direction. Chipilly Ridge and Gressaire Wood, both of which had been strongly fortified, formed a position which completely dominated the British trenches in that sector and rendered impossible the passage of the Somme or any advance in that vicinity so long as they were held by the enemy. The

position had been taken, but all attempts to hold it had proved abortive. After the attack at Hamel on July 4, the British line south of the Somme had been advanced to a point directly opposite Chipilly, but the continuous enfilade fire from that ridge had made the line well-nigh untenable and its withdrawal was consequently under consideration. The British commanders determined, however, to take the bull by the horns and to make a final effort to secure Chipilly Ridge and Gressaire Wood, which constituted the key to the entire sector.

Orders were therefore issued on August 8, 1918, placing the 131st Infantry (Colonel Joseph B. Sanborn) under the 58th British Division (Major General Frank Ramsay) in the reserve of the IIIrd British Corps and directing its movement to Heilly, where the Headquarters of the 18th British Division were located, and Franvillers. These positions were reached that same evening, but at ten o'clock instructions were received by the regimental commander to move at once to an assembly point on the Bray-Corbie road about three thousand yards south of Heilly, facing east across that road and immediately west of the Cobar Trench, in readiness to attack next morning at one o'clock. Since the troops had been marching the greater part of the night and were without supports, and as the terrain had never been reconnoitred and no provisions had been made for supplies, the general commanding the 58th British Division decided to postpone the attack in that direction. The 131st Infantry was sent forward through Vaux-sur-Somme to a position in readiness in the valleys between that town and Sailly-le-Sec. At the same time orders were dispatched to the regimental machine gun company at Franvillers to move to Vaux and there to await orders.

On the morning of August 9, 1918, the troops arrived in

the valley of the Somme in a decidedly exhausted condition, the 3rd Battalion having covered fully twenty miles. Moreover, they were without water and rations, since some of the transport had been unable to accompany them and, as a matter of fact, did not overtake them until later in the day.

The British plan contemplated an assault at 5 P.M. starting from a jumping-off line extending from a point nine hundred yards northwest of the intersection of the Bray-Corbie and Morlancourt-Chipilly roads southeast to the point where the road running northeast from Chipilly terminates at the edge of the ridge. The assault was to be made by the 10th London Battalion (175th British Brigade) on the right, the 131st Infantry in the centre and the 175th Brigade—less the 10th London Battalion but with one battalion of the 174th Brigade attached—⁴⁷on the left. At 1:30 P.M. Colonel Sanborn was informed of this plan and was ordered to reconnoitre in the direction of the Gressaire Wood, but the lieutenant colonel and the battalion commanders who were sent forward accompanied by scouts soon returned with the report that such a reconnaissance could not be effected, inasmuch as the enemy was in occupation of the Malard Wood and the region beyond it. The 131st Infantry was in march formation on the road west of Sailly-le-Sec when, at 3:30 P.M., the Commanding General of the 58th Division came in person to deliver the order of attack to the regimental commander. When it was realized, however, that the troops could not possibly reach the jumping-off line at five o'clock, the zero hour was postponed to 5:30 P. M. As not a moment was to be lost, the regimental commander, in spite of having had no rest whatsoever for twenty-four hours and notwithstanding his sixty-two years, immediately started at a run for the head of his column, set it in motion, and preceded it to the jumping-off line. Under full packs and a hot sun the troops covered

approximately four miles at a rapid gait and, upon reaching the position designated, were formed with the 1st Battalion on the right, the 2nd on the left, and the 3rd in reserve on the Sailly-Laurette-Chipilly road at the entrance to the ravine between Les Célestins and the Malard Wood.

The attack of the 131st Infantry, which was covered by a line of skirmishers, was led by Colonel Sanborn in person through the heaviest sort of enemy barrage, but it was not until it had been thoroughly launched and after he had been knocked down by the concussion of a shell that he returned to the rear, collected runners from the reserve battalion, and established his P. C. in a shell hole in the ravine mentioned above. The onslaught of the Americans was irresistible. The Germans were thrown into a panic and their retreat was so precipitate that their battalion commander abandoned in his dugout orders, maps, telephone switchboard—everything. Even the machine-gun nests were powerless to arrest the advance and, at 8 P.M., the 2nd Battalion reported that it had reached its objective. Its left flank remained uncovered for the reason that the 175th British Brigade had been unable to keep pace with it and did not get up until the following day.

On the right, however, greater resistance was encountered, and the 1st Battalion and the 10th London Battalion were held up by heavy machine-gun fire from the woods northwest of Chipilly Ridge. The commander of the latter unit reported this fact and asked for assistance, whereupon a company from the 3rd Battalion was sent forward and the enemy was driven out of the woods.

The presence of the enemy and a number of machine guns at Chipilly and on that ridge rendered further advance of that part of the line out of the question, but, after dark, a British detachment mopped up the town, capturing the German commander and his machine guns along the ridge, as well as some

three hundred prisoners. At 9:20 P. M. the commander of the 1st Battalion reported that his line extended from near the southwestern corner of Gressaire Wood east to the northern end of Chipilly Ridge and thence south along the Somme to the road leading to Chipilly, and that the troops had dug in. The 2nd Battalion was therefore left that night with both flanks unprotected but by 6 A. M. on August 10 it was joined by the 1st Battalion plus one company, and both units took position on the objective. This fact was reported to the commanding general, 58th Brigade, and the remainder of the 3rd Battalion was sent forward to reënforce the line, which later in the day assumed position along the Corbie-Bray road from the intersection of the Morlancourt-Étinehem road on the west to the "Double Telegraph Post" on the east. In spite of heavy artillery and machine-gun fire and much gas the position was held and consolidated, and at 9 P. M. the 13th Australian Brigade and one machine gun company passed through the American lines and took up positions opposite Bray-sur-Somme and the bend of the river. During the night the 131st Infantry changed front and occupied a line extending from the crossroads at the eastern edge of the woods north of the Bray-Corbie road south to the Somme and thence along the right bank to a point south of the Chipilly Ridge in touch with the troops on the left bank.

This position was held until August 14, the enemy being driven out of Étinehem and the pocket south of that village on the night of August 11-12. On August 14 orders were received to occupy a new line west of Bray-sur-Somme, and the movement was completed on the next day at 6 A.M. The 1st Battalion was placed in the front line, the 3rd in support, and the 2nd in reserve. The attack on August 9 was made without any preparation, being extemporized under dire emergency. The heights, of which Chipilly Ridge and Gres-

saire Wood formed part, completely dominated the low ground south of the Somme where the most advanced British lines were situated, while their left flank suffered under a continuous enfilade fire which was rapidly making them untenable. Possession of those heights had therefore become a necessity; hence the haste displayed. The operation of the 131st Infantry was crowned with success; the enemy was dislodged from these heights and driven out of Gressaire Wood with a loss of some seven hundred prisoners, seven 5.9 howitzers, thirteen 4.2 guns, two 10-inch guns, two 75-millimeter French pieces, six guns of various other calibres, two minenwerfers, about one hundred machine guns, more than fifty-nine rifles, an aeroplane in perfect condition, and a large amount of other *matériel*. Not only was the British objective attained, but a portion of the Corbie-Bray road beyond was seized. These results were achieved with a loss of only 385 American officers and men, but the next six days—August 11-16, inclusive—during which the 131st Infantry was subjected to incessant fire and gas, were attended by casualties to the number of 370.⁴⁸

The action at Gressaire Wood⁴⁹ is particularly notable in that it initiated the penetration of the German line which developed into the final British advance. The British commanders, with characteristic promptness, expressed their appreciation of the brilliant achievement. On August 10 Lieutenant General Sir H. K. Butler, commanding the IIIrd British Corps sent the Division Commander the following telegram:

Hearty congratulations on successful attack carried out by 131st Infantry Regiment yesterday. Added 33rd Division, 66th American Brigade, 131st Infantry Regiment.

On the same day the British Division Commander sent this letter:

THE 33RD DIVISION

HEADQUARTERS
58TH DIVISION

x.viii.xviii.

DEAR GENERAL BELL:

I wish to express to you my appreciation of the great assistance afforded to my Division by your 131 Regiment in the attack on Gressaire Wood yesterday afternoon, and my admiration for the way it carried out a very difficult manoeuvre to get into the Battle Line and for the stout way in which it overcame all resistance.

I enclose a letter of thanks which I would be glad if you would forward to the officer commanding the regiment.

Yours sincerely,

FRANK RAMSAY.

The letter in question read as follows:

HEADQUARTERS
58TH DIVISION

x.vii.xviii.

DEAR COLONEL SANBORN:

I have to thank you for the very great assistance which your regiment afforded in its attack on Gressaire Wood yesterday afternoon.

You had a very difficult task to perform and the way in which your battalions manoeuvred and took the objectives allotted to them reflects the greatest credit on all ranks.

I have to thank you personally on the way in which you led your Regiment on to its battle alignment, and which very materially assisted in the success of the operation.

Yours sincerely,

FRANK RAMSAY.⁵⁰

During the period from August 8 to 23, 1918, the 33rd Division, frequently bombed and shelled by the enemy,⁵¹ continued its very intensive training under the Program of Training prescribed by the General Headquarters of the American Expeditionary Forces.⁵² The training circulars issued in conformity therewith,⁵³ were decidedly thorough, and no effort was spared to bring the troops up to the highest possible standard of discipline and efficiency. Much attention was paid to target

practice, every unit was given a considerable period in the trenches, and a large number of officers and men were sent away to school.⁵⁴ Great stress was also laid upon the importance of taking the utmost care of all property and the admirable British system of feeding and grooming horses was put into operation. On August 15 the 132nd Infantry relieved the 12th Australian Brigade in the reserve trenches, and on the following day both the 65th and 66th Brigades had units occupying the front line positions, the latter relieving the front line and assembling in the Camon and Hamel areas on August 19.⁵⁵

This period was particularly notable for an event unique in the history of an American division. On August 12, about eleven o'clock in the morning, George V, king of England, arrived at the Headquarters of the 33rd Division, at the Chateau of Molliens-au-Bois, where he was received with full honors. Awaiting him were General Pershing, the commander-in-chief of the American Expeditionary Forces, and General Tasker H. Bliss, who had arrived the day before. On the former the King bestowed the Grand Cross of the Order of the Bath, and the latter he made a Commander of the Order of St. Michael and St. George. The King, accompanied by a group of officers, among whom were General Sir Henry Rawlinson, commanding the Fourth British Army, then proceeded to the spot near the chateau, where some three hundred men selected from every unit in the 33rd Division were drawn up in a hollow square, and decorated twelve officers and enlisted men for the gallantry which they had displayed in the action at Hamel on July 4. To some were given the Military Cross, to others the Distinguished Conduct Medal or the Military Medal, the King personally pinning the decoration on the breast of each recipient and congratulating him upon his bravery. Seven others had been singled out for the

same honor but their wounds precluded their leaving the hospital. At 11:30 A. M. the ceremony terminated and the King took his departure.⁵⁶

On August 21,⁵⁷ orders were issued for the transfer of the 33rd Division by rail to the First American Army in the Toul sector,⁵⁸ and preparations were begun accordingly, all British rifles, bayonets, Vickers, Maxim and Lewis guns being turned in and Springfield rifles being issued to the men.⁵⁹ The experience and training received under the British proved to be of incalculable value, as was realized at the time and to a still greater degree later. The severance of the cordial relations which had characterized the stay of the 33rd Division was genuinely regretted on both sides and found expression in the following letters from General Sir Henry Rawlinson, commanding the Fourth British Army, and General Godley:

HQ. FOURTH ARMY,
21st August, 1918.

33RD ILLINOIS DIVISION.

FOURTH ARMY NO. G. S. 2/13.

On the departure of the 33rd Division from the Fourth Army, I desire officially to record my admiration of the energy, keenness and soldierly qualities exhibited by all ranks during their period of training under my orders. The marked advance which has been made and the satisfactory standard of fighting efficiency that has been reached reflects high credit on all concerned, and guarantee that the Division will render brilliant service to the Allied cause wherever it may be employed as a fighting Division in face of the enemy.

My regret is that it will not have further opportunity for offensive action whilst in the Fourth British Army, but portions of the Division have already acquitted themselves most gallantly, and I desire to tender my warm thanks to those units engaged for their brilliant successes in the Hamel offensive and at Gressaire Wood.

I greatly regret the departure of the Division and offer

to General Bell and all ranks under his command the best of good fortune in the strenuous times which lie before them.

H. RAWLINSON.

General Godley's letter to General Bell was equally complimentary. It read thus:

III CORPS C. O. 1565

20th August, 1918.

MAJOR GENERAL GEORGE BELL, JR.,
Commanding 33rd American Division.

On the departure of your Division from this Corps, I write to ask you to convey to all ranks under your command our thanks and appreciation of the excellent work that the Division has done during its period of attachment to the III Corps.

The 131st Regiment of the 66th Brigade, carried out the attack on the 9th August in a manner which reflected great credit, not only on its gallantry, but on its previous training; and the work done by the whole of your Division during its periods of attachment and of holding the line has been of high order.⁶⁰

All ranks of the III British Corps wish the 33rd Division the best of luck in the future, and in watching its future victorious career will always remember with great pleasure the time which they have spent together with their American comrades in arms.

ALEX GODLEY,
Lieutenant General,
Commanding III Corps.⁶¹

The next to the last day of the stay in the British area, August 22, was notable for the visit of the Honorable Franklin D. Roosevelt, the assistant secretary of the navy, who arrived at the Headquarters of the 33rd Division at one o'clock that afternoon, accompanied by his Staff, and lunched with the Division Commander, his personal Staff and the brigade commanders at the Chateau of Molliens-au-Bois. General Sir Henry Rawlinson, Lieutenant General Sir John Monash, and Lieutenant General Godley were expected but were prevented from coming by the renewed violence with

which the battle had broken out that morning. After lunch Mr. Roosevelt proceeded to the Molliens Wood, where the 65th Infantry Brigade was drawn up in mass formation. In a stirring speech he thanked the troops of the 33rd Division, on behalf of the government, for the lustre which they had shed upon American arms, told them that on all sides he had heard of their prowess, and that he had been given the story of their achievements at Hamel by the King of England himself.⁶²

On the night of August 23-24, 1918, the troops of the 33rd Division⁶³ began entraining at Vignacourt, St. Roch, and Longueau for their journey by rail from the British area to that of the First American Army in the Toul sector. On August 25 the new Division Headquarters were opened in the chateau at Tronville-en-Barrois, and at four o'clock next morning the last of the units detrained and occupied billets in the vicinity.⁶⁴ That same day instructions were issued prescribing that the training of the division for the ten days beginning on August 28 would be based upon the "Memorandum for Corps and Division Commanders," General Headquarters, dated August 5, 1918, supplemented by Training Circular No. 159, 33rd Division, August 15, and by certain requirements contained in Training Circular No. 161.⁶⁵ The German scheme of defense and a memorandum on the "Secrecy of Troop Movements" were published on August 29,⁶⁶ a reconnaissance was made on the next day with a view to selecting a proper terrain for a division manoeuvre, and on August 31 the front line was inspected by the operations section.⁶⁷ That night certain modifications of position were effected,⁶⁸ and on September 1 directions were published relative to "Combat Instructions" and to the concealment of troops against observation by hostile aeroplanes.⁶⁹ Next day the 65th Infantry Brigade performed a tactical exercise in

advance and passage of lines, and the 108th Supply Train, which had been detached since its arrival in France on May 30, rejoined the division.⁷⁰ The 58th Field Artillery Brigade, which had been separated from the division since its departure from Camp Logan, had undergone a course of instruction at Ornans, and had been attached to the 89th and 1st Divisions in succession.⁷¹ During the operations in Picardy the British had supplied the necessary artillery but, as the 33rd Division was about to undertake active operations as a whole, the 52nd Artillery Brigade under Brigadier General George Albert Wingate of the 27th Division was attached to the command; and, on September 3, its first regiment arrived in the Tronville area. Next day the 33rd Division engaged in a terrain exercise under the supervision of the Vth American Corps.⁷² On September 5, orders were received from the First American Army placing the 33rd Division "at the disposal of the II French Army for tactical control, administration and supply," directing it to proceed to the "area occupied by the II French Army" and prescribing the movement of one brigade of infantry on the night of September 5-6.⁷³ Later in the day orders were received from the II French Army placing the division at the disposal of the 17th French Corps and directing its movement to the Blercourt area, southwest of Verdun, beginning on the night of September 5-6;⁷⁴ and the necessary instructions were issued in consequence.⁷⁵

III. OCCUPATION OF THE SECTOR AT VERDUN AND BEGINNING OF THE MEUSE- ARGONNE BATTLE

The movement from the area of the First American Army to the Verdun sector began on the night of September 5-6. The foot troops traveled by bus and the other troops marched, staging at the Issoncourt area. The operation, headed by the 65th Infantry Brigade, terminated on September 8.¹ In the meantime the new division P. C. had opened at Blercourt at 4 P.M. on September 7, and that evening orders were received from the 17th French Army Corps for the relief of the right regiment of the 157th French Division in the sector of Hill 304 and of the units of the 120th French Division in the sector comprising the Mort Homme and Cumières.² The necessary instructions were issued at once,³ and the relief of all French units in those sectors was effected during the nights of September 7, 8, and 9,⁴ the command passing on September 10 at 8 A.M.⁵ to the 33rd Division, the headquarters of which were transferred that morning from Blercourt to Fromeréville.⁶ On the night of September 11-12 the 52nd Field Artillery Brigade moved into the Bois des Sartelles,⁷ the firing batteries, which had been hurried into position beforehand, and all the machine guns of the division participating at 1 A.M. on September 12 in the demonstration fire which opened along part of the Allied front as a diversion to cover the American attack at St. Mihiel.⁸ During the nights of September 13-14⁹ and 15-16 the 79th American Division on the west of the 33rd Division relieved

that part of the 157th French Division which had not been relieved by the 33rd¹⁰ on the nights of September 7, 8, and 9.¹¹ Meanwhile, on September 14 the 33rd and 79th Divisions had passed from the 17th French Corps to the IIIrd American Corps under Major General Robert L. Bullard,¹² an inspection had been made of the sector of the right (66th) Brigade,¹³ and orders had been issued for the opening of the 33rd Division Infantry School on September 19 at the Bois de Nixéville (Sud).¹⁴ September 15, 16, and 17 were characterized by modifications in the position of certain units,¹⁵ by an inspection of the sector occupied by the 65th Brigade,¹⁶ and by the measures taken to guard against hostile aerial observation and gas attacks, to better the existing liaison, to familiarize the officers and men with the "Combat Instructions, Confidential, No. 1348," issued by General Headquarters, and to improve the handling of the platoons.¹⁷

The French plan of defense of the Verdun sector required eight 3-inch guns to be placed east of the Meuse in the territory occupied by the 18th French Division under General Andlauer; but, as it was deemed advisable to withdraw them, the necessary arrangements were made by the IIIrd Corps, and these two batteries of the 105th Field Artillery returned to the Bois des Sartelles during the night of September 16-17.¹⁸ By that date the area not only of the First Army but also that of the IIIrd Corps had become crowded with troops which were being brought up in expectation of a general attack, and the IIIrd Corps ordered that the location of the 33rd Division Infantry School at the Bois de Nixéville (Sud) be changed. However, after a thorough reconnaissance of the division area disclosed that there existed no other place fit for this school, the IIIrd Corps consented, on September 18, that it should remain at the location announced on September 14.¹⁹ On September 19 instructions were issued in respect to

the situation reports to be rendered each day and the necessity for concealment against enemy aerial observation was reiterated.²⁰ On the night of September 20–21 three companies of the 132nd Infantry in the front trenches were replaced by twelve.²¹ Since the plan of the First Army for the general offensive contemplated the introduction of the 4th and 80th Divisions between the 33rd and the 79th, orders were issued on September 21 for the relief of two battalions of the 33rd Division by one from the 4th and another from the 80th, both of which were to pass temporarily under the command of the 33rd Division, and for certain rectifications of position in consequence, all of which was to be effected during the night of September 21–22.²² On September 23 the plan of liaison to accompany the field order for the attack was issued, followed next day by the field order itself and the requisite annexes.²³ The necessary liaison agents were also sent to the adjoining divisions and brigades.²⁴ On September 25 two addenda to the field order and one addendum to the plan of liaison were issued;²⁵ and that afternoon the P. C.s of the 33rd Division and of the 52nd Field Artillery Brigade were moved from Fromeréville to "P. C. la Hutte,"²⁶ a dugout in the Bois Bourrus, in readiness for the attack next morning.²⁷

During this period from September 6 to 25, inclusive, a number of officers and enlisted men were sent away to various schools,²⁸ but the maximum amount of instruction was given to the units²⁹ consistent with the occupation of a so-called "quiet sector," which, however, became more animated after the demonstration fire on the early morning of September 12.³⁰ No effort was spared to develop among the officers and men the highest *esprit de corps* and that spirit of relentless initiative which is invaluable in battle. Thorough instruction in the use of every available weapon, especially the bayonet,

was continued unceasingly and the utmost stress was laid upon the absolute necessity for every precaution against hostile aerial observation and gas attacks. The highest standard of discipline and implicit obedience not only to the spirit but to the very letter of orders was exacted. These requirements, which were characteristic of the training at Camp Logan and with the British, were maintained undiminished in the Verdun sector,³¹ both officers and men responding admirably.

On the other hand, considerable difficulty was experienced in the control of traffic. During the week preceding the attack on September 26, there poured through the bottle-neck at Fromeréville an endless stream of artillery, transportation, vehicles, troops of every sort, and officers on reconnaissance—all intent upon getting to the front as quickly as possible, regardless of traffic regulations and the insistence of higher authority upon the concealment of troop movements.³² It was only by the most drastic measures that offenders were controlled within the area of the 33rd Division and that all movements by convoys or troops were restricted to the hours of darkness between 8:30 P.M. and 6 A.M. Luckily, most of the week in question was marked by bad weather—always cloudy and often rainy—so that aerial observation was difficult, if not impossible. Another fortunate factor was the comparative supineness of the enemy artillery, which confined its operations largely to harassing fire, particularly against the roads and the forward areas which for several days prior to the battle were packed with troops and *matériel*.

The French counterstroke, begun in the Château-Thierry sector on July 18, 1918, developed during the next two months into a general offensive by the Allies along almost the entire western front. It was characterized by notable successes, ground was gained nearly everywhere, and a distinct weakening of the German morale was apparent. At Château-

Thierry and on the British front American troops participated, under the orders of the French or British, in the active operations which wrested from the enemy many of his strongest positions. On September 12 American troops began a drive which resulted in the capture of the St. Mihiel salient. This salient had defied all attacks for four years, and its capture freed the important railway from Bar-le-Duc through Commercy and Toul to Nancy, which had previously been subjected to constant shelling and bombing. The success thus achieved was promptly followed up by incessant blows elsewhere on the western front, and the enemy was robbed of all chance of resuming the offensive.

One of the most important of these operations occurred just a fortnight after the commencement of the St. Mihiel drive and was made by the joint action of the Second French Army west of the Argonne Forest and of the First American Army between the Argonne and the river Meuse. The eventual objectives of this concerted offensive were Sedan and Mézières, two important railway centres through which most of the supplies were forwarded to the German forces within the quadrilateral formed by those two points and Laon, Rheims, and Verdun. The seizure of Sedan and Mézières had a threefold object: first, the capture or destruction of the German armies within that quadrilateral; second, the severance of the principal belt railway of the enemy, which ran, more or less parallel to his front, from the Vosges to Lille and which served as his main line of supply; and third, the threat which such a success would necessarily make against the German positions on the Meuse, the last strong line of defense west of the Rhine. Once in possession of the west bank of the Meuse from St. Mihiel to Mézières, the Allies would be in a decidedly favorable position from which to attack the heights of the upper Meuse. Such an offensive, if

successful, would imperil the enemy's retreat to the Rhine, would force the evacuation of all northern France and southern Belgium and, furthermore, would result in the capture of the important mines of Longuyon and Briey³³ and lead, if so desired, to the investing of Metz.

The First American Army, under the command of General Pershing, was at that time composed of the Ist, IIIrd, IVth, and Vth American Corps, the 17th French Army Corps, and the 2nd Colonial Army Corps.³⁴ Its plan was to attack in the direction of Buzancy and Stonne, with the IIIrd Corps (Major General Robert L. Bullard) on the right next to the Meuse, the Vth Corps (Major General George H. Cameron) in the centre, and the Ist Corps (Major General Hunter Liggett) on the left. The right of the IIIrd Corps was to maintain liaison with the 17th French Army Corps (General Claudel) east of the Meuse, while the Ist Corps, the left of which was to penetrate through the eastern half of the Argonne Forest, kept touch with the French Fourth Army (General Mangin) on the west. The reserve of each corps was composed of one division, while three divisions constituted the general reserve of the First American Army.

In conformity with this plan, the mission of the IIIrd Corps was to break through the enemy positions between the Ruisseau de Forges and the Bois de Forêt, to exploit its success by advancing northward from the Bois de Forêt in the direction of Buzancy and Stonne, and at the same time to organize the west bank of the Meuse for defense in proportion as the attack progressed. The attack was to be made with three divisions in the front line, the 33rd Division (Major General George Bell, Jr.) on the east, its right along the left bank of the Meuse, the 80th Division (Major General Adelbert Cronkhite) in the centre and the 4th (Regular) Division (Major General John L. Hines) on the

west. This last division was to maintain liaison with the 79th Division (Major General Joseph E. Kuhn), which formed the right of the Vth Corps, while the 33rd did likewise with the 18th French Division (General Andlauer), which constituted the left of the 17th French Army Corps east of the Meuse. The first objective of the IIIrd Corps was the enemy's second position, the Hagen Stellung Nord which will be described presently,³⁵ and its second objective was the American Army objective, the Volker Stellung, both of which were to be reached during "D day."³⁶

The plan of the 33rd Division, formulated in compliance with that of the IIIrd Corps,³⁷ prescribed an attack against the German positions from the Meuse westward to the Passarelle du Don exclusive—a footbridge leading across the Forges Brook midway between Béthincourt and the Moulin de Raffecourt. The left of the division was directed to make its attack in such a way as to reach as quickly as possible the open terrain north of Drillancourt and east of the village of Gercourt-et-Drillancourt and the Tranchée du Bois Juré, thus assisting the centre of the division in the capture of the Bois de Forges. In a word, the attack was to be made by echelons, the left in advance. At the conclusion of the operation the division was to organize and hold the line extending from the Côte de l'Oie on the south to the outskirts of the town of Dannevoux on the north, its movement of conversion bringing it into position facing northeast and parallel to the Meuse, and it was to clear away any enemy between its front and the river.³⁸ The attack was to be made in one bound by the 66th Infantry Brigade (Brigadier General Paul A. Wolf) in the front line, its regiments side by side, the 132nd Infantry (Colonel Abel Davis) on the right and the 131st Infantry (Colonel Joseph B. Sanborn) on the left. Two battalions of each regiment were to be placed in the front line and one bat-

talion in support. The mission of the 132nd was to penetrate and capture the Bois de Forges, while the 131st Infantry was to advance over the open ground west of that obstacle, carry the villages of Drillancourt and Gercourt-et-Drillancourt, the Tranchée du Bois Juré and the Tranchée du Bois Rond, mop up the ground between the northern edge of the Bois de Forges and the northern boundary of the division, and finally take position facing the west bank of the Meuse between a point four hundred meters north of the Bois de Forges and the Laiterie de Belhame.

The 66th Infantry Brigade was reënforced by Company A, 1st Gas and Flame Regiment, and its reserve consisted of one battalion, 130th Infantry, stationed near Cumières, one company being detailed to support the 122nd Machine Gun Battalion.

The Divisional Reserve was composed of troops of the 65th Infantry Brigade with headquarters at Béthelainville, namely, the 130th Infantry (Colonel John V. Clinnin), less one battalion; the 123rd Machine Gun Battalion (Major Albert L. Culbertson), less Companies A and B; the 108th Engineers (Colonel Henry A. Allen), less the 2nd Battalion, in the ravine of the Ruisseau de Damon; the 129th Infantry (Colonel Edgar A. Myer), plus Companies A and B, 123rd Machine Gun Battalion, occupying the sector of the 79th Division and Centres of Resistance 304 and Lorraine; and the 122nd Machine Gun Battalion (Major Mariano B. Southwick) participating in the barrage from Centres of Resistance Loison and Eiffel.³⁹

The attack was to be made under cover of a rolling barrage of artillery and machine guns, supported in addition by counterbattery and neutralization fire against the enemy's guns east of the Meuse by the corps and divisional artillery not engaged in barrage. Nine aeroplanes and a number of

tanks were to coöperate with the infantry. The 1st Battalion, 108th Engineers, was directed to have in readiness all materials necessary to assist the troops in crossing the Forges Brook, and to build a bridge in the vicinity of Forges and roads across the valley as soon as the new position had been occupied.

The enemy troops opposite the 33rd Division at that time were identified as the 115th Division, which contained many inhabitants of Alsace and Lorraine. It extended from the Meuse westward to Malancourt, the 40th Regiment on the east, the 136th in the centre, and the 171st on the west. Each regiment consisted of three battalions, one in the front line, one in reserve, and one in the rear area at rest, each battalion being composed of three companies. Along the front were groups of from twenty to thirty men, with sentry squads along the Forges Brook, especially at the points of crossing. The units were far below prescribed strength and the troops were war-weary and discouraged.

The terrain over which the IIIrd Corps was to attack presented many interesting features, as the region north of Verdun is known to be a natural fortress of extraordinary strength and has for centuries played an important rôle in all wars in which France has been engaged. The enemy's position opposite the 33rd Division rested at its western extremity on a line of ridges running northward from Sivry-la-Perche through the Bois de Malancourt to the walled town of Montfaucon. This place was connected with the extensive Bois de Forges by a series of ridges running east to the Meuse and embracing Hills 308, 277, 281, and 272. From these ridges spurs jut to the northeast or southeast, among them being the ridge west of the Bois d'en Dela, that toward Gercourt, and the ridge projecting from Montfaucon.

The soil, as a rule chalky, is solid except where it is

interspersed with patches of clay. Such forests as still exist are difficult to penetrate. The general trend of the wide valleys which alternate between the ridges is toward the Meuse, and their bottoms are of clay and frequently very marshy. The most important of these valleys was that of the Forges Brook which separated the American and German fronts. This brook, averaging about five meters in width east of Béthincourt and two meters west of that town, has two channels in the major part of its course, the southern arm being fordable. The approaches to the stream are marshy but in a dry season present little difficulty; in such weather as that which preceded the attack, however, the Forges Brook constituted a decided obstacle.

The German positions on the front of the 33rd Division were distinctly cut up and therefore presented considerable difficulty to an attack. Organized in depth, they comprised three barrier positions or systems of defense, the southern entitled the Hagen Stellung, the second the Volker Stellung, and the northern the Kriemhild Stellung. The first, which ran from the wood southwest and west of Malancourt to the Bois de Forges, skirting the southern and southeastern edge to the Meuse, consisted of two positions, the Hagen Stellung Sud and the Hagen Stellung Nord, each of two trenches. When the Germans rearranged their defense at Verdun on August 15, 1917, the former was replaced by a series of advanced posts jutting to the south line bastions and provided with machine-gun emplacements and shelters for small groups of men. This line served as a covering zone, while the real line of resistance was the Hagen Stellung Nord, extending from the Bois de Véry along the southern edge of the Bois de Montfaucon, where it bent to the north past the Bois de Cuisy and thence in a broad bow south of the village of Cuisy to the Bois de Forges, at which point it joined the Hagen Stellung

Sud. Better located than the latter, it was additionally strengthened by a deep ravine west of Béthincourt which it completely dominated. During the preceding six months the enemy had made substantially no improvements in this system except near Hill 281, north of which was a zone of dugouts, and on the eastern edge of the Bois de Montfaucon, although some new observation posts had been constructed along this front. The trenches, protected by a double or treble network of low, concertina wire, were in good condition; but the dugouts—holding fifteen or twenty men and about fifteen feet deep—were not of concrete and the communicating trenches were exposed except where concealed by crests or woods.

Beyond the Hagen Stellung Nord and at distances from it ranging from one and a half to four kilometers was the Volker Stellung, which may be likened to a snake, its head in the Argonne Forest southwest of Montblainville and its tail at Dannevoux. In its first form it began between Baulny and Charpentry on the west, but the head and first third of its length had been recently constructed. These new works joined the old about one kilometer southeast of Épinonville whence this system pursued its serpentine course around the southern and eastern outskirts of Montfaucon, north to the Bois de Septsarges, where it bent toward the east through the opening between the Bois de Sachet and the Bois d'en Dela, and skirted the southern and eastern edges of the Bois Juré to a point midway between Dannevoux and the Meuse. The communicating trenches were not particularly strong but were defiladed by the crest and protected by the Bois de Sachet, d'en Dela, and Juré; the trenches south of these woods, however, were in bad condition and there existed no intermediate defenses between the Hagen and Volker systems.

The third or withdrawal system, known as the Kriemhild Stellung, constituted part of the final line of resistance of the

Hindenburg system. It consisted of two widely separated positions, the southernmost lying three kilometers from the Volker Stellung at the nearest point. The western extremity of this position rested on the Grandpré-Varennnes road about three kilometers from the former town, whence it extended through Sommerance, across the Bois de Moncy, south of the Bois de Ognons and, bending to the northeast, terminated about two kilometers from Brieuilles-sur-Meuse. The second line of the Kriemhild Stellung, situated some six kilometers farther north, ran in a fairly straight line south of the villages of Thénorgues, Sivry-les-Bezancy, Bayonville et Chennery, and Andevanne, and terminated at the river directly opposite Dun-sur-Meuse.

The Kriemhild Stellung was a continuation on the east of the Brunhild Stellung, which it adjoined at Mouron. Begun in October and November, 1917, it was only partly completed; the finished portion was, however, constructed in accordance with the latest German regulation. East of the Meuse, the Kriemhild Stellung was nearer completion and was extremely strong.

During the varying phases of the struggle for Verdun in 1916 and 1917, the Germans established a large number of emplacements for artillery. In 1918 the number actually occupied was small by comparison, but four nests of batteries had been located, their activity being dependent largely upon the unit serving the guns. One of these nests was in the vicinity of Gercourt, north of Hill 281; the second was in the Fond-des-Haupt-Prés, Fond de Tanières, and the Bois de Forges; the third was in the neighborhood of Cuisy on the slopes south of the ravine of Grands-Prés; and the fourth was in the region of the Bois de Cuisy, four batteries being in reserve in the ravine of the Bois de Montfaucon. The guns were of the average calibre, including small and medium

howitzers. Batteries were known to be in the Bois de Forges and in June some ten batteries of 77- and 105-millimeters appeared between Apremont and Montfaucon. Counter-battery work also disclosed a number of large calibre guns of Austrian manufacture.

The entire region north of Verdun is one of extraordinary natural strength. Generally speaking, the terrain consists of a series of high ridges, the ends of which overlap one another alternately in such a way as to afford perfect observation and flanking fire. In the sector embraced in the attack of the IIIrd American Corps the most striking features are the wide and marshy valley of the Ruisseau de Forges, the massive Bois de Forges, and the walled town of Montfaucon, perched on a height which completely dominates miles of the surrounding terrain. The configuration of the ground is such that it was evident that (a) the right or east bank of the Meuse permitted observation well to the rear of the positions south of the Forges Brook; (b) any attack on the west bank and within several kilometers of the river would be exposed to flanking fire by artillery posted on the commanding heights east of the Meuse; and (c) the line of crests, of which Montfaucon was the key, was plainly the first objective in any advance on the left bank of the river.

On September 25, 1918, at 11:30 P.M., all the corps artillery in the First American Army began its preparation fire.⁴⁰ Three hours later—2:30 A.M. on September 26—the army artillery joined in and, under cover of this combined fire, the troops assembled at their appointed places in the front-line trenches. In the 33rd Division everything was in readiness for the attack; and the 108th Engineers, who had prepared 12,000 fascines and had stored them, with planks and other necessary material, in the forward trenches, began the construction of nine passages over the Forges Brook, built the

necessary approaches, and laid the duckboards, tapes, and ropes leading to them. The early part of the night had been very still; but as the moon rose, a heavy ground mist gathered and later the sky became overcast. Protected by covering parties of infantry, the bombardment, and the mist, the engineers succeeded, in spite of the enemy's artillery and machine-gun fire, in getting these bridges in place and ready before the zero hour,⁴¹ while in their rear the infantry successfully performed the difficult work of cutting lanes through the network of wire in front of the American positions.⁴² Farther to the east the 108th Field Signal Battalion completed the laying of a cable across the Meuse, this work having been begun the night before for the purpose of insuring lateral communication with the 18th French Division on the right bank.⁴³

At 5:30 A.M. the divisional artillery joined in the bombardment with preparation fire⁴⁴ and a standing barrage by the 75s which, in the case of the 52nd Field Artillery Brigade, was put down along the Forges-Béthincourt road for twenty-five minutes.⁴⁵ Under its protection, supplemented by that of a machine-gun barrage,⁴⁶ covered by a smoke-screen⁴⁷ and concealed by the fog, the attack was launched at the same minute. Side by side the 131st and 132nd Infantry, the former on the west, the latter on the east, advanced into the marshy valley of the Forges Brook, plunged through the morass, crossed the stream at nine different points where passages had been prepared by the engineers, and re-formed on the northern bank, using the Forges-Béthincourt road as a guide. Considering the terrain, the obstacles encountered, and the heavy machine-gun fire from the enemy's positions dominating the valley, this operation was attended with very little loss.⁴⁸ This was undoubtedly due to the tremendous American bombardment, the fog, the remarkable speed with

which the crossing was effected, and to the height of the enemy's fire.⁴⁹ The advance of the 131st Infantry, however, was hampered by the failure of the 319th Infantry (160th Infantry Brigade, 80th Division) to be in its proper position immediately west of the 131st at the zero hour; this circumstance necessitated putting in the support battalion—the 1st, commanded by Captain Carroll M. Gale—to clean up a portion of the sector assigned to the 319th Infantry.⁵⁰

At 6:27 A.M. the rolling barrage commenced⁵¹ and the troops, which had then been re-formed along the Forges-Béthincourt road,⁵² jumped off. Scarcely had the advance begun when an immense amount of enemy wire and heavy fire from well-organized machine-gun nests on the slopes and in the various woods were encountered. All efforts to establish liaison with the 80th Division proved fruitless and, in consequence, the left flank of the regiment remained “in the air” throughout the attack and until long after the objective had been attained.⁵³

Following behind a rolling barrage about eight hundred meters wide,⁵⁴ the 131st Infantry advanced with unusual rapidity, notwithstanding the difficult terrain, the heavy fire from the enemy artillery and machine-gun nests, the smoke from the barrage, and the fog which made it impossible to see farther than a few yards. The trenches of Cervaux, Besace, Billemont, Lenime, and Berny were successfully crossed and mopped up, and a large number of machine-gun nests were reduced.⁵⁵ At the Cervaux Trench, about two hundred meters from the jumping-off line, the 1st Battalion ran athwart the rear waves of the preceding battalions and a mass of wire, was held up for an hour, and became separated from the rest of the regiment. It was not until 8 A.M. that it succeeded in extricating itself; but, once under way, it pushed forward as rapidly as possible, although then fully two miles behind the

other two battalions. It crossed the German trenches without meeting resistance; but its progress was greatly hampered by subsequent trenches, the large amount of enemy wire and the transverse ravines encountered, and by the smoke—in which Companies A and D, which had run into troops in front of them, became lost. It was only by following the compass bearing that Companies B and C were able to maintain direction and to cross the top of the hill and the German main line of defense. At this point the smoke became less dense, no enemy infantry was encountered, no friendly troops were visible, there was no sign of Companies A and D, and the barrage was more than two miles ahead. Upon the assumption that the rest of the regiment was somewhere in advance, the battalion commander deployed Companies B and C in combat groups covering the regimental front and pushed on, frequently under machine-gun fire from the enemy. Upon reaching an enemy strong point in a copse about one thousand yards southwest of Drillancourt, Company C had a lively fight which ended in the killing of six Germans and the capture of fifteen prisoners, three machine guns, and two fieldpieces. During this little engagement Company B, reënforced by one platoon of Company C, advanced on the eastern slope of the valley to Drillancourt, where the former took a machine-gun nest and three prisoners and the latter six machine guns and thirty prisoners. Company C then pushed forward to Ger-court-et-Drillancourt, and in that town captured eight machine guns, two fieldpieces, forty prisoners, and a Mercedes motor ambulance. The advance to the northeast was resumed, the left of the company protected by two platoons, one moving along the edge of the Bois Juré, the other by the east bank of the Hoche Brook. Little opposition was encountered, as the crews of the German machine guns in that wood drew back and permitted the company to pass unmolested. About a mile

north of Gercourt-et-Drillancourt, Company C overtook the American barrage, which was extremely thin at this point, and the movement was slowed down to conform to it. The platoon on the left then recrossed the stream and Company C turned eastward, its front prolonged to the south by Company B which, upon reaching the road from Gercourt-et-Drillancourt to Consenvoye, had swung in the same direction, its right following that road. This latter company had scarcely changed front when it came under point-blank fire from a 77-millimeter gun, protected by a machine gun, posted on the high ground about a kilometer northeast of Gercourt-et-Drillancourt.⁵⁶ A spirited attack resulted in the killing of part of the crew and the capture of these guns as well as several other fieldpieces which were found abandoned in the vicinity. Further resistance was confined to a few machine guns, which ceased firing long before they could be reached, and the sky line in front was dotted with fleeing Germans.

The objective, seven kilometers from the point of departure, was attained at 10:10 A.M., and a report to this effect was dispatched by runner to the regimental commander.⁵⁷ The arrival of these troops was evidently unexpected, since 8 German officers—including a colonel—and 138 men were discovered in dugouts and houses on the side of the cliff. They surrendered when fired upon,⁵⁸ thus bringing the total number of prisoners captured that morning by the 1st Battalion up to 406; in addition, they took the stores along the cliff abandoned by the enemy.⁵⁹ Position was promptly taken along the Verdun-Sedan highroad and railway, facing the Meuse, the front of the 1st Battalion, two kilometers in length, extending from the junction of the road leading to Consenvoye on the south to a point about seven hundred meters southeast of the Laiterie de Belhame. Owing to the transference of many men to other units and to the fact that no other American troops

were in sight, the line was thinly held. The consolidation was effected by platoon posts and the troops at once started to dig in,⁶⁰ under cover of the guns of Company C, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, which, after completing its opening barrage, had followed the 1st Battalion.⁶¹

Meanwhile the 3rd Battalion (Major Francis M. Allen), which formed the left of the 131st Infantry, had experienced many vicissitudes. Immediately after crossing the Forges Brook, every attempt was made to establish liaison with the 319th Infantry of the 80th Division, but all efforts proved ineffectual and in consequence a platoon was posted on the left to cover that exposed flank.⁶² The movement had scarcely begun before it was held up for twenty minutes by a barrage over the sector of advance allotted to this battalion, put down by the machine guns of the 80th Division in spite of the fact that the machine guns of the 33rd Division designated to cover the initial movement of this particular command had then ceased firing.⁶³ Upon the termination of this barrage the advance was resumed under constant heavy machine-gun fire which failed, however, to check the progress. As the troops toiled up the southern slope of Hill 227 the sun burst through the mist, and the scene which unfolded before them stimulated them to the greatest effort.⁶⁴ Upon reaching a point about two hundred and fifty yards south of Gercourt-et-Drillancourt the 3rd Battalion was greeted by a hot fire from enemy machine-gun nests and snipers. Gallant action on the part of an officer and two corporals and effectual work by a platoon of the 124th Machine Gun Battalion soon put them *hors de combat*,⁶⁵ while the Bois Juré was subjected to such a violent machine-gun fire that the infantry was enabled to penetrate that wood.⁶⁶ The task of mopping up to a depth of two hundred yards beyond the flank trenches a kilometer in length along the eastern edge of the Bois Juré was a slow and diffi-

cult one;⁶⁷ nevertheless, the work was thoroughly done and the 3rd Battalion succeeded in reaching the objective on scheduled time, 11 A.M., having captured, during its advance, a large number of prisoners,⁶⁸ twenty-eight machine guns, six cannon, and a quantity of engineering equipment.⁶⁹ The troops promptly occupied and began the consolidation of the northernmost sector, in the rear of the left of the 1st Battalion, their right resting on the high ground south of the Ravin du Gué Semette and their left close to the Laiterie de Belhame,⁷⁰ where the 3rd Platoon of the 124th Machine Gun Battalion was posted to protect that flank, which remained uncovered until the 319th Infantry of the 80th Division reached its objective immediately adjacent on the afternoon of September 27.⁷¹ A platoon of infantry was at once sent to take possession of an enemy depot between Dannevoux and the Meuse, which was found to contain an enormous quantity of war *matériel* of every sort.⁷²

The 2nd Battalion (Major Hamlet C. Ridgway), which formed the right of the 131st Infantry, was subjected to no such delay after leaving the jumping-off line, although the trench mortar detachment accompanying it was put out of action at the very start and the 37-millimeter gun had to be left behind as it was impossible to move it across the Forges Brook.⁷³ The advance of this battalion, however, was impeded in numerous ways; among other difficulties, it encountered a severe resistance and two of its companies, E and F, were lost in the smoke.⁷⁴ These companies, reënforced by the detachment of engineers attached to Company E which fought as infantry, nevertheless pushed on, making such good progress that they reached the objective about 11 A.M., almost simultaneously with the 3rd Battalion, and took their proper position in the rear of the 1st Battalion.⁷⁵ The remaining companies, G and H, were hampered by a succession of

machine-gun nests, resistance encountered in the enemy rear trenches—which were rapidly mopped up, however—machine guns in Drillancourt, and attacks by hostile aeroplanes, which turned their machine guns on the troops and wounded two men.⁷⁶ Great care had to be exercised to maintain close liaison with the 132nd Infantry on the right and to avoid too rapid an advance lest the eastern flank of the 131st be exposed to the enemy in the Bois de Forges before that wood had been thoroughly secured. Consequently it was not until 12:15 P.M. that Companies G and H attained the objective and rejoined Companies E and F. The 2nd Battalion then took position in second line, its right resting on the Côte des Grands-Prés and its left at the Ravin du Gué Semette in touch with the right of the 3rd Battalion, and the work of consolidation was rapidly pushed to completion. The 2nd Battalion contributed its share to the captures of the day by approximately 250 prisoners, 30 machine guns, and 10 fieldpieces.⁷⁷

At 1:30 P.M. Company D, which formed the left of the 1st Battalion, reached its objective after many delays. At the outset it had followed Companies I and L of the 3rd Battalion up the first crest and, about two hundred and fifty yards north of the Berny Trench, had encountered an enemy strong point in a copse. A skillful attack yielded 106 prisoners, but at this point the company lost touch completely with Companies I and L. After thoroughly mopping up this position, it continued its advance alone through Gercourt-et-Drillancourt and along the eastern edge of the Bois Juré, where it was subjected to enemy fire but luckily incurred no casualties. Pushing on it took position in the rear of the 3rd Battalion, facing north, its left close to the Tranchée du Bois Rond; when its arrival was reported, however, it was moved forward into place on the left of the 1st Battalion.⁷⁸

It was still later in the afternoon when the commanding

officer of Company A, which had constituted the right of the 1st Battalion, reported his arrival. In advancing up the first hill this company had run into Companies F and H of the 2nd Battalion and had coöperated with them in the capture of about one hundred Germans and several machine guns. It then skirted the southwestern edge of the Bois de Forges, continued through Drillancourt, swung to the east upon reaching the road from Gercourt-et-Drillancourt to Consenvoye, and halted one kilometer east of the former town in the position originally assigned to it. When the commanding officer reported the arrival of the company, it was ordered forward to take over the southern sector of the battalion, which had been held by Company B pending its appearance.⁷⁹

During the afternoon twelve machine guns, captured from the enemy and manned by a section of the 37-millimeter detachment, some orderlies, and intelligence privates were posted on the ridge in the rear of the 2nd Battalion as a protection against any offensive on the part of the enemy from the Bois Juré.⁸⁰

In addition to the seizure of the enemy depot near Danneveux, to which allusion has been made, the captures effected by the 131st Infantry during its advance of seven kilometers were very considerable and included among other *matériel*, sixteen guns of various calibres, fifty-two machine guns, and some railway cars.⁸¹ The number of prisoners taken was estimated at six hundred and fifty but, as many of these were turned over to other units for immediate use, the number cannot be exactly determined. Considering the results achieved the cost was comparatively small, since only one officer and 19 enlisted men were killed, although 2 officers and 131 other ranks were wounded.⁸² There were no missing reported in this action.

Not less successful was the attack of the 132nd Infantry

(Colonel Abel Davis) on the right or east of the 131st Infantry. As has been seen, its mission was to break through the enemy positions in front of and in the formidable Bois de Forges and to organize the Verdun-Sedan road four hundred meters north of the Bois de Forges.⁸³ The proximity of this regiment to the Meuse made it the pivot for all operations west of that river. Its formation for the attack was analogous to that of the 131st Infantry,⁸⁴ on the right of which it crossed the valley of the Forges Brook and re-formed on the Béthincourt-Forges road,⁸⁵ its left just west of the Moulin de Raffecourt and its right about one thousand yards from the outskirts of the village of Forges.

At 6:15 A.M., when the standing barrage changed into a rolling barrage and started forward,⁸⁶ the front line battalions of this regiment—the 1st (Captain B. J. Dodd) on the right, the 2nd (Major Paul C. Gale) on the left, with the 3rd (Major John J. Bullington) in its rear—followed at a distance of three hundred meters. Upon reaching the Diogenes Trench and the southern edge of the Bois de Forges about 6:30 A.M., the troops were greeted by a hot fire from the enemy machine guns; but the advance was not interrupted, since the flanking platoons speedily disabled the guns. At this point Company D, 1st Battalion, which formed the entire right, separated from the rest of that unit and swung to the east in order to carry out the particular mission assigned to it. Brushing aside all opposition, it proceeded to capture the village of Forges, mopped up all trenches in the immediate vicinity, and started after the battalion.⁸⁷

Meanwhile the 132nd Infantry had attained a position in the Bois de Forges extending from the Forges-Drillancourt road on the left to the southwestern edge of the woods on the right and had met a very severe resistance from a mass of machine-gun nests echeloned in five tiers. So heavy was their

fire that further progress in line formation was out of the question, and the troops were accordingly split up into small combat groups. In this fashion the regiment pushed forward under incessant fire, flanking the machine-gun nests, strong points, and other resistance, and bombing isolated posts. In this operation trench mortars were used to great advantage, while the enemy snipers who infested the trees were effectually disposed of by the riflemen. The dense fog which hung low in the woods cloaked the movements of the Americans and full advantage was taken of it. It was a fortunate factor in view of the method employed, which alone enabled the troops to cope successfully with the conditions confronting them. The companies necessarily became somewhat mixed and, because of the density of the woods, many men were lost or separated from the groups to which they belonged. By the time the Forges-Drillancourt road was crossed, however, the advance was being made in as good order as could be expected under such difficult circumstances.⁸⁸

At this point the front of the regiment swung to the right until it faced the northeast and the advance continued.⁸⁹ As the 1st Battalion approached the Ravin du Rapilleux one company was met by heavy machine-gun fire from a commanding position on the farther side; but the troops worked quietly forward, rushed the gun, and killed the entire crew. At the same time the left company of the same unit closed in on the German battalion headquarters situated at the eastern edge of the woods between the mouth of the ravine just mentioned and that of the Ravin Pimpanel, surprised the machine guns defending it, and captured a considerable number of prisoners. The German commander and part of his staff were barely able to escape and beat a hasty retreat across the bridge to Consenvoye, their flight covered by two machine guns in the valley of the Meuse.⁹⁰ The 1st Battalion then continued its movement

and about 9:45 A.M. reached its objective and took position along the railway track, its left opposite the mouth of the Ravin Pimpanel. Here it was joined soon after by the right company, which had attacked Forges and which extended the line as far as the easternmost point of the woods.⁹¹

Meanwhile the 2nd Battalion had attained the sixty-centimeter railway, which traversed the Bois de Forges about three hundred yards west of the Forges-Drillancourt road, and had executed a turning movement to the northeast which brought its right upon the road running from the southwest corner of the woods and issuing through the Ravin Pimpanel. Its advance was marked by frequent encounters with machine-gun nests, which were reduced in short order, and by heavy artillery fire as it debouched from the woods. Before ten o'clock it, too, had reached its objective; it then took position north of the 1st Battalion, its left just beyond the Côte des Grands-Prés.⁹²

In its rear the 3rd Battalion followed at a distance of five hundred yards until the Bois de Forges was reached. Here it struck off toward the north, skirting the western edge of the woods in order to maintain the liaison between the 131st and 132nd Infantry and to fill the void created by the turning movement of the latter. Part of this battalion was sent to take commanding positions in the centre of the Bois de Forges, to mop up that wood and to hold the approaches in the event of a counterattack. The remainder continued on to its objective, where it arrived about 10 A.M., and took position north of the 2nd Battalion,⁹³ its left prolonged by the 1st Battalion, 131st Infantry, which came into place at 10:10 A.M.⁹⁴

At ten o'clock the entire 132nd Infantry was on its objective and the work of digging in began.⁹⁵ The consolidation was effected with the assistance of the engineers but was subjected to an annoying fire from enemy machine guns in the

direction of Consenvoye.⁹⁶ Company D, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, which had followed the 3rd Battalion, arrived at 10:30 A.M.; half an hour later Company A, which had been attached to the 2nd Battalion, came up and put its guns into position in that sector, but it was after midday before they succeeded in silencing the enemy.⁹⁷ The trench mortars and 37-millimeter guns had been unable to keep pace with the infantry but during the course of the afternoon they were brought up and placed in position.⁹⁸

The distance covered by the 132nd Infantry was five kilometers,⁹⁹ and its operation was a notable achievement. That it was able in three hours and a half to fight its way through such a formidable forest as the Bois de Forges, one of the strongest positions in the Verdun sector, which had been held by the Germans for four years and which was a veritable fortress bristling with machine guns, is proof of the skill and energy with which the regiment was handled. That the encircling movement of the 131st Infantry contributed greatly to the result in nowise detracts from the feat of the 132nd. Apart from what was accomplished in the operation itself, in which the regiment engaged the 72nd and 115th German Reserve Infantry Regiments and various detachments of *minenwerfers*, signalmen, and the like, the captures effected were not less remarkable. In addition to 800 prisoners, 4 six-inch howitzers, 10 fieldpieces, 10 trench mortars, 109 machine guns, 2 anti-tank guns, and a large quantity of ammunition and stores fell into its hands.¹⁰⁰ Such were the results achieved with a loss to the 132nd Infantry of only one officer and 15 men killed, and 72 men wounded.¹⁰¹

In the history of the 66th Infantry Brigade, Thursday, September 26, 1918, was a notable day. The brigade had broken through an enemy position which had defied every such attempt for four years; it had carried the Bois de Forges;

it had established itself solidly on the west bank of the Meuse in position to cover the right flank of an American advance northward or to form the pivot of a movement against the heights east of the river in case an operation in that direction were decided upon. In addition to the great amount of *matériel* captured, it had taken approximately 1,400 German officers and men. Its own casualties numbered only 2 officers and 34 other ranks killed, and 2 officers and 203 other ranks wounded, a total of 241.¹⁰² The work of the auxiliary arms, as well as that of the infantry, had been such as to receive the highest commendation.¹⁰³ The achievements of the day were admirably summarized by the brigade commander, who declared in his report:

This entire engagement was particularly interesting because of the fact that it was an action planned and executed by a Brigade as a unit. It was entirely successful, owing, first to the courage and dash of our splendid troops, and second because the plans had been carefully worked out and studied by all concerned and during the action these plans were followed with marvellous exactness.¹⁰⁴

During this battle the 65th Brigade (Brigadier General Edward L. King) acted as the reserve of the 33rd Division, although the 130th Infantry (Colonel John V. Clinnin) constituted the reserve for the 66th Infantry Brigade in the attack.¹⁰⁵ Of this regiment the 1st Battalion (Captain James Lindsey-Oliver) had been detached on September 24 and sent to Germonville to report to the commander of the 66th Brigade. Three companies, A, C, and D, were utilized to assist the 108th Engineers to carry material to the front-line trenches during the night of September 24-25, while Company B was stationed north of Cumières to support the 122nd Machine Gun Battalion in the Vaux-Setif Trenches and on the Haut de la Côte de l'Oie.¹⁰⁶ The 2nd and 3rd Battalions

under the regimental commander, marched on the night of September 25 from the Bois de Ville to a position in the ravine of the Ruisseau de Bamont, directly south of the Fort de Bourrus, where they arrived on September 26 at 1 A.M., in ample time before the zero hour. The 129th Infantry (Colonel Edgar A. Myer), which had been relieved on the night of September 25 by units from the 80th, 4th, and 79th Divisions, moved to Esnes and was established, together with Companies A and B, 123rd Machine Gun Battalion, in the Rascasse Trench between Hills 304 and 310, where it was retained all day.¹⁰⁷ The rest of the 123rd Machine Gun Battalion (Major Albert L. Culbertson) at 8 P.M. on September 25 followed the 130th Infantry from the Bois de Ville to Bamont Ferme, where it arrived at 12:30 A.M. on September 26 and stayed for the remainder of the night. Early on the morning of September 26 orders were received from the brigade commander to proceed to a position in the rear of the Mort Homme. The advance was accordingly resumed but at 11:30 A.M. it was held up by the congestion of traffic one kilometer east of La Claire and did not reach its position until several hours later.¹⁰⁸

The brigade P. C. remained at Béthelainville until 10 A.M., when it was moved forward to point 177.713, on the commanding ridge 1,300 yards northeast of Esnes. At this place orders were received designating the 65th Brigade as the reserve of the IIIrd Corps, and at 12:59 P.M. it was so reported to the Corps Commander¹⁰⁹ Pursuant to instructions from the brigade commander, received about 12:30 P.M., the 130th Infantry, less its 1st Battalion, proceeded under cover of the smoke screen from the guns east of the Meuse via Chattancourt to the Mort Homme, but so great was the congestion in this position and so heavy the enemy artillery fire that the two battalions were put under shelter in the

trenches in the immediate vicinity of Chattancourt, a fortunate precaution inasmuch as this place was bombarded continuously throughout the night. In this position the regiment was rejoined at the end of the day by the 1st Battalion.¹¹⁰

IV. DEFENSE OF THE MEUSE SECTOR

From September 27 to October 7, 1918, inclusive, the operations of the 33rd Division on the west bank of the Meuse were characterized by no engagement of major importance. The positions occupied at the close of the battle on September 26 were held, except for certain modifications which will be enumerated, and thoroughly organized. During this period of eleven days the troops were subjected to incessant artillery fire and gas from both banks of the Meuse. The resistance of the enemy to the attacks of the First American Army between that river and the Argonne was conspicuous for its desperation, so that heavy losses were entailed in driving him from the exceptionally strong heights which he had fortified and occupied for more than four years.¹

On September 27, the 66th Infantry Brigade retained and strengthened its positions facing the Meuse from the eastern edge of the Bois de Forges opposite Brabant² to the Laiterie de Belhame.³ The arrival there that evening of the 319th Infantry of the 80th Division afforded protection to the left flank which had been exposed for more than twenty-seven hours.⁴

At 6 A.M. the headquarters of the 65th Infantry Brigade received telephonic instructions from G-3 of the 33rd Division to move without delay to positions south of Gercourt-et-Drilancourt, there to await further orders and to reconnoitre thoroughly the area held by the 80th Division with a view to relieving it.⁵ The necessary instructions were issued and at

9 A.M. the 129th Infantry, forming the head of the column and accompanied by Companies A and B, 123rd Machine Gun Battalion, began its advance via Esnes and Béthincourt to the valley south of Hill 281. Here the brigade P. C. was established⁶ and a defensive position taken by the regiment, which sent officers and noncommissioned officers to reconnoitre the positions of the 319th Infantry north and east of Dannevoux preparatory to relieving the 80th Division.⁷ The 129th was followed by the 130th Infantry, which left Chattancourt at 7 A.M. but, upon reaching Esnes, found the road between that point and Béthincourt completely blocked and was compelled to make a detour by a trail along the western slope of the Mort Homme. As this movement had to be made in single file, it was 2 P.M. before that regiment reached Béthincourt, where it resumed its march in normal formation and took position in the rear of the 129th Infantry.⁸ It was followed by the battalion P. C. and Companies C and D, 123rd Machine Gun Battalion, which were posted on the southern slope of Hill 281, where they were rejoined by Companies A and B.⁹ The transport of the 129th Infantry, forming the tail of this column, was caught in the congestion of traffic north of Esnes and did not reach its destination until 6 P.M.¹⁰

The 52nd Field Artillery Brigade moved one battery of the 308th French Regiment of heavy artillery to the Ravin des Caurettes, west of Cumières, sent a detachment to operate the German guns captured near Drillancourt, and directed the 1st Battalion, 104th Field Artillery, to proceed at 7:30 P.M. from La Claire to new positions near the southwestern corner of the Bois de Forges. During the afternoon and evening it participated in counterbattery work against the enemy artillery,¹¹ which had been quite active in shelling the Bois de Forges, Cumières, and the back areas.¹²

Saturday, September 28, was devoid of interesting fea-

tures so far as the 66th Infantry Brigade was concerned. Patrols were sent to reconnoitre the Meuse and the points of crossing, and the enemy artillery subjected the vicinity of the Bois de Forges and the Côte des Grands-Prés to harassing fire.¹³ Considerable enemy movement was also observed between the Bois de Brabant and Brabant, and the 122nd Machine Gun Battalion kept the crossroads in the town under fire from 9 until 1 A.M., incidentally silencing a fieldpiece.¹⁴

There were no changes of position by the 65th Infantry Brigade during the morning and most of the afternoon, although a reconnaissance in the region of the Bois de Danneveux and the Bois de la Côte Lemont was made by the regimental, battalion, company, and platoon commanders of the 130th Infantry with a view to relieving certain units of the 80th Division.¹⁵ At 2:30 P.M. a warning order was received from Division Headquarters directing the brigade to "march at once to the Bois d'en Dela, north of Hill 281, where it will be held at the disposal of the Comdg. General, III Army Corps as Corps Reserve."¹⁶ About 6 P.M. this movement began, the 129th Infantry advancing to the Bois Sachet, the 130th and 123rd Machine Gun Battalion to the Bois d'en Dela.¹⁷ At 8:30 P.M. orders were issued for the relief of the 80th Division that night, its right brigade by the 129th Infantry and Company B, 123rd Machine Gun Battalion, and its left brigade by the 130th Infantry and Company C, 123rd Machine Gun Battalion, while Companies A and D, 123rd Machine Gun Battalion, were to constitute the reserve of the 65th Brigade.¹⁸ At midnight the relief of the right sector held by the 319th Infantry began and was completed at 8 A.M. on September 29; but, as the enemy artillery fire was extremely heavy and as many gas shells were used, this operation was attended with a loss of nine men killed and twenty-five wounded.¹⁹ The relief of the left sector of the

80th Division did not occur that night owing to a misunderstanding which is graphically described by Colonel Clinnin:²⁰

At 22:00 Hour on this date, verbal orders were received from the Commanding General, 65th Brigade, for the 130th Infantry to relieve the 320th Infantry in the line in the BOIS-DE-LA-CÔTE-LEMONT and the Commanding Officer, 130th Infantry, reported to the Commanding Officer, 320th Infantry, at his P. C. near cross roads south of the BOIS-D'EN DELA where he was informed that no orders had been received by the Commanding Officer, 320th Infantry, for a relief and, until such orders were received, no relief would take place. Runners were arranged to bring information to the Commanding Officer, 130th Infantry, when such orders were received by the Commanding Officer, 320th Infantry, and the 130th Infantry remained in bivouac in the BOIS-D'EN-DELA for the night.

5:20 A.M. morning of 29th September, 1918, information was received from the Commanding Officer, 320th Infantry, that orders had arrived for the relief and that said relief would take place at once.

The sequel will be described in the narrative for September 29.

The divisional artillery spent a quiet morning but during the afternoon subjected Brabant and the road leading to Malbrouck on the east bank of the Meuse to heavy fire, as considerable enemy movement in that direction had been observed. Two appeals for assistance were received from the 80th Division, one being responded to, the other communicated to the corps artillery, as the enemy batteries were out of range. The 1st Battalion of the 105th Field Artillery was also moved to a position near the Tranchée de la Roue.²¹ The 108th Engineers were kept busy repairing the roads in the forward area, which were in bad condition, and in building bridges and new roads across No Man's Land.²²

Sunday, September 29, was another day of inaction on the part of the 66th Infantry Brigade except for patrols along the Meuse searching for good points of passage and for frequent enemy artillery fire close to its positions.²³

In the 65th Brigade, the 129th Infantry completed its relief of the sector of the right brigade of the 80th Division at 8 A.M., as has been seen, and during the afternoon was joined by Company B, 123rd Machine Gun Battalion, which occupied the positions in the Bois de Dannevoux. The day was devoted to consolidating and improving the sector.²⁴ The relief of the left sector, which was effected by the 130th Infantry, began after 5:30 A.M. but was not finished until 2:20 P.M. for the reasons already alluded to, aggravated by congestion of traffic and the bad condition of the roads.²⁵ This regiment was joined in the Bois de la Côte Lemont²⁶ by Company C, 123rd Machine Gun Battalion, while Companies A and D of that organization remained in the Bois d'en Dela as the brigade reserve.²⁷ The artillery of the 80th Division was temporarily retained in the sector but at the disposal of the 4th Division,²⁸ while the 52nd Field Artillery Brigade, in addition to firing on an enemy battery and requesting counter-battery work by the corps artillery to suppress the heavy shelling to which the 132nd Infantry was being subjected about 3 P.M., supported the front of the 65th Brigade by the 1st Battalion, 104th Field Artillery, about two hours later.²⁹ As a matter of fact, the extreme left of the 33rd Division was under intense enemy fire, mixed with gas shells, during intervals on the night of September 29-30.³⁰

The 108th Engineers were busily occupied constructing the new road from Cumières to Raffecourt³¹ and in effecting other necessary work, in which they were assisted by a detachment of 150 men from the 122nd Machine Gun Battalion.³²

Monday, September 30, like the preceding four days, was marked by overcast skies, occasional rain, mist, and decidedly cool temperature for that season.³³ The IIIrd Corps made virtually no progress owing to the resistance of the enemy, whose artillery was very active along the entire front.

In the sector occupied by the 33rd Division, the Cumières road, the Bois de Forges and its vicinity, the position of the 131st Infantry, and the area of the 65th Brigade were heavily shelled.³⁴ The divisional artillery was therefore kept busy with counterbattery work. In the case of certain trench mortars and guns which were beyond its range, it was obliged to send requests to the corps artillery for support.³⁵ The enemy fire was not confined to the west bank of the Meuse, both the 131st Infantry and a regiment of the French 18th Division being considerably harassed;³⁶ in the case of the latter, the 122nd Machine Gun Battalion was appealed to for assistance.³⁷

The usual patrols were made by both infantry brigades, but there were no changes of position beyond the occupation of the Bois de Septsarges by Company D, 123rd Machine Gun Battalion.³⁸ The 65th Brigade bent its efforts to organizing its sector in accordance with the plan of defense formulated by the IIIrd Corps³⁹ on September 25,⁴⁰ but suffered some casualties from the heavy shelling and gassing to which it was subjected.⁴¹ There was no cessation in the work of the 108th Engineers and the new road from Cumières to Raffecourt was fast approaching completion.⁴²

Tuesday, October 1, 1918, was rather more quiet, but a material gain was made by the IIIrd Corps in the sector of its left divisions.⁴³ The enemy's artillery was less active, although certain spots received a considerable amount of shelling.⁴⁴ The 52nd Field Artillery Brigade had a comparatively restful day in consequence, its principal operations being confined to the assumption of new positions near the Moulin de Raffecourt by three batteries of the 106th Field Artillery; the departure at 5 P.M. of the 212th French Regiment of field artillery, which had been withdrawn by the IIIrd Corps and which proceeded during the night of October 1-2 to the

Bois de Nixéville (Nord) ;⁴⁵ and the issuance of orders to the 106th Field Artillery to support the attack of the 18th French Division on the east bank of the Meuse next morning.⁴⁶

There were no changes of position by the infantry of the 33rd Division,⁴⁷ but the patrolling of the Meuse was continued⁴⁸ and the Machine Gun Company attached to the 129th Infantry indulged for a short period in harassing fire against enemy strong points.⁴⁹ The events which occurred that day in the 65th Infantry Brigade are thus described by its commander :

October 1st: Arrangements made for a gas projector attack from Subsector occupied by the 129th Infantry⁵⁰ on enemy lines in vicinity of Vilosnes night 1st/2nd October. Unfavorable wind condition prevented the carrying out of this attack. There was more than ordinarily heavy enemy artillery action this date from the vicinity of Sivry-sur-Meuse. There was an enemy gas attack on Subsector occupied by 130th Infantry at 19:00 hours which was ineffective so far as units of this Brigade were concerned, but was carried by prevailing winds toward the sector of the 4th Division, which division was immediately notified. The work of taping [sic] the Main Line of Resistance in the 130th Infantry Sector was started. Brigade Defense Scheme was issued, providing for brigade sector to be held by the 130th Infantry on the left, and the 129th Infantry on the right with a two-battalion front, echeloned in depth, in two positions, with the Outpost Zone garrisoned by the strength of one battalion per regiment and the Main Line of Resistance garrisoned by the remaining battalions of each Regiment in a continuous line, the troops distributed in depth, leaving a sufficient Barrage Zone unoccupied between the Outpost Zone and the Main Line of Resistance. Work on Main Line of Resistance, in accordance with Scheme of Defense, deferred by 130th Infantry until their position became better settled.⁵¹

Wednesday, October 2, was unmarked by any advance on the part of the IIIrd Corps or any important changes of position by the troops of the 33rd Division.⁵² The enemy

artillery, comparatively quiet during most of the morning, grew more active during the rest of the day, shelling the Ger-court-Drillancourt road, the Bois de Forges and Forges during the afternoon, and subjecting this latter village and Cumières to intermittent fire during the night.⁵³ Shortly after daybreak the 104th Field Artillery silenced the enemy batteries which had put down a barrage on the 65th Infantry Brigade, and in the afternoon the howitzer regiment—the 106th—engaged in counterbattery work against the enemy guns on the east bank of the Meuse.⁵⁴ At 8:15 P.M. this regiment started for new positions east of Béthincourt, but the road at Cumières was found completely blocked and the advance had to be abandoned after the gun carriages left at the side of the road had been camouflaged and the horses sent back.⁵⁵ The 1st Battalion, 105th Field Artillery, was likewise in movement that night and changed its batteries from the Moulin de Raffecourt to the vicinity of the Bois Sachet.⁵⁶

So far as the infantry of the 33rd Division was concerned the day was unimportant,⁵⁷ save in the sector of the 65th Brigade, where some changes were made in the 129th Infantry⁵⁸ and Company B, 123rd Machine Gun Battalion harassed the enemy in retaliation for his barrage.⁵⁹ Other events of interest that Wednesday are thus summarized by the brigade commander:⁶⁰

October 2nd: Heavy enemy gas shelling on the front of the 129th Infantry. Smoke screen on the front of the 130th Infantry, but no attack followed. 1st Battalion, 129th Infantry, substituted for 3rd Battalion, 129th Infantry, as Divisional Reserve. Regiments directed to send out patrols along the River Meuse with the object of discovering any routes and means of crossing that river. Gas projector attack on the town of Vilosnes at 23:00 hours by the First Gas Regiment successfully carried out. Enemy artillery very active this date, enfilading our positions from the right bank of the

River Meuse, assisted by direct observation and frequent registrations of fire by aeroplanes.

October 3, 1918, was another day of trench routine for the troops of the 65th and 66th Infantry Brigades.⁶¹ The enemy artillery continued its customary harassing fire,⁶² to which the guns of the 52nd Field Artillery Brigade, supported from time to time by the corps artillery, responded. At 1 P.M. the 102nd Ammunition Train was ordered to load all available trucks with ammunition and to proceed posthaste to the 4th Division at Cuisy,⁶³ and that night the 1st Battalion, 105th Field Artillery, moved forward into concealed positions along the northwestern edge of the Bois de la Côte Lemont, but was heavily shelled and gassed in the operation, as well as subjected to lively machine-gun and rifle fire.⁶⁴ Companies A and B, 123rd Machine Gun Battalion, likewise advanced to the same wood during the course of the night of October 3-4 and lost twelve men in this movement.⁶⁵

These movements were in pursuance of the warning orders issued about 3 P.M. from Division Headquarters, followed by Field Order No. 28 at 10:15 P.M.,⁶⁶ all based upon Field Order No. 22, IIIrd Corps, which had been received early in the afternoon. This corps order announced that the First American Army would continue its attack while the IIIrd Corps would do likewise on D day at H hour with its centre and left divisions, its object being to penetrate the German third position between the Meuse and Cunel and to capture the heights northeast of the latter place. To this end the 80th Division, forming the left, was to attack along the Bois de Ognons and the 4th Division, in the centre, the Bois de Fays, its eastern flank protected by the 33rd Division, which was to hold its present sector. In conformity with this plan the Commanding General of the 33rd Division took the necessary dispositions, the most essential of which were as

follows: The 132nd Infantry in the Forges subsector was to be relieved that night and was directed to proceed straight to Malancourt where it was to await orders and form part of the reserve of the IIIrd Corps. Its sector was to be taken over by the remaining troops of the 66th Brigade and Companies A and D, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, were to report to the Division Machine Gun Officer and to be stationed along the northwestern edge of the Bois de la Côte Lemont during the night of October 3-4 so as to be utilized in overcoming enemy resistance and in breaking down counterattacks between the Bois de Brioules, the Bois de Forêt, and Brioules-sur-Meuse. Both the 65th and the 66th Brigades were charged to be on the alert against attack and the former was to establish combat liaison with the 4th Division. The reserve of the 33rd Division was constituted from the support battalions of the 129th and 131st Infantry and the 122nd Machine Gun Battalions in their present positions. The artillery was to neutralize the enemy guns in the Bois de Chatillon, the Bois des Sartelles, and the two ravines east of Liny-devant-Dun, and to station three batteries of 75s along the northwestern edge of the Bois de la Côte Lemont.

At 11:10 P.M. announcement was made by the division P. C. that "D" day would be October 4, and "H" hour at 5:25 hours, French time, or 5:25 A.M., American time.⁶⁷ All the movements prescribed for the night of October 3-4 were executed on scheduled time⁶⁸ except that of the two companies of the 124th Machine Gun Battalion, which was delayed by a combination of circumstances such as every unit experiences in the course of war.⁶⁹

On Friday, October 4, 1918, the First American Army wrested from the enemy more ground between the Argonne and the Meuse than on any other single day since its attack on September 26.⁷⁰ The most important gains were effected

by the IIIrd Corps, which pivoted on the 33rd Division immediately next to the river and attacked at 5:25 A.M. with the 4th Division in the centre and the 80th Division on the left.

In the 33rd Division the withdrawal from the Bois de Forges sector of the 132nd Infantry—which moved that day to Malancourt, where it passed into the reserve of the IIIrd Corps—⁷¹necessitated a redistribution of the 131st Infantry and of Companies B and C, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, which therefore occupied the entire sector of the 66th Infantry Brigade and continued the usual patrols along the Meuse.⁷² Companies A and D, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, reached their new positions on the northwestern edge of the Bois de la Côte Lemont, passed under the commanding officer of the 123rd Machine Gun Battalion, and, together with his companies, supported the 4th Division by harassing fire against Brioules and the Tranchée de Teton,⁷³ the latter of which proved such a stumbling-block for several days. Close to them were two batteries of the 105th Field Artillery which remained silent throughout the day pursuant to orders from the IIIrd Corps, whereas the rest of the divisional artillery was actively employed in supporting the attack of the 4th Division and in counterbattery work against the enemy's guns east of the Meuse.⁷⁴

The rôle of the 65th Brigade was to be on the alert against attacks and to maintain combat liaison with the 4th Division on its right. Its part in the operation of the day is thus epitomized by the brigade commander:⁷⁵

October 4th: Third Battalion 130th Infantry took up new location as Brigade Reserve in trenches near Hill 281.⁷⁶ Hostile balloon brought down at 4:36 P.M. Second gas projector attack planned by First Gas Regiment on the town of Vilosnes. Preparatory to attack planned by 4th Division morning Oct. 5th [should be 4th], combat liaison established between 130th Infantry and the regiment of the 4th

Division on their left. Patrols of one officer and 34 men, each, from 123rd M. G. Bn. and 124th M. G. Bn., sent out to reconnoiter and, if possible, occupy Teton Trench, returned, reporting that they were unable to accomplish their mission. Harassing Machine Gun fire concentrated upon the town of Brioules and the region one kilometer northwest of that place.⁷⁷

Apart from the issuance of two confidential memoranda⁷⁸ and orders to carry out the instructions of the IIIrd Corps in respect to the reconnaissance and occupation of the Tranchée de Teton,⁷⁹ the day was barren of interest in the P. C. of the 33rd Division at La Hutte in the Bois Bourrus.

Saturday, October 5, was largely devoted by the IIIrd Corps to consolidating the gains made the day before,⁸⁰ but there was considerable activity on the part of the Allied artillery and of the aeroplanes on both sides.⁸¹ During the afternoon and evening the 52nd Field Artillery Brigade was busily employed in firing on Haraumont, Liny-devant-Dun, Brioules, and the Tranchée de Teton and in counterbattery work against the German guns on both banks of the Meuse. There were no changes of position by its units, but at 6:15 P.M. the 2nd Battalion of the 308th French Regiment of heavy artillery was withdrawn from the division⁸² and proceeded to the Bois des Sartelles during the night.⁸³ The companies of the 123rd and 124th Machine Gun Battalions in the Bois de la Côte Lemont continued their harassing fire in the vicinity of Brioules,⁸⁴ but the attempt to infiltrate machine guns and automatic rifles into the Tranchée de Teton failed, the enemy refusing to relinquish possession.⁸⁵

The troops of the 66th Brigade holding the sector along the Meuse had an uneventful day except for the customary patrols and some shelling in their vicinity, coupled that night with a few bombs dropped in various parts of the division area.⁸⁶ The 132nd Infantry remained at Malancourt as part

of the corps reserve,⁸⁷ while the 65th Brigade took over part of the front facing the Meuse, and its right regiment, the 129th Infantry, suffered 374 casualties as a result of the heavy shelling and gassing to which it was subjected throughout the day.⁸⁸

In compliance with instructions received from General Headquarters, based upon the decision of the French government, announcement was made by the P. C. of the 33rd Division that "the legal time will be retarded at midnight, October fifth" and timepieces were accordingly directed to be set back one hour at midnight.⁸⁹

Sunday, October 6, was marked by no advance on the part of the IIIrd Corps, which continued the organization of the terrain already gained,⁹⁰ and was fairly quiet on the whole. The enemy artillery indulged in its customary harassing fire, shelling various points in the area of the 33rd Division, among them the Bois de Forges and the Côte de l'Oie, and his aeroplanes were likewise rather active. The Allied artillery was distinctly active during the day,⁹¹ all the available guns of the Army and IIIrd Corps concentrating on the enemy batteries in the Bois de Chatillon, while the 75s of the 52nd Field Artillery Brigade devoted their attention to the Tranchée de Teton and Briulles⁹² as instructed.⁹³ There were no changes of position on the part of this command until evening, when the 2nd Battalion, 104th Field Artillery, moved from La Claire to the vicinity of the Moulin de Raffecourt in proximity to the 1st Battalion of that regiment.⁹⁴ The 1st Battalion, 105th Field Artillery, remained in the Bois de la Côte Lemont as did the companies from the 123rd and 124th Machine Gun Battalions which supported the artillery by harassing fire on Briulles, the ridge northwest of that place, and the Tranchée de Teton.⁹⁵

To the troops of the 66th Infantry Brigade, occupying

the sector along the Meuse, the day was one of ordinary trench routine, with the usual patrols in the river valley and occasional artillery fire from the enemy.⁹⁶ The 132nd Infantry remained at Malancourt in the reserve of the IIIrd Corps, but its 3rd Battalion and machine gun company were attached that afternoon to the 4th Division, by orders from the IIIrd Corps,⁹⁷ reported to the commanding officer of the 59th Infantry, and during the night of October 6-7 relieved the 58th Infantry and a battalion of the 59th in the Bois de Fays.⁹⁸ At 9:30 P.M. orders were issued by the IIIrd Corps returning the remainder of the 132nd Infantry to the 33rd Division⁹⁹ but, obviously, they were not received until the following day.

Allusion has already been made to the operations of the 123rd Machine Gun Battalion and the events of that day which concerned the infantry of the 65th Brigade are thus described by its commander:¹⁰⁰

October 6th: Order of Corps Commander to neutralize the Trench de Teton by Machine Gun and Artillery fire and by Infantry raiding parties with bayonets and bombs, in order to protect the right flank of brigade troops in the Bois de Fays from danger of enemy machine gun fire, received and carried out. Final result reported October 7th. Town of Briulles on immediate left of Brigade front was bombed by 20 Allied planes commencing at 18:00 hours. First Bn. 129th Infantry was withdrawn from the line to Regimental Reserve [on] account [of] long continuous service in the line and having suffered heavy casualties as a result of enemy artillery activity concentrated upon that Regimental Sector and the enemy gas attack of October 5th.¹⁰¹ Commanding officer 130th Infantry made request for detail of engineers to remove nitro-glycerine charges from the muzzles of 7 captured German guns, which was approved. Orders issued to all units of the Brigade to insure men protecting themselves by proper wearing of the gas mask in case of gas attacks.

Save for the usual routine work and carrying out of in-

structions from higher authority, that Sunday was without event of particular interest in the P. C. of the 33rd Division¹⁰² until the receipt of an order issued that day by General Claudel, commanding the 17th French Army Corps, announcing that the 33rd Division had been placed under his command by order of General Pershing and that, while maintaining its normal defensive mission on the left bank of the Meuse, it should be in position to coöperate in an offensive action by the 17th Army Corps on the east bank "on J day at H hour."¹⁰³ To that end the 33rd Division was directed to place two battalions in the southern part of the Bois de Forges ready to cross at Brabant and one in the northern part preparatory to crossing at Consenvoye, the exact time of passage to depend upon the progress of the attack and to be fixed by the Commanding General of the 18th French Division (General Andlauer) who would be in charge of the operations on the left bank. Of engineers there were to be one or two companies in the region of Brabant-Consenvoye ready to throw bridges for the infantry. The artillery formed the subject of a separate order which prescribed its division into three groups; two battalions of 75s in battery south of the Bois de Forges, the third in the direction of the Côte de l'Oie and one battalion of 155s north of Chattancourt—the whole forming one group under a colonel to be designated by the Commanding General of the 33rd Division—the mission of which was to protect by a rolling barrage the attack of the two infantry battalions debouching from Consenvoye.¹⁰⁴ To insure complete unity of action, the first order directed that the infantry, engineers, and artillery of the 33rd Division participating in this attack should be placed "under the command of one and the same chief." These two communications were accompanied by a "Personal and Secret Note for the Generals commanding the 29th and 33rd Divisions, U. S.," which announced that "at the moment when the Normal Objective has been attained,

the American units will begin exploitation in the U. S. zone," and outlined the plan under which this exploitation would be effected.¹⁰⁵

The 33rd Division was likewise placed under the 17th French Army Corps by virtue of Field Order No. 24 issued by the IIIrd Corps that day, but only for tactical purposes;¹⁰⁶ for administration and supply it was retained under the IIIrd Corps by the provisions of an order issued at midnight that Sunday.¹⁰⁷

Monday, October 7, 1918, was largely devoted by the IIIrd Corps to holding and organizing the ground already gained and to preparing for future attack.¹⁰⁸ The cloudy weather which had persisted for days rendered aerial observation poor, so that the aeroplanes on both sides were very little in evidence. The artillery likewise was rather quiet, although there was some spasmodic firing during the course of the day and the enemy shelled the neighborhood of Forges with gas from 10 P.M. until shortly before midnight.¹⁰⁹ The 52nd Field Artillery Brigade was comparatively silent,¹¹⁰ but preparations were made for the attack next day;¹¹¹ and, in consequence thereof, the 2nd Battalion, 105th Field Artillery, moved at nightfall from the Bois de la Côte Lemont to new positions on the Côte de l'Oie.¹¹² About the same time Companies A and D, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, proceeded from the former place to the Bois de Forges, where they arrived about 9 P.M. and rejoined the rest of their command,¹¹³ leaving two companies of the 123rd Machine Gun Battalion in occupation of the Bois de la Côte Lemont¹¹⁴ together with the 1st Battalion, 130th Infantry.¹¹⁵

The troops of the 66th Infantry Brigade occupying the sector along the Meuse spent the day preparing for the attack of the morrow, and at dark the 2nd Battalion and Machine Gun Company, 131st Infantry, under Major Hamlet C. Ridg-

way, were assembled in the northern part of the Bois de Forges and placed under the command of Colonel Abel Davis, 132nd Infantry, in readiness to cross the river at Consenvoye next day.¹¹⁶ The commanding officer of the 132nd Infantry, having received from the IIIrd Corps the order returning his 1st and 2nd Battalions to the 33rd Division,¹¹⁷ proceeded with them from Malancourt to the Bois de Forges. There he was joined during the course of the evening by the detachment from the 131st Infantry just mentioned and by Companies B and D, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, the former of which put twelve guns in position on the ridge north of the Ravin du Gué Semette. In addition to these troops his command was comprised of Company A, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, which reported next morning at eight o'clock,¹¹⁸ two companies, 108th Engineers, which were busy that night, as they had been for several days, getting everything into readiness for the bridges which they were to throw opposite Brabant and Consenvoye; the 1st and 2nd Battalion, 104th Field Artillery, in the southwestern portion of the Bois de Forges; the 2nd Battalion, 105th Field Artillery, on the southern slopes of the Côte de l'Oie;¹¹⁹ and the 2nd Battalion, 106th Field Artillery (155-millimeter howitzers) near Chattancourt.

Allusion has already been made to the attaching of the 3rd Battalion, 132nd Infantry, to the 4th Division and to its relief of the 58th Infantry and one battalion of the 59th Infantry in the Bois de Fays during the night of October 6-7.¹²⁰ The position thus assumed formed a salient, with the enemy on both flanks and strongly entrenched in the Bois de Maulamont directly in front of it. This position was maintained throughout October 7 and 8, the patrols in constant contact with the Germans and the battalion itself subjected to "intense artillery and machine gun fire from both flanks."¹²¹

The operations of the infantry of the 65th Brigade were

principally confined to the usual trench routine, performed under constant artillery fire which inflicted a large number of casualties upon the 129th Infantry,¹²² and to complying with the warning order just received from the division P. C. relative to the utilization of troops of that regiment in the approaching operation east of the Meuse.¹²³

Apart from the customary routine work,¹²⁴ the P. C. of the 33rd Division at La Hutte in the Bois Bourrus spent a busy day in formulating, in pursuance of the orders of the 17th French Army Corps, the dispositions for the impending attack. These were communicated, in substance, to the unit commanders concerned by means of a warning order, followed at 6 P.M. by Field Order No. 27 embodying all the particulars and, subsequently, by the notification that "D" day had been fixed for October 8 and "H" hour at 5 A.M.¹²⁵ About the middle of the afternoon the Division Commander received a visit from General Andlauer, commanding the 18th French Division, under whose direction the attack was to be made next day, and every detail was found to be thoroughly understood.¹²⁶

During the course of the preceding narrative frequent mention has been made of the troops of the 33rd Division which were to participate in this operation, the purpose of which was to seize and hold the heights of the Meuse between that river and the Thinte northeast of Beaumont. The initial attack was to be made by the 17th Army Corps¹²⁷ with the 18th French Division on the west and the 26th French Division on the east, the former reënforced by four Senegalese battalions, the latter by two. The mission of the 18th Division, to which the 58th Brigade of the 29th American Division was attached, was to seize the observatories of Haumont, Ormont, and the ridge of Malbrouck; the 26th French Division was to get possession of the Bois des Caures

and the village of Flabas; the 10th French Colonial Division was destined to protect the attack of the 26th Division and to be prepared to seize the ridge of Caurières and the southern part of l'Herbebois; while the 15th French Colonial Division maintained its usual defensive mission on the extreme right.¹²⁸ The normal objective of the 17th Army Corps was fixed at the line Flabas (exclusive), Crépion (exclusive), southern edge of the Bois de la Reine, Consenvoye (exclusive), and, until it had been attained, the 33rd Division was to continue its defensive mission on the west bank of the Meuse. When the 18th and 26th French Divisions had gained the normal objective, their success was to be exploited by that part of the 33rd Division which was destined to cross to the east bank and by the 58th American Brigade which was to be introduced between the 33rd American and the 18th French Division.¹²⁹ The first exploitation objective of the corps was defined by the line Flabas (inclusive), Crépion (exclusive), Bois d'Etrayes, southern edge of the Bois de Chaume, while the second exploitation objective comprised Flabas (inclusive), Crépion (exclusive), Bois d'Etrayes (inclusive), Bois de la Grande Montagne and Sivry-sur-Meuse.¹³⁰ The 57th Brigade of the 29th American Division under Major General Charles G. Morton, was to remain with the corps reserve, since the fan-shaped terrain where the attack was to take place did not permit the 29th Division, which had not yet been in action, to be utilized in its entirety until the advance had progressed beyond the normal objective. The IIIrd Corps was to assist in this operation by a simultaneous attack west of the Meuse¹³¹ but, inasmuch as the principal operation was to occur on the east bank, the 26th American Division (Major General Clarence R. Edwards), which formed part of the reserve of the First Army, was stationed at Verdun.

To insure concerted action between it and the French

forces across the Meuse every precaution had been taken by the 33rd Division. All details in respect to infantry movements, artillery support, bridges to be built at Brabant and Consenvoye, engineering work to be performed,¹³² and liaison to be maintained, had been thoroughly arranged by means of frequent conferences between the officers of the 33rd Division on one hand and those of the 17th Army Corps and the 18th French Division on the other.¹³³ A cable had been laid across the Meuse¹³⁴ and, on the night of October 7-8, everything was in readiness for the attack.¹³⁵

V. OPERATIONS WITH THE 17TH FRENCH ARMY CORPS ASTRIDE THE MEUSE, OCTOBER 8 TO OCTOBER 15, 1918

At 5 A.M. on Tuesday, October 8, 1918, the attack of the 17th French Army Corps began on the east bank of the Meuse without preliminary artillery preparation.¹ While the 15th and 10th Colonial Divisions on the east maintained a defensive attitude, the 26th and 18th French Divisions were launched in a direction approximately north-northeast. The latter, which formed the left of the attack at its opening, jumped off at the zero hour from its trenches east of Samogneux and, as it advanced, the battalions of the 58th Infantry Brigade (29th Division), which had been assembled along the Meuse Canal,² came into their allotted positions on its left.³ This delicate operation was effected with remarkable smoothness and precision. Although the enemy flooded Côte 344 with gas shells within the first hour, he was evidently unprepared for such a manoeuvre and at 7:20 A.M. his customary artillery reaction had not occurred.⁴ Pushing forward toward their respective objectives,⁵ the French and Americans crossed near Brabant, the road leading northeast from that place, and shortly before 8 A.M. the 58th Infantry Brigade reached the Tranchée de Balis. Upon receiving a report to this effect, General Andlauer requested the Commanding General of the 33rd Division to order the leading battalion of the 132nd Infantry to cross the Meuse at Brabant.⁶

Meanwhile the engineers had been hard at work per-

forming a task of extreme difficulty. During the night of October 7–8, those of the 18th French Division had constructed a bridge over the canal at Samogneux; the engineers of the 17th Army Corps had built a pontoon bridge over the Meuse at Regnéville;⁷ and the 108th Engineers of the 33rd Division had everything in readiness to throw passages for infantry over the river and canal opposite Brabant and Consenvoye. At dawn on October 8 this work was begun and pushed at top speed, despite the fact that the material had to be carried and put into place under direct enemy observation in broad daylight, and the construction effected under heavy artillery fire averaging ninety shells an hour—many of them gas shells, so that masks had to be worn during part of the time. The maximum depth of water near Brabant was 12 feet and the bridge was 120 feet in length; near Consenvoye the maximum depth of water was 16 feet and the bridge 156 feet long, the latter requiring five and a half hours of work to finish. Notwithstanding the difficulties and casualties involved, the construction progressed without interruption and with such rapidity that both bridges were finished on scheduled time. The main bridge at Consenvoye, which had been partly destroyed, was then reestablished and important repairs were made on the Brabant-Consenvoye road, both operations being carried on under heavy shell fire.⁸

The 108th Field Signal Battalion showed similar efficiency under equal handicaps. During the night of October 7–8 a telephone cable was laid across the marshes, river, and canal of the Meuse; but at daybreak one working party was fired upon, attacked, and part of it captured. The necessary work had been successfully performed, however, so that there was no interruption in the communication between both banks and, by a lucky chance, the Americans who had been made prisoners were recaptured later in the day.⁹

Upon receipt, about 8 A.M., of the instructions from the Commander of the 18th French Division—to which allusion has been made—the necessary orders were sent from the P. C. of the 33rd Division to Colonel Abel Davis.¹⁰ At 9 A.M. the 1st and 2nd Battalions, 132nd Infantry, were accordingly set in motion from the southern part of the Bois de Forges, crossed the Meuse on the newly constructed bridge near Brabant,¹¹ and formed just north of that village on a line running east and west, the 2nd Battalion on the right, the 1st on the left.¹² The effectiveness of employing machine guns in intimate conjunction with the infantry had been strikingly demonstrated by the 33rd Division in its attack on September 26.¹³ Profiting by this experience, accordingly, Company A, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, was posted on the right of the 2nd Battalion¹⁴ and Company D on the left of the 1st Battalion.¹⁵ Each battalion had also sections of trench mortars and 37-millimeter guns attached to it. The 2nd Battalion, 131st Infantry, which was to form the support, was left in the northern portion of the Bois de Forges, inasmuch as it was destined to cross at Consenvoye, and was similarly provided, the machine gun company of the same regiment being attached to it.¹⁶ Company B, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, which had put twelve guns in position north of the Ravin du Gué Semette during the night of October 7–8, remained on the left bank to coöperate with the artillery in covering the attack east of the Meuse,¹⁷ while Company C, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, was retained with the other battalions of the 131st Infantry occupying the sector of the 66th Infantry Brigade along the river.¹⁸

At 10:15 A.M. it was reported that the 18th French Division had experienced great difficulty in its progress through the Bois d'Haumont on account of enemy wire and machine guns and that its schedule was therefore delayed one hour.

On its left the 58th American Infantry Brigade was reported to be in possession of the Balis and Anatolie Trenches and of Malbrouck, its first objective, and to have reached the southern edge of the Bois de Brabant.¹⁹ At 11 A.M. the 1st and 2nd Battalions, 132nd Infantry, together with the two machine gun companies operating with them—the entire force in line of combat groups preceded by scouts—began their advance toward the normal objective assigned to them; namely, the road running from Consenvoye²⁰ northeast to the northern edge of the Bois de Consenvoye. The movement had scarcely commenced when both flanks came under enemy machine-gun fire, the right from the southwestern edge of the Bois de Consenvoye, the left from the village of Consenvoye. This menace, which was decidedly unexpected inasmuch as it had been assumed that this region had been thoroughly mopped up by the troops ahead, was promptly met by dispatching to either flank combat groups of half platoons, with automatic riflemen in the lead. By this method the hostile machine-gun nests were engaged and their fire confined against the flanks while the line continued its advance.²¹ The enemy in addition used anti-tank guns against the troops and a number of casualties were sustained; but, at 12:30 P.M., the normal objective was reached and the lines were re-formed pending the receipt of orders for a resumption of the advance to the first exploitation objective.²²

Meanwhile, the progress of the 58th Infantry Brigade had been temporarily held up near Malbrouck, but at 1:50 P.M.—after examining a map dropped by an aviator near P. C. Neptune, which showed the left of the 17th Army Corps in position from Consenvoye to the Bois de Consenvoye—the Commander of the 18th Division gave instructions that the third battalion from the 33rd Division cross immediately at Consenvoye and that the entire force push forward, under the

protection of its artillery, from the normal objective to the first exploitation objective north of the Bois de Chaume.²³ In conformity therewith, the 2nd Battalion and Machine Gun Company, 131st Infantry, left the northern part of the Bois de Forges, crossed the Meuse by the newly-completed foot-bridge, and took position in support of the two battalions of the 132nd Infantry. The sequel is thus described by Colonel Davis.²⁴

At 3:00 P.M. the order came to make the advance at 4 P.M. Accordingly, the battalions started off under the protection of a rolling barrage,²⁵ keeping 300 meters in the rear of the barrage. The advance proceeded without much opposition until darkness when the attacking battalions at the south edge of the Bois de Chaume there halted and dug-in for the night.²⁶

The consolidation was effected in echelon by the 2nd Battalion, 132nd Infantry, on the right, one hundred meters south of the southern edge of the Bois de Chaume, and by the 1st Battalion, on the left, about seven hundred meters northeast of Consenvoye, while the 2nd Battalion, 131st Infantry, took position on the Consenvoye-Richêne road, south of the Bois de Chaume, in support.²⁷ The line of the 17th Army Corps extended that evening from these positions across the western edge of the Bois de Consenvoye and north of Malbrouck through points 5996 and 6596 in the Bois de Brabant to the Ravin de Walonsevaux, where the right of the 58th Infantry Brigade rested. Thence it ran northeast to point 6901, where it bent sharply southeast through the Ormont Ferme, the observation post south of the Bois d'Ormont and the northern edge of the Bois d'Haumont, turned east and slightly north to the northwestern corner of the Bois des Caures, where it swung abruptly south through Côte 329 to the wood of La Wavrille northeast of Beaumont.²⁸ This front was a mixture of the intermediate and normal objectives, coupled with certain posi-

tions in advance of the latter line. So far as the troops of the 66th Brigade on the east bank of the Meuse were concerned, their operation that Tuesday had been a complete success,²⁹ and their position at nightfall south of the Bois de Chaume and the first exploitation objective conformed to the intentions of General Andlauer, who purposed to utilize them as the pivot on the left for the manoeuvres during the succeeding days.³⁰

The position of the 33rd Division astride the Meuse was distinctly delicate, as such positions invariably are, particularly in view of the extensive marshes on both sides of the river and the canal, the limited number of bridges available near the front, the difficulty of rapid communication, and the fact that the enemy artillery and machine guns on the heights north and east of Sivry-sur-Meuse completely dominated, not only the open ground adjacent to the right bank, but the American positions on the left bank for a considerable distance below Dannevoux. It was therefore essential that the ground gained on the east bank be securely held, lest a retirement by the troops there expose the right flank of those on the opposite bank and oblige them to withdraw, thereby in turn, imperiling the right of the IIIrd American Corps. Accordingly, every measure was taken by the Commander of the 33rd Division to guard against such an eventuality and to be in readiness to support his forces on the east bank at a moment's notice.

With this purpose in view, orders were sent that afternoon to the commanding officer of the 131st Infantry to concentrate the 1st and 3rd Battalions of his regiment on the edges of the Bois de Forges ready to act as a reserve for the troops on the east bank in case of emergency. This order was promptly carried out,³¹ but there were no further changes that day or night in their position nor in the positions of Com-

panies B and C, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, in the sector of the 66th Brigade west of the Meuse.³²

So far as active operations went, the day was comparatively quiet for the 65th Brigade, since orders had been received to refrain from further raids or attacks on the Trenchée de Teton.³³ The 129th Infantry, which formed the right and occupied the sector in the bend of the Meuse from above Dannevoux to a point opposite Vilosnes, supported by Company B, 123rd Machine Gun Battalion, had another costly day, losing 178 officers and men from heavy shelling and gassing. That night its 3rd Battalion and Machine Gun Company, sent to reënforce the troops on the east bank, crossed at Consenvoye and reached their destination at 2 A.M. on October 9.³⁴ The sector west of the 129th was held by the 130th Infantry and Company B, 123rd Machine Gun Battalion, their left terminating at the farther edge of the Bois de la Côte Lemont which, as well as Hill 281, was occupied by Companies A and D, 123rd Machine Gun Battalion.³⁵ The 3rd Battalion of the 130th constituted the brigade reserve in the vicinity of the brigade P. C. at Hill 281, south of Ger-court-et-Drillancourt.³⁶

The divisional artillery was comparatively silent throughout the day, although the 1st Battalion, 106th Field Artillery (155-millimeter howitzers), engaged in harassing fire against the Bois de Chaume from 8:40 A.M. until 3 P.M., incidentally devoting some attention to enemy machine guns in the open ravine between that wood and the Bois de Consenvoye.³⁷ On the other hand, the group under Colonel Smith, 106th Field Artillery,³⁸ was kept well occupied. At 5 A.M. the 2nd Battalion, 105th Field Artillery (75-millimeter guns), joined with the French guns in barrages on sensitive points, lifting as the infantry attack progressed; about noon, however, its fire ceased.³⁹ At 4 P.M., the time set for the advance of the troops

of the 33rd Division from the normal objective, rolling and standing barrages were laid down on the east bank of the Meuse for two hours by the 75s,⁴⁰ together with accompanying fire by the "heavies" for an hour and thirty-five minutes.⁴¹ The enemy was evidently on the alert, since he pounded the Bois de Forges with 75s and 155s from 1:30 to 4 A.M. During the attack that morning, however, his artillery reaction was rather weak, probably owing to the superiority of the six hundred guns at the disposal of the 17th Army Corps, but in the course of the afternoon he showed decided activity in counterbarrages and in harassing fire along the lines of communications.⁴² The Allies retaliated however, with a continuous fire of their heavy and long-range guns throughout the night of October 8.

During the evening the Commander of the 17th Army Corps issued his orders for the ensuing day, directing that advantage be taken of that night to hold the ground already gained, particularly the Bois d'Haumont, to reorganize the units and reserves, and to rectify the positions of the troops, which were to be echeloned in depth. Announcement was made that the attack would be resumed at 8:30 A.M. on October 9, and emphasis was laid upon the urgency for progress along the crest of Hill 338 north of Malbrouck, to the north and northwest of the Bois de Consenvoye, at the Bois d'Ormont and in the direction of Flabas—the purpose of the last being to clean up the terrain between the Bois d'Haumont and the Bois des Caures. The right flank of the corps was to be protected by the 26th and 10th Colonial Divisions (French), while the 57th Brigade (29th American Division) was retained in the corps reserve, with one regiment and a machine gun battalion on the right bank of the Meuse in the zone of Brabant-Samogneux and a like force on the Côte de l'Oie.⁴³

It was quite late when this order reached the P. C. of the

33rd Division, so that it was not until 11:45 P.M. that Field Order No. 28 was issued. It embodied all the above which pertained to the division but fixed the beginning of the exploitation at 6 A.M., when the artillery was to lay down a standing barrage which was to roll forward at 6:40 A.M. It likewise directed that the battalion of the 129th Infantry, already placed at the disposal of Colonel Davis, cross to the east bank that same night, and it put special stress upon the necessity for care in protecting the right flank and in maintaining liaison between it and the troops of the 29th Division.⁴⁴

On Wednesday, October 9, 1918, at 6 A.M., a standing barrage fired by the artillery group under Colonel Smith came down in front of troops of the 33rd Division, which had spent the previous night on the right bank of the Meuse south of the Bois de Chaume and along the Consenvoye-Richêne road.⁴⁵ Both battalions and the two machine gun companies operating with them then formed three hundred meters in its rear and at 6:40 A.M., when this barrage began to roll forward,⁴⁶ the infantry started to advance. The 1st Battalion, 132nd Infantry, and Company D, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, on the left, moved nearly parallel to the Consenvoye-Sivry-sur-Meuse road over the open ground and along the slopes which skirt the east bank in this sector. Although under heavy fire from enemy artillery and machine guns, and although several times held up, no unusual obstacles were encountered; under the protection of a double barrage and accompanying fire from the guns of their own artillery group,⁴⁷ at 11 A.M. they reached the first exploitation objective, which ran from a point nearly opposite Dannevoux to the northern edge of the Bois de Chaume. Strong combat patrols were sent forward toward the second exploitation objective, about one kilometer farther north, and the troops began to dig in.⁴⁸

The 2nd Battalion, 132nd Infantry, and Company A, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, on the right, experienced much greater difficulties. Upon reaching the middle of the Bois de Chaume these units met stout opposition from the enemy, whose well-served machine guns inflicted some losses upon them and delayed their progress until they fell behind their proper alignment with the units on the left. In spite of the thick woods, dense underbrush, and incessant machine-gun fire from the east and northeast, their advance continued, although somewhat slowly. Progress became increasingly difficult, owing to the constantly augmented volume of machine-gun fire against the right flank, coming, apparently, from the sector through which the 58th Infantry Brigade (29th Division) was presumed to be advancing.⁴⁹ The 2nd Battalion and the machine gun company operating with it pushed on, nevertheless, and eventually reached the first exploitation objective at 11:55 A.M., nearly one hour after the arrival of the troops forming the left. Both detachments then sent out strong combat patrols toward the second objective and proceeded to dig in.⁵⁰

The 2nd Battalion and Machine Gun Company, 131st Infantry, which constituted the support, upon reaching its allotted position, detached one company to cover the right flank while the other dug in a short distance in the rear of the 2nd Battalion.⁵¹

As soon as the barrage lifted, the combat patrols from both the front line battalions advanced to the second exploitation objective, which in that sector followed approximately the road from Sivry-sur-Meuse to the Villeneuve Ferme. The intervening ground was without cover, save for a few scattering copses, and considerable opposition was encountered, particularly by the patrols from the 2nd Battalion on the right. A number of machine-gun nests and small groups of the enemy

had to be reduced to submission, but ultimately these combat patrols attained the second exploitation objective. Just as they reached this line the dense fog lifted; to the amazement of both sides, the fronts were seen to be only about fifty meters apart. The enemy quickly fell back several hundred yards but left some machine guns in his main line of defense.⁵²

The situation of these forces and the conditions confronting them are thus graphically described by Colonel Davis:⁵³

Throughout the advance from the normal to the second objective our right battalion looked in vain for liaison with the Division on our right.⁵⁴ Under orders, our troops were to attempt to reach their second objective independently of the action of the troops on our right. On reaching the final objective it became certain that the troops on our right failed entirely to advance from the normal objective. In fact the troops on our right had even failed to reach the normal objective.⁵⁵ This situation left an exposed flank on our right of approximately 2,000 meters. The enemy took advantage of the situation by pressing hard against our right flank, filtering through the gap left open by the failure of the troops on our right to advance. The activity of small groups of the enemy was followed by a counter-attack directed against the exposed right flank. The employment of the battalion in support and the two companies on the extreme right flank was not sufficient to overcome the counter-attack and hold the line at the same time. It became necessary to bend the right flank in an effort to connect up with the extreme left of the Division on our right. In the counter-attack the enemy employed Infantry⁵⁶ assisted by machine guns, played quite heavily with his artillery on our lines and used a large number of airplanes which were flying low and firing directly at our troops. The enemy failed to break up our lines. He was repulsed after inflicting many casualties on us and sustaining more himself. The line was then re-organized with the extreme right flank resting on the line of the normal objective.⁵⁷ The left flank remaining on the second exploitation objective.⁵⁸

That night it was decided to employ another regiment in an advance to the second exploitation objective in coöperation with the Division on our right, which was to make another

effort in the advance in which it failed that day. Accordingly an attack was delivered the following morning through our lines. Our troops retired and formed the reserve for the troops ahead of us.

At the close of the fighting that day the front of the 17th Army Corps ran from a point five hundred meters south of Sivry-sur-Meuse along the northern edge of the Bois de Chaume, through the Bois Boussois, the Bois de Molleville, the Ferme d'Ormont, the northern edge of the Bois d'Hau-mont, the northwestern edge of the Bois des Caures and points 96.80 and 06.76 in that wood, along the southern edge of the Bois de Champneuville, through the Dauphin work, the Bonnet work in La Wavrinle and Côte 351 to the north-eastern corner of the Bois les Fosses, beyond Beaumont.⁵⁹

That Wednesday evening witnessed the conclusion of the operations in the front line on the east bank of the Meuse by the forces under Colonel Davis. Their part had been well played. In two days they had advanced into enemy territory more than five kilometers;⁶⁰ they had broken through the Hagen Stellung and the Volker Stellung and had reached the Giselher Stellung, the principal line of enemy resistance. They had captured 20 officers and 760 men—including an Austrian major and 5 lieutenants—13 guns, 3 trench mortars and 113 machine guns.⁶¹ They had met with stubborn resistance, had been heavily pounded with shells and machine-gun fire, and flooded with gas.⁶² They had been attacked by picked German shock troops on their right, which had been left exposed and which it was the mission of the adjoining American brigade to protect; they had lost one officer and 37 men killed, and 11 officers and 315 men wounded.⁶³ Although compelled to relinquish about one kilometer of the ground gained, they were the only troops on the east bank of the Meuse whose

position that evening, even after falling back, was near the first exploitation objective. Allusion has already been made to the gallantry of Captains McCormick and Masoner and the 105 men with them who had been surrounded but heroically defended their position all night.⁶⁴ The machine gun companies, too, displayed exceptional efficiency and courage during the enemy counterattack, thus contributing effectually in breaking it up at a moment when it threatened to become extremely serious.⁶⁵

The instant the report of the enforced withdrawal of these troops reached the Division Commander, he acted with characteristic vigor. As it was manifest that larger forces were required on the east bank, Brigadier General Wolf, commanding the 65th Infantry Brigade, was immediately placed in charge⁶⁶ and reënforcements were hurried across the river. The 3rd Battalion and Machine Gun Company, 129th Infantry, had already reached the left bank⁶⁷ and were followed by Company B, 122nd Machine Gun Battalion.⁶⁸ Beginning about darkness, the bridges that night were packed with troops of the 33rd Division marching to the support of their comrades east of the Meuse, the 1st and 3rd Battalions, 131st Infantry,⁶⁹ followed by Company B, 124th Machine Gun Battalion;⁷⁰ the 1st and 2nd Battalions, 129th Infantry, accompanied by the 3rd Battalion, 130th Infantry;⁷¹ and Company A, 122nd Machine Gun Battalion.⁷² These movements were effected with unusual rapidity and precision, considering the darkness, the paucity of bridges, and the difficulties of the terrain, and these reënforcements arrived at their allotted positions in ample time for the attack next morning.⁷³

The withdrawal of the 2nd Battalion and Machine Gun Company, 131st Infantry, on the night of October 7, coupled with the movement of the 1st and 3rd Battalions to the east bank about 4 P.M. on October 9,⁷⁴ left Company C, 124th

Machine Gun Battalion, in the Bois de Forges the sole occupant of the sector originally occupied by the 66th Brigade. The presence of troops of the 33rd Division directly across the Meuse lessened the necessity of holding that portion of the front strongly; but it was, nevertheless, highly undesirable that this sector should be left without any troops. To prevent such a possibility, the Commanding General of the 65th Brigade issued orders that afternoon for two platoons to occupy the sector between Dannevoux and a point opposite Consenvoye.⁷⁵ The 3rd Battalion and Machine Gun Company of the 129th Infantry had marched to the right bank on the night of October 8-9,⁷⁶ followed on the next night at 8 o'clock by the 1st and 2nd Battalions of that regiment and by the 3rd Battalion, 130th Infantry.⁷⁷ This reduction in the strength of the 65th Brigade to two battalions of infantry and one of machine guns necessitated a redistribution of these troops, and that night the 2nd Battalion, 130th Infantry, took over the sector in the Bois de Dannevoux formerly held by the 129th Infantry,⁷⁸ while the positions of two of the brigade machine gun companies were modified to meet the requirements which had been thus suddenly altered.⁷⁹

Beyond the routine customary under such circumstances, the day was a quiet one at the P. C. of the 33rd Division until the arrival that afternoon of the report that the troops across the Meuse had been forced to retire from the second exploitation objective. From that minute until long after midnight the dugout at La Hutte bustled with activity. No field order was issued that evening—it was a time for action, not for writing long and detailed instructions—⁸⁰but every effort was bent toward hurrying forward reënforcements and toward making the necessary arrangements for the attack which was to be launched at dawn—6:05 A.M. was the hour set—in conformity with the Division Commander's determination to retake every

inch of ground lost that afternoon. The steps thus taken anticipated, but at the same time harmonized with, the order issued that evening by the Commander of the 17th Army Corps, which prescribed that "the action will be pursued tomorrow, 10th October, along the entire front" and that the "33rd U. S. Infantry Division will assure the possession of the Bois de Chaume in liaison with the 29th U. S. Infantry Division and will push reconnaissances onto the crest of St. Pantaléon and on Sivry." On its right the 29th American Division and the 18th French Division were to continue "the progress toward the objectives of the plan of engagement, notably in the direction of the Bois de la Grande Montagne and in the region Bois de la Reine—Bois d'Ormont—Bois de Moirey, the conquest of which will mark an important result." By reason of the extension of the front, the 57th American Brigade, which had crossed to the right bank of the Meuse, was placed at the disposal of the general commanding the 18th French Division, who was empowered to engage it on the right of the 58th Brigade in such a way that the elements of the 29th American Division would remain grouped together. The 26th and 10th Colonial Divisions (French) were to continue their mission of protecting the right, the 114th Infantry and 110th Machine Gun Battalion (57th Brigade) were retained on the Côte de l'Oie, and the corps artillery was instructed to continue its missions of interdiction, counter-battery, and support of the divisional artilleries.⁸¹

The activities of Thursday, October 10, 1918, began at daybreak with an attack by the 66th Brigade for the purpose of retaking the ground relinquished the day before, and all the reënforcements which had been hurried to the east bank of the Meuse during the preceding night arrived in ample time. The mission assigned to these forces was to clear the Bois de Chaume and the Bois Plat-Chêne and to exploit to

the second exploitation objective of the corps. Consolidation was to be effected on a line from the Tranchée de l'Hôpital along the northern edge of the Bois de Chaume and the Bois Plat-Chêne to Meridian 24. Starting at 6:05 A.M. from the immediate rear of the trenches south of the Bois de Chaume, the attack was to be made directly north by two battalions 131st Infantry, one battalion 129th Infantry, two companies 124th Machine Gun Battalion, and one company 122nd Machine Gun Battalion, these troops being placed under the command of Colonel Sanborn of the 131st Infantry. Two battalions in the front line and one in reserve following and protecting the right flank were to advance, under the protection of a rolling barrage, at the rate of one hundred meters every six minutes. The maintenance of combat liaison with the 115th Infantry (58th Brigade) on the right was confided to the 131st Infantry. The Brigade reserve, composed of one battalion 129th Infantry, one battalion 130th Infantry, and one company 122nd Machine Gun Battalion, was ordered to assemble immediately north of Consenvoye at 5 A.M.,⁸² under the command of Colonel Myer of the 129th Infantry.

Upon reaching the jumping-off line the troops were formed⁸³ shortly before the zero hour; at 6:05 A.M. the barrage came down⁸⁴ and the attack was launched through the line of the forces under Colonel Davis in the Tranchée du Câble.⁸⁵ The enemy was not caught napping; during the night his machine guns had worked around the right and rear of the 132nd Infantry and, while the 1st Battalion, 131st Infantry, and the 3rd Battalion of the 129th were forming, machine-gun fire from the Bois de Consenvoye took them in the rear.⁸⁶

On the left of the attacking line the 3rd Battalion, 131st Infantry, and Company B, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, encountered thick woods, dense undergrowth, and a succession

of machine-gun nests which it required considerable time to overcome.⁸⁷ Effective use was made of the trench mortars and 37-millimeter gun but rapid progress was impossible in view of the continuous opposition. Into the middle of the Bois de Chaume an open ravine projects from the north and, upon reaching this opening, seven enemy aeroplanes flew low and sprayed the troops with machine-gun fire, while bombs dropped by three aeroplanes resulted in four casualties.⁸⁸ Upon debouching from the northern edge of the Bois de Chaume these troops found themselves boxed in by a counter-barrage along that wood, in the valley Dans les Vaux and on the ridge beyond, which had been put down by the enemy artillery and machine guns. Nevertheless they pushed onward through this barrage and, closely followed by Company B, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, about 10 A.M. reached the crest immediately south of the second exploitation objective, which in the sector of the 66th Brigade was the road from Sivry-sur-Meuse to the Villeneuve Ferme.⁸⁹

Meanwhile, the 1st Battalion, 131st Infantry, and Company B, 122nd Machine Gun Battalion, forming the right, had met with similar difficulties in the shape of natural obstacles, were subjected to incessant machine-gun fire, and were further hampered by the exposure of their right flank resulting from the failure of the 58th Infantry Brigade to keep pace with them. So hot was the enemy's fire that the 1st Battalion became somewhat disorganized,⁹⁰ and Companies B and C were so effectually flanked by it that their advance was completely arrested until two companies from the 3rd Battalion, 129th Infantry, came to their assistance.⁹¹ On the other hand, Companies A and D, which constituted the assaulting echelon, pushed forward and, about 10 A.M., the leading platoons attained the crest overlooking the second exploitation objective.⁹² Their arrival was almost simultaneous with that of

the 3rd Battalion on the west⁹³ and the void between the two was subsequently filled by the major part of Company B, 124th Machine Gun Battalion.⁹⁴ The ridge was, however, swept by such intense enemy artillery and machine-gun fire that it had to be abandoned within a short time and all the front-line troops had to be withdrawn behind the crest for shelter.⁹⁵ The position ordered to be consolidated ran through the Tranchée de l'Hôpital and thence northeastwardly along the northern edge of the woods to Meridian 24, but was untenable since it was exposed to hostile fire and, furthermore, its vegetation was reeking with gas. After a brief conference the two battalion commanders selected the northern slopes of the valley Dans les Vaux and the Ravin de la Vaux de Mille Mais on account of the protection which they afforded; the troops were ordered to dig in along this line,⁹⁶ their front covered by a chain of outposts composed of automatic rifle squads stationed just north of the crest for the purpose of observation and as a protection against counterattacks.⁹⁷ It was in this sheltered position that they were rejoined sometime later by Companies B and C, 131st Infantry, which had been held up early in the attack and which, upon arriving, were posted on the right of the 1st Battalion.⁹⁸

The 3rd Battalion, 129th Infantry, which constituted the part of the support for the front line troops and which was to follow five hundred meters behind them in order to protect their right flank, experienced many vicissitudes. When Companies B and C, 131st Infantry, were stopped by machine-gun fire from the east, two companies of the 3rd Battalion, 129th Infantry, eventually were sent to their assistance. The remaining two companies of this battalion passed through them and continued toward their objective, which they attained about 2 P.M., and took position on the extreme right of the front line, a short distance southeast of the Magenta

Ferme. When the enemy's machine guns had been subdued⁹⁹ sufficiently to permit Companies B and C, 131st Infantry, to resume their movement, Company B of the 129th Infantry continued its advance and about 3 P.M. rejoined the rest of the battalion. After this affair at noon Company L, having been charged to maintain liaison with the 115th Infantry (58th Brigade), made no further advance,¹⁰⁰ and the stragglers did not put in an appearance until the following morning.¹⁰¹

The 3rd Battalion, 130th Infantry, which formed part of the reserve, was however directed by Colonel Sanborn to follow five hundred yards in the rear of the 3rd Battalion of the 129th and was given special instructions to support the right. Like the others it encountered numerous difficulties. It had scarcely got under way when it was caught in an enemy barrage which descended upon it in the open valley south of the Bois Plat-Chêne. The infiltration of hostile machine guns in the zone through which the 58th Infantry Brigade was presumed to be advancing culminated in an enfilade fire from one enemy nest which was so heavy against the right of this command that the battalion was thrown into disorder and Companies I and K became partly disorganized. Terrestrial fire was not the only thing which had to be contended with; the troops were heavily bombed and machine-gunned by hostile aeroplanes and were even subjected to point-blank fire from some 77s in their right rear. While Company M continued to the objective assigned to the battalion at the northern edge of the Bois de Chaume, Major Bittel remained behind, rallied such men as he could collect, and sent them forward in detachments to rejoin Company M. It was not, however, until the following morning that the stragglers who were scattered throughout the thick woods were assembled and brought back to the command,¹⁰² which had spent the night in the Bois de Chaume in a position on Parallel 82 between the Wuillebau-

bois ravine and the road which separates the Bois de Chaume from the Bois Plat-Chêne.¹⁰³ The necessity for thorough liaison between the units engaged in a combined attack was strikingly illustrated inasmuch as "the failure of the troops on the right to advance subjected this Battalion and all other troops in this advance to terrific artillery fire consisting of high explosive, shrapnel and gas, as well as flanking machine gun fire resulting in many casualties."¹⁰⁴

Three times the front line troops pushed forward to the second exploitation objective, only to be compelled to fall back, since the position was untenable and their right flank was dangerously "in the air."¹⁰⁵ Throughout the day the troops were harassed with fire of every sort and the terrain which they occupied was flooded with gas.¹⁰⁶ The enemy persisted with his infiltration against the exposed right¹⁰⁷ and the situation became such that the brigade commander ordered the 1st Battalion, 129th Infantry, and Company A, 122nd Machine Gun Battalion, to advance and to form a defensive flank on the east. This movement was made under a constantly increasing shell and machine-gun fire, and a position *en potence* on the extreme right was taken by these units,¹⁰⁸ their left touching the right of the 3rd Battalion, 129th Infantry,¹⁰⁹ near the Magenta Ferme and their front facing east extending directly south across the Vaux de Mille Mais to the eastern terminus of the Ravin du Plat-Chêne. The opposite extremity of the line was held by the Machine Gun Company, 131st Infantry, in the Tranchée de la Vanne, its left resting on the Consenvoye-Sivry road and its right at the northwestern edge of the Bois de Chaume, liaison with the left company of the 131st Infantry being maintained by night patrols. The troops which constituted the reserve of the 66th Brigade—the 1st and 2nd Battalions, 132nd Infantry, the 2nd Battalion, 131st Infantry,¹¹⁰ and Company A, 124th

Machine Gun Battalion—remained in their positions south of the Bois de Chaume in the Tranchée du Câble, while in the extreme rear the 2nd Battalion, 129th Infantry, and Company D, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, continued to occupy the trenches near Consenvoye.¹¹¹

The situation at the time and the measures of security taken for the approaching night, which was destined to be the prelude of the days and nights when these troops were so unmercifully punished with every weapon possessed by the enemy,¹¹² are thus described by Colonel Sanborn,¹¹³ who commanded the leading battalions in this attack:

During the afternoon of the 10th it became evident that no support would be forthcoming from troops on our right. Many messages came in reciting the fact that [our] troops were under heavy machine gun fire, shell fire and gas. Nine enemy planes sprayed the lines with machine gun fire for five minutes without opposition. Later the raid was repeated. Enemy troops started working around the right flank in small squads. . . and more or less disorganization existed in some of the three Regimental Detachments and Machine Gun Companies scattered as they were through the woods. After consultation with the Brigade Commander, it was decided to hold a line with detachments and to dig in a defensive position in the valley Dans les Vaux through the woods east to Grid Line 24 [which position was] to be held at all costs.¹¹⁴ All troops except those holding the line and [in the] Brigade Reserve were to be employed on the work.¹¹⁵ Lieutenant Colonel Stansfield, 132nd Infantry, who was with the reserve was given instructions to order the work. It was impossible to complete parts of this line during daylight. Work was continued at intervals when opportunity permitted. Not much progress was made in the way of connecting up the entire line, but individual units dug in the best they could. Major Bittel did especially good work in preparing his position, cutting out underbrush, wiring approaches, etc.

To the 20 officers and 760 men captured by the 132nd Infantry on the two preceding days were added 4 officers and

149 men, besides a considerable quantity of enemy *matériel* of all sorts.¹¹⁶

On the west bank of the Meuse were two units belonging to the 66th Infantry Brigade. The first—Company C, 124th Machine Gun Battalion—remained in reserve in the Bois de Forges,¹¹⁷ whereas the other—the 3rd Battalion, 132nd Infantry—had been detached. As has been seen, it relieved the 58th Infantry and a battalion of the 59th Infantry in the Bois du Fays on the night of October 6–7 and held that difficult position during October 7, 8, and 9. On October 10 two of its companies participated, in the support line, in an advance attack through the Bois de Malaumont and during the night were sent forward into the front line preparatory to a resumption of the attack next day.¹¹⁸

The 65th Infantry Brigade, greatly depleted by virtue of the reënforcements which it had sent across the river—thus reducing it to two battalions of infantry and one of machine guns—spent a comparatively quiet day,¹¹⁹ especially as the enemy shelling was lighter than usual. The taking over of the outpost and defense lines in the Bois de Dannevoux vacated by the 129th Infantry the night before was finished at 3:15 A.M. by the 2nd Battalion, 130th Infantry, and the entire sector in the bend of the Meuse from the Laiterie de Belhame through the Bois de Dannevoux to the western edge of the Bois de la Côte Lemont was therefore thinly held by the 1st and 2nd Battalions of that regiment.¹²⁰ Companies B and C, 123rd Machine Gun Battalion, remained in their former positions in the line, but the other two companies were sent that night to join the forces on the east bank.¹²¹

Aside from making two requests to the corps artillery for fire against certain points out of range, ordering one platoon from the 102nd Trench Mortar Battery to be put at the disposal of the commanding officer, 131st Infantry, direct-

ing all available machine guns placed in the Bois de Forges for anti-aircraft missions, and instructing the 105th Field Artillery to do some counterbattery work, the 52nd Field Artillery Brigade spent a rather tranquil day.¹²² The artillery group under Colonel Smith, on the other hand, was busily employed in supporting the troops east of the Meuse with barrages and accompanying fire.¹²³ Frequent allusion has been made to the activity that day of the enemy artillery which pounded the Bois de Chaume in a decidedly lively fashion from 1 to 5:30 P.M. About 8 P.M. it shelled the Bois de Forges in accordance with its almost daily custom and from 11 P.M. until an hour after midnight kept the 130th Infantry awake by bombarding Danneveux and its neighborhood with 105-millimeter shells.¹²⁴

Early in the evening the Corps Commander issued his orders for the operations of the morrow.¹²⁵ Announcement was made that the line attained at the close of the day by the 17th Army Corps ran through the Tranchée de la Vanne across the northern edge of the Bois de Chaume and the Bois Plat-Chêne, through "Hill 371 (west of Richêne),¹²⁶ northern edge of the Bois de Molleville, Bois de la Reine to Point 76.06, southern and southwestern parts of the Bois d'Ormont, southern boundary of the Bois de Moirey, 200 meters west of the Bois la Fosse-à-Terre, southern edge of the Bois de Champneuville, la Wavrille (except the northeast corner)." Instructions were given that "the action will be pursued tomorrow, 11th October, along the whole front under the general conditions indicated by Order No. 4 of the 9th October." "Mission unchanged" were the directions for the 33rd Division, whereas the 29th Division was charged with "progression toward the objectives of the plan of engagement, notably on the Grande Montagne, objective of first importance, which constitutes the base of the exploitation toward the north," as well as "to assure close liaison with the 33rd I. D.

U. S. on the left and the 18th on the right." The same mission was given to the French divisions, while the 10th Colonial Infantry Division was "to maintain at all costs the possession of la Wavrille, which covers the right flank of the attack" and "to assure close liaison with the 26th I. D." and the corps artillery was to continue its interdiction and counter-battery fire in concert with the divisional artilleries.

The P. C. of the 33rd Division at La Hutte in the Bois Bourrus was the scene of considerable activity that day in view of the attack being made on the east bank of the Meuse. Aside from the occurrences connected with the engagement, the principal event of importance was the issuance at 2 P.M. of Field Order No. 29,¹²⁷ which prescribed that the troops on the right should continue their operations next day in accordance with the plan of engagement of the 17th Corps, should hold the sector gained, and assure the possession of the Bois de Chaume and the Bois Plat-Chêne as far as the Ravin du Plat-Chêne. The area of the 33rd Division was divided into two sectors, the right sector lying between the Meuse and Meridian 24, the left sector between the western bank of that river and the left boundary of the division. For the right sector an outpost zone and a main line of resistance were prescribed, and the latter, which was to skirt the northern edge of the Bois de Chaume and follow the wood road running south-east to Hill 371, was ordered to be prepared for defense and to be "held to the last." A mixed detachment was to be established near Hills 371 and 382 (Richêne) for close liaison with the 29th Division, lines of information were to be put into perfect working order to insure proper communication with the division P. C., and other measures were provided for the security of the troops.¹²⁸

On Friday, October 11, 1918, there was no advance, nor indeed any important movement by the 33rd Division, save in

the case of a few isolated units. The day was not, however, wholly lacking in interest and the troops on the east bank of the Meuse were kept decidedly on the *qui vive* by the incessant shelling, machine-gun fire, and gassing to which they were subjected throughout the day and night. Their own artillery responded by firing that morning on Sivry-sur-Meuse, where the enemy was causing them considerable annoyance, and on Haraumont, where the enemy batteries were very active; in harassing the road at the western edge of the Bois de la Grande Montagne leading from La Borne de Cornouille to an enemy dump on a forty-centimeter tramway,¹²⁹ and in requesting the corps artillery for support, particularly against the guns near Haraumont and against the enemy artillery and machine guns in the Bois Plat-Chêne that evening.¹³⁰ It was deemed advisable to have some batteries of 75s belonging to the artillery group under Colonel Smith closer to the troops which they were supporting and, accordingly, during the night of October 11-12, the 1st Battalion, 104th Field Artillery, moved from its position at the southwestern corner of the Bois de Forges to the vicinity of the Tranchée de Heraclée south-east of Consenvoye.¹³¹

The principal events that day affecting the forces on the east bank of the Meuse are thus narrated by the commanding officer of the 131st Infantry.¹³²

The morning of October 11th a message was received from the C. O. 115th Infantry that their second Battalion was about to effect a passage of the lines, with orders to gain the second Exploitation Objective. The movement apparently failed as the left of that organization was located the following morning at 1:50 o'clock 2½ kilometers in rear on Grid 81. It became evident in the early morning [of October 11] that a reorganization and readjustment of the line was necessary.¹³³ The C. O. 131st Infantry was notified by the Brigade Commander that he would be in command of operations between North and South Grid 24 and River Meuse with three

Battalions and Machine Gun Co. 131st Infantry and following attached troops: 3rd Battalion, 130th Infantry, 3rd Battalion, 129th Infantry¹³⁴ and attached machine gun units.¹³⁵ Major Allen, 3rd Battalion, was designated by the C. O. 131st Infantry as his representative, with orders to place Captain Melville in charge of all machine gun units, to check positions and make readjustments where necessary. Troops which are forward of line dug last night [are] to be held by out-posts; other line designated at the same time to be held and the position organized in depth. Liaison to be maintained on right.¹³⁶ Anticipating some act on the part of right flank troops as evidenced by their message at 8 A.M. in which it was stated our second Bn. (115th Inf.) is about to effect a passage of lines to begin the attack. . . . Orders to gain the Second Exploitation Objective,¹³⁷ our forward troops again occupied that portion of the line on our immediate front. Consummation of the intended move was not accomplished. At 11:25 A.M. the Liaison Officer of the 115th Infantry was asked to ascertain where the left of his organization was and what progress was being made, there being no apparent movement. Heavy machine gun fire increasing in volume continued on our right. First Battalion Commander reported situation serious. No report was received to inquiry as to position of the 115th Infantry. . . . During the night of October 11th-12th a conference was held with the Brigade Commander, at which time a decision was reached to consolidate and dig in a line in the general direction east and west of Grid 82 toward the north edge of Chaume Woods,¹³⁸ but conditions during that night made the movement impossible.¹³⁹ It was therefore deferred until the following night. About 500 yards of trenches two feet wide and three or four feet deep were however dug by early morning.

There were no movements on the part of the 1st and 2nd Battalions, 132nd Infantry, the 2nd Battalion, 131st Infantry, and Company A, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, in the trenches south of the Bois de Chaume,¹⁴⁰ or by the 2nd Battalion, 129th Infantry, and Company D, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, in the trenches near Consenvoye;¹⁴¹ but during the day Companies A and D, 123rd Machine Gun Battalion,

arrived from the west bank, were placed under the commanding officer of the 129th Infantry, and were sent forward to the line occupied by the 1st and 2nd Battalions of that regiment.¹⁴²

On the right bank of the Meuse were two units belonging to the 66th Infantry Brigade—Company C, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, which continued to occupy the Bois de Forges,¹⁴³ and the 3rd Battalion, 132nd Infantry, then operating with the 4th Division. On October 11 this battalion participated in an attack in which it had two companies in the front line and two companies protecting the right flank of the assaulting troops. The objective—the northern edge of the Bois de Forêt—was reached on scheduled time,¹⁴⁴ and the conduct of this battalion throughout its operations was such as to win high commendation from the unit commanders under whom it served.¹⁴⁵

Apart from minor rectification of position, no events of importance occurred in the sector along the river as far as the western edge of the Bois de la Côte Lemont held by the 65th Infantry Brigade, which had been further weakened by the transfer of Companies A and D, 123rd Machine Gun Battalion, to the Bois de Chaume.¹⁴⁶

Except for routine, that Friday was virtually a *dies non* in the P. C. of the 33rd Division and the only event that need be chronicled was the receipt during the course of the evening of the operation order issued by the 17th Army Corps,¹⁴⁷ which postponed its customary statement of the front held at the end of the day but announced that:

In these 4 days of battle, aside from the losses inflicted upon the enemy (more than 5000 prisoners and a considerable *matériel*), apart from an advance of more than 5 kilometers on a difficult terrain and across formidable organized works, the American and French units belonging to the 17th Army

Corps have lent an efficient assistance to the general action by consuming strong enemy reserves.

It went on to direct that:

Tomorrow, 12th October, the progression will be resumed under the following conditions: *33rd I. D., U. S.* will continue its mission of resistance at the Bois de Chaume and at the Bois Plat-Chêne and of reconnaissance on Sivry and the Côte de St. Pantaléon. It will insure a close liaison with the *29th I. D., U. S.* and will aid, if need be, this latter to outflank the clearing of Molleville and the one to the west (this latter not indicated on the map). *29th I. D., U. S.* will resume its advance on the Bois de la Grande Montagne, insuring the security of its right flank by a suitable echelonment if the *18th I. D.*, more particularly oriented toward the N. E., does not immediately conform to the movement of the *29th I. D., U. S.*

The *18th French Division* was to carry out its operation in the region of the Bois de'Ormont and the Bois de Moirey at 7 A.M. with its infantry; the *26th French Division* was to continue its pressure particularly to the left in order to bring about the fall of Crest 329; while the mission of the *10th Colonial Division* was local resistance at La Wavrille. A footnote referring to the instructions for the *33rd* and *29th American Divisions* announced that "It is understood that the advance prescribed to the *29th I. D. U. S.* is subordinated to the getting into place required by the powerfully fortified work of the Clearing of Molleville and its outskirts."

On Saturday, October 12, 1918, at 1:50 A.M. patrols from the *131st Infantry* located the left of the *115th Infantry* east of the reserve of the *66th Brigade*, which held the Tranchée du Câble south of the Bois de Chaume.¹⁴⁸ This position was behind the normal objective assigned to the *58th Brigade (29th Division)* and nearly two and a half kilometers in the rear of the front line of the *33rd Division* at its right extremity.¹⁴⁹ Subsequent reports, received at 7:30 and 9 A.M., however, announced a position somewhat farther forward and

gave the information that the 57th Brigade on its right was then engaged in an attack.¹⁵⁰

The forces of the 33rd Division on the east bank spent the day in making the prescribed reconnaissances on Sivry-sur-Meuse¹⁵¹ and beyond the ridge where the Chapel of St. Pantaléon and the Magenta Ferme are situated and in holding their positions under intense shell fire, which began about midnight on October 11, and continued almost without interruption until 7 P.M. There was also heavy machine-gun fire, a counter-attack at 2:15 A.M., and frequent attacks by hostile aeroplanes.¹⁵² Indeed, the latter became so bold that machine guns had to be sent to the front lines for anti-aircraft work. The supporting artillery responded, combining counterbattery with its other fire, but without affording much relief to the punishment which the infantry was forced to undergo. It was therefore deemed expedient to move more of the 75s farther forward where their fire would be more effective and the 2nd Battalion, 105th Field Artillery, accordingly changed position that night from the vicinity of the Bois de Forges to the southwestern edge of the Bois Juré.¹⁵³

During the latter part of the afternoon the commanding officer, 131st Infantry, issued orders for a reorganization of the system of defense during the night of October 12-13¹⁵⁴ and directed the construction of a main line of resistance which was to be finished by daylight. This line was to run from the open ground north of the Tranchée de la Vanne midway between the Consenvoye-Sivry road and the northwest corner of the Bois de Chaume, around the edge of that wood and into the ravine where Wuillebaubois is situated, joining with the position of the 3rd Battalion, 130th Infantry, and thence along Grid line 82 to Meridian 24. It was to be laid out under the supervision of Major Bittel and the work was to be done by the 2nd Battalion, 129th Infantry, and Company

A, 123rd Machine Gun Battalion, which were to report at 6 P.M. with the necessary shovels and picks. Upon completion, it was to be occupied by the 3rd Battalion, 131st Infantry, on the west, the 3rd Battalion, 130th Infantry, in the centre, and the 2nd Battalion, 129th Infantry, on the east, each battalion accompanied by the machine gun company attached to it. The 1st Battalion, 131st Infantry, was to be withdrawn from the front line and was to join the 2nd Battalion of that regiment in the trenches south of the Bois de Chaume, the two to constitute the support. The 1st and 3rd Battalions, 129th Infantry, and the 2nd Battalion, 132nd Infantry, were to form the reserve in the trenches northeast of Consenvoye.¹⁵⁵ The necessary orders were therefore issued by Major Allen, commanding the front line troops, but these were shortly afterwards countermanded, since the commanding officer of the 131st decided to postpone the occupation of the new line until it was entirely ready.¹⁵⁶ Approximately nine hundred yards of shallow trenches had been dug during the day¹⁵⁷ and that night the work was pushed as rapidly as possible under the circumstances.

On the west bank of the Meuse the two units belonging to the 66th Brigade remained in their former positions, Company B, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, in the Bois de Forges¹⁵⁸ and the 3rd Battalion and Machine Gun Company, 132nd Infantry, in the Bois de Forêt.

So far as the depleted 65th Brigade was concerned, that Saturday was devoid of interest beyond the usual trench routine, the only incident necessary to mention here being the improvements made to the main line of resistance in the sector occupied before dawn by Company C, 123rd Machine Gun Battalion.¹⁵⁹

In the P. C. of the 33rd Division likewise, there occurred nothing worthy of record until the arrival that evening of the

order issued by the Commander of the 17th Army Corps,¹⁶⁰ which contained much interesting information. It opened with the announcement that:

The line attained at the end of the day passes through the northern edge of the Bois de Chaume, Ravin du Plat Chêne, Richêne, southern edge of la Clairie de la Ferme Molleville, Ravin de Molleville, Ravin de la Reine, southern edge of the Bois de Chênes toward Point 78.07, northern edge of the Bois d'Ormont, at 79.05, a line traversing the wood from this point at 84.02, Tranchée de Koutahia as far as 86.00, thence the line attained the 11th October.

Our progression[s] at the northern and southern edges and in the interior of the Bois d'Ormont have given rise to some very hot actions in which a strong enemy aviation took part.

It then went on to say:

II. The present situation can be summed up as follows: The Exploitation Objective then the Normal Objective have been attained as far as Meridian 28. To the east of the latter there is a struggle for the Normal Objective (Bois d'Ormont, Bois de Moirey). The Intermediate Objective has been approximately realized in the Bois des Caures.

Under these conditions, successive local actions are still to be resumed with the object of reducing the *points d'appui* which are hindering our progress. Starting from strong points already acquired, these actions will be treated like large raids with the occupation of the terrain acquired (precise preparation by artillery, employment of trench mortars, caging by machine guns, etc.).

For the ensuing day, October 13, it was announced that the 33rd Division "will maintain possession of the Bois de Chaume and of Plat-Chêne and will assist the 29th U. S. I. D. when it moves forward. These reconnaissances will endeavor to maintain themselves on the saddle of St. Pantaléon where they will advantageously serve as covering and contact elements." The 29th Division, it was prescribed, "will resume the preparation of its operation on the Grande Montagne, an operation which it is desirable to realize as quickly as possible

since the enemy can only profit by every delay to re-enforce himself. It will make known as soon as possible the date and hour of this operation." The 18th French Division was "first of all to insure the total conquest of the Bois d'Ormont" and, apart from minor actions, to prepare for the major operation which had been fixed for October 14. The 26th French Division was exhorted "to realize the Intermediate Objective" and by thrusting forward its left to aid the 18th. The missions of the 10th Colonial Infantry Division and the artillery remained unchanged, but the latter was charged "to observe scrupulously the orders relative to the consumption of projectiles outside of attacks."

Sunday, October 13, 1918, was marked by increased artillery activity on both sides. Beginning at 1:30 A.M. and continuing until midnight, the enemy guns concentrated at various times on different localities throughout the area occupied by the 33rd Division and from 11 A.M. until 5 P.M. harassed a number of places intermittently. The bridge at Consenvoye, the road leading from that town toward Damvillers and the southern edge of the Bois de Chaume came in for their share, nor did the troops in the trenches escape this fire.¹⁶¹ The corps artillery devoted some attention to the Villeneuve Ferme at 5 A.M. and twelve hours later to a certain enemy battery which was causing considerable annoyance by its activity. The 52nd Field Artillery Brigade was comparatively quiet but made preparations to coöperate in the attack of the 29th Division next day, until announcement was received of a postponement for twenty-four hours.¹⁶² The supporting group under Colonel Smith indulged in considerable harassing fire and in the latter part of the day the "heavies" and the 2nd Battalion, 105th Field Artillery, bombarded Sivry-sur-Meuse quite heavily to cover the emplacement of a portion of the 102nd Trench Mortar Battery on

the ridge near Dannevoux. On October 11 and 12 two battalions of 75s had been moved forward with a view to increasing their effectiveness, and during the night of October 13-14 three batteries of the 106th Field Artillery followed suit by changing position from the Côte d l'Oie to the immediate vicinity of Gercourt-et-Drillancourt.¹⁶³

Under continuous shelling, rendered doubly onerous by constant enemy machine-gun fire, the troops of the 33rd Division in the advanced positions east of the Meuse spent a distinctly uncomfortable day.¹⁶⁴ The work of constructing the trenches constituting the main line of resistance was pushed throughout the night of October 12-13 and during the day.¹⁶⁵ The injunction from the division P. C. "to avoid any ugly salients in the line" resulted in the elimination of the projection caused by following the northwestern corner of the Bois de Chaume, and the modified trace connected the Tranchée de l'Hôpital with the position of the 3rd Battalion, 130th Infantry, and thence ran eastwardly to Meridian 24, so that the entire system was located south of, and more or less parallel to, Grid line 82. During the course of the day it became manifest that these trenches would be ready for occupation as soon as the troops could be safely withdrawn under cover of the darkness but, about 2:30 P.M., the commanding officer, 131st Infantry, decided that two battalions were sufficient to hold this new line provided one battalion were in support and four in reserve.¹⁶⁶ The dispositions announced on the preceding afternoon but postponed for twenty-four hours¹⁶⁷ were accordingly modified by orders¹⁶⁸ designating the 2nd Battalion, 129th Infantry, and the 3rd Battalion, 130th Infantry, as the garrison for the main line of resistance. The former on the east was to extend its right as far as Meridian 24, where it was to connect with the 115th Infantry (58th Infantry Brigade), while the latter on the west,

in addition to the position which it then occupied, was to take over the sector held by the 3rd Battalion, 131st Infantry, on the left. The support was to be formed by the 2nd Battalion, 131st Infantry, in its existing position in the Tranchée du Câble south of the Bois de Chaume. The 1st and 3rd Battalions, 131st Infantry, were to withdraw to the trenches south of Consenvoye at the eastern approach to the bridge over the Meuse where, together with the 1st and 3rd Battalions, 129th Infantry, likewise withdrawn from the front line, they were to constitute the reserve.¹⁶⁹ Major Allen, commanding the 3rd Battalion, 131st Infantry, was left in command of the line and particular stress was laid upon the fact that "no troops will be in position north of grid line 82."

At 4:30 P.M. Major Allen issued the orders for the withdrawal of all troops from the front line and about 6 P.M. the movement began¹⁷⁰ under protection of the patrols extending as far as the second exploitation objective. The machine gun units accompanied or remained in place with the infantry battalions, depending upon the position assigned.¹⁷¹ Fortunately the enemy's artillery was comparatively inactive that night and the entire operation was successfully effected before daylight without appreciable losses.¹⁷²

Aside from the usual trench routine, that Sunday was a day of rest for the 2nd Battalion, 131st Infantry, and Company A, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, in the Tranchée du Câble south of the Bois de Chaume, as well as for the 1st and 2nd Battalions, 132nd Infantry, Company D, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, and the 1st Battalion, 104th Field Artillery, in the trenches in the neighborhood of Consenvoye.¹⁷³

That night terminated the active operations of the 66th Brigade in the advanced positions on the east bank of the Meuse and, apropos of them, the Colonel of the 131st

Infantry, who was in command of the front-line troops, makes the following trenchant comments in his report:¹⁷⁴

It was unfortunate that the troops on the right in this attack were unable to make progress as their advance would have insured the taking of strong positions on the Haraumont Ridge. Our troops were three times on the final objective overlooking the ridge and were obliged to fall back for lack of support to prevent being cut to pieces. The morning of Oct. 10, enemy forces appeared to be in confusion and hastily fled before our advance.¹⁷⁵ When the advance was not followed up machine gun detachments worked back through the woods on our open flank in continually increasing numbers, becoming very bold. It was not deemed advisable to shell and gas the woods on the right except as a last resort for fear of interfering with troops which were attempting to come forward and also [owing to] the danger of involving other troops occupying lines at the angle.

On the right bank of the Meuse were three units belonging to the 66th Brigade, Company C, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, in the sector held by the 130th Infantry and the 3rd Battalion and Machine Gun Company, 132nd Infantry, which were detached from the IIIrd Corps and were relieved in the Bois de Forêt during the night of October 14.¹⁷⁶

The depleted 65th Brigade, in the sector facing north along the left bank of the Meuse and extending from the Bois la Ville to the Bois de la Côte Lemont, spent a day of customary trench routine, enlivened by the spasmodic bursts of shelling to which it was subjected.¹⁷⁷ Two platoons from the 2nd Battalion, 130th Infantry, were sent to occupy the position between Dannevoux and the road leading to Consenvoye, and during the night of October 13-14 patrols were sent out along the entire front line,¹⁷⁸ while Company C, 123rd Machine Gun Battalion, was withdrawn from the Bois d'en Dela and marched to the trenches half a kilometer south of Consenvoye, arriving about dawn on October 14.¹⁷⁹

The usual routine in the P. C. of the 33rd Division at

La Hutte in the damp Bois Bourrus was relieved by two events which require chronicling. The first was the issuance at 6 P.M. of Addendum No. 1 to Field Order No. 29 of October 10.¹⁸⁰ This addendum ordered the mutual transfer of the 65th and 66th Brigades, together with the command, to the east and west banks of the Meuse respectively.¹⁸¹ For this purpose the necessary reliefs were to begin on the night of October 14-15 and to be effected so long as the darkness continued, such reliefs as were unfinished that night to be completed the ensuing night. Utilizing the Consenvoye bridge, the 132nd Infantry was to relieve the units of the 65th Brigade, which were in turn to proceed directly to the east bank, and a similar relief of the elements of the 66th Brigade on the right bank was to be effected by the 65th Brigade. The two brigadiers were directed to make such adjustment as would return the machine gun units to their respective commands, and the 122nd Machine Gun Battalion was to be placed in reserve in the Bois de Forges. The relief on the east bank was to be under the supervision of the commanding general, 65th Brigade; that on the west bank under the 66th Brigade commander; and all details in connection with these reliefs were directed to be arranged during daylight on October 14. Apropos of the system of defense on the east bank of the Meuse, the construction of which had been ordered on October 10, particular emphasis was laid upon the fact that:

Par. 3 (a) (1), Field Order No. 29, with reference to line of Resistance in right sector, will be strictly carried out, adjustment only being made to connect up with the Line of Resistance of the troops of the 29th Division on the right. Care will be taken to avoid any ugly salients in the Line as assumed.

The second event of importance was the receipt that evening of the corps instructions for the operations of the

morrow, which was sufficiently brief to be quoted *in extenso*.
It ran as follows:

HDQRS., the 13 October, 1918.

1ST ARMY U. S.

17TH ARMY CORPS.

STAFF

3RD BUREAU

No. 606-S/3.

ORDER No. 8

- I. The line attained at the end of the day passes through N. edge of the Bois de Chaume, Ravin du Plat-Chêne, Richêne, South edge of la Clairière de la Ferme Molleville, Ravin de Molleville, Ravin de la Reine, S. edge of the Bois de Chênes as far as the point 78.07, North edge of the Bois d'Ormont at 79.05, line traversing the wood from that point to 84.02, Tranchée de Koutahia as far as 86.00, (and) from this point the line attained the 12th October.
- II. During the course of tomorrow, 14th, the 29th I. D. U. S., the 18th I. D. (and U. S. elements attached to it) and the 26th I. D. will resume the preparations of their particular operations prescribed by Order No. 7 of the 12th October.
The 18th I. D. will be kept informed of the means of fresh infantry which will be given it.
- III. The 10th C. I. D. will continue the organization of the disposition prescribed by Note No. 596-S/3 of the 12th October.
- IV. Mission unchanged for the 33rd I. D. U. S.
- V. Attention is called to the precautions to be taken against enemy firing with gas shells.

It is particularly important that masks be put on and not removed until the proper time and that standing still at points shelled with mustard gas be carefully avoided.

The General Commanding the 17th A. C.
H. CLAUDEL.

Monday, October 14, 1918, was a comparatively quiet day on the front of the 17th French Army Corps, although there was a fair amount of artillery and machine-gun fire on

both sides.¹⁸² In the direction of the Bois d'Ormont there was a comparative lull in the desperate struggle for the possession of that wood, but the enemy artillery was sufficiently active in that direction to cause the 29th Division to call upon the artillery of the 18th French Division¹⁸³ that afternoon for support for its 57th Brigade.

For the 33rd Division the day was likewise quiet and was principally devoted to preparations for the mutual relief to be effected that night between the 65th Brigade on the west bank of the Meuse and the 66th Brigade on the east bank. Aside from the transfer of the P. C. 123rd Machine Gun Battalion from Hill 281 to the trenches south of Consenvoye,¹⁸⁴ there were no changes of position by the 65th Brigade during the hours of daylight, but that morning the 3rd Battalion, 132nd Infantry, which had been operating with various units of the IIIrd Corps since October 4 and which had been relieved in the Bois de Forêt during the preceding night, appeared and took position close to the brigade P. C. at Hill 281, near which was Company C, 123rd Machine Gun Battalion.

On the east bank of the Meuse the withdrawal to the newly constructed main line of resistance and the various reliefs and changes of position made in consequence have already been described. On the morning of October 14, that system of defense was occupied by the 3rd Battalion, 130th Infantry, on the west and by the 2nd Battalion, 129th Infantry, in the eastern subsector,¹⁸⁵ its right in liaison at Meridian 24 with the 115th Infantry of the 58th Infantry Brigade, thus forming a concave arc from the eastern extremity of the Tranchée de l'Hôpital across the Bois de Chaume and the Bois Plat-Chêne to the point where the forty-centimeter line crossed Meridian 24.¹⁸⁶ The line was additionally defended by Companies A and D, 123rd Machine Gun Battalion,¹⁸⁷ supplemented later in the day by the machine gun company of the

129th Infantry,¹⁸⁸ and the entire front was covered by patrols extending as far forward as the ridge overlooking the second exploitation objective, as well as on both flanks.¹⁸⁹ The 2nd Battalion and Machine Gun Company, 131st Infantry, constituting the support in the Tranchée du Câble south of the Bois de Chaume was completely relieved at 8:20 P.M. by the 3rd Battalion, 129th Infantry,¹⁹⁰ which during the day had occupied the trenches south of Consenvoye,¹⁹¹ together with the 1st Battalion of the same regiment,¹⁹² and the 1st and 3rd Battalions, 131st Infantry.¹⁹³ As a matter of fact, the trenches in the neighborhood of Consenvoye were filled that day with troops of the 33rd Division and in the total were included, in addition to the above, the 122nd Machine Gun Battalion, Companies A, B, and D; 124th Machine Gun Battalion; the 1st and 2nd Battalions, 132nd Infantry; and three batteries of the 104th Field Artillery.¹⁹⁴

The guns of the 52nd Field Artillery Brigade were silent during the morning with the exception of the 155-millimeter howitzers, which supported the front of the 29th Division with accompanying fire across the Ravin de Moyemont and along the eastern end of La Vaux de Mille Mais from 7:20 to 8 A.M. and indulged in adjustment fire lasting from 9:30 A.M. until 2 P.M.¹⁹⁵ Later in the afternoon there was considerable counterbattery work, especially against the enemy guns near the Villeneuve Ferme, and covering fire to protect the construction of trench mortar emplacements on the Dannevoux ridge, ending after 10:20 P.M. with firing on the Magenta Ferme at the request of the commander of the 158th Field Artillery Brigade (29th Division).¹⁹⁶

At 10:30 A.M. the commanding general of the 66th Brigade issued his orders for the reciprocal relief between his troops and those of the 65th Brigade on the opposite bank,¹⁹⁷ and at 8:20 P.M. the 3rd Battalion, 129th Infantry, relieved

the 2nd Battalion and Machine Gun Company, 131st Infantry, in the trenches south of the Bois de Chaume.¹⁹⁸ The 1st and 2nd Battalions, 132nd Infantry, together with Company D, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, marched across the Consenvoye bridge, were joined later by the 3rd Battalion of that regiment, and relieved two battalions and the machine gun company of the 130th Infantry in the Dannevoux—Bois de la Côte Lemont sector;¹⁹⁹ these units in turn proceeded during the course of the night to Consenvoye;²⁰⁰ and at 8:45 P.M. the command of the entire forward sector of the 33rd Division on the east bank of the Meuse passed from Major Allen to the command of Colonel Myer of the 129th Infantry.²⁰¹ This latter officer had been placed in charge of an operation to be made next day by certain troops of the 65th Brigade acting in conjunction with the 29th Division, which was to undertake to reach its first exploitation objective,²⁰² and that evening issued his instructions accordingly. His operation order directed the 2nd Battalion, 129th Infantry, to advance to an objective which may be described as a line originating at a point on the northern slope of the Ravin de la Vaux de Mille Mais, about four hundred meters southeast of the Chapelle St. Pantaléon, and extending thence past the houses at the western end of La Vaux de Mille Mais to Meridian 24. Combat liaison with the 115th Infantry (58th Brigade) was to be maintained by Company L, 129th Infantry, and a section from Company A, 123rd Machine Gun Battalion. Whenever possible, the movement was to be supported by fire from the left company of the 2nd Battalion and from the 3rd Battalion, 130th Infantry, which were to remain in their actual positions, while the reserve was to be constituted by the 1st and 3rd Battalions, 129th Infantry, less certain detachments in the case of the former and less Companies K and L of the latter.

The troops were directed to be in place at 7 A.M and the zero hour was announced as 8 A.M.²⁰³

Although it was not until the ensuing day that the command of the sector of the 33rd Division east of the Meuse officially passed to the Commanding General of the 65th Infantry Brigade, and in spite of the fact that all the troops of the 66th Brigade did not leave the right bank until the morning of October 15, so far as the latter brigade was concerned its active operations east of the river terminated on the evening of October 14. Its achievements during the seven days commencing on October 8 with the advance of the forces under the command of Colonel Davis, 132nd Infantry, are thus admirably summarized by the commanding general of the 66th Infantry Brigade:²⁰⁴

During the period October 9th to 12th, our troops were three times in force on the final objective (2nd "Exploitation" Objective) and ready to continue their advance but were unable to do so because of our exposed right flank. Each time the enemy saw the opportunity to attack on our right and took quick advantage of it.

Machine Gun Companies attached to our Battalions fulfilled their missions and did excellent work in repelling counter attacks.²⁰⁵

During these operations our liaison throughout the Brigade was excellent and we were at all times able to communicate by telephone with the Battalions engaged.

The Officers and men of the Medical Corps deserve praise from all ranks for their bravery and industry during this action.²⁰⁶

From October 9th to 15th, our troops were constantly subjected to very heavy fire from Artillery and machine guns, gas, airplane attacks and fire from snipers. The difficulty of getting food to those in the line was very great owing to the presence of mustard gas, and to add to their discomfort it rained nearly every day. The above difficulties combined with lack of opportunity to sleep were serious in themselves but the men hung on without complaining and without thought of giv-

ing an inch unless ordered to do so. They showed conclusively the magnificent spirit of the American troops. Their fortitude under adverse conditions will always remain an example of heroic valor worthy of emulation.

During these operations the 66th Brigade was confronted by the 1st Austro-Hungarian Division, supported by German machine guns, gunners, and minenwerfers, the 232nd German Reserve Infantry Regiment and the 105th German "Sturm" Battalion,²⁰⁷ from which approximately 24 officers and 1,002 men were taken prisoners.²⁰⁸ The booty was considerable—2 pieces of heavy artillery, 14 guns (77-millimeter), 4 trench mortars, 11 anti-tank guns, 136 machine guns, 19 Lewis automatic rifles, 205 rifles, 100 rounds of trench mortar ammunition, 1,750 rounds of 77-millimeter ammunition, 30,000 rounds of Lewis gun ammunition, 72,000 rounds of small-arms ammunition, 1,000 stick grenades, together with a large quantity of clothing, shoes, and other equipment.²⁰⁹ These results were, obviously, not achieved without loss, particularly in view of the exceptional strength of the enemy positions attacked and the incessant shell and machine-gun fire, gas, aeroplane raids, and counterattacks to which the 66th Brigade was subjected. Two officers and 53 men were killed; 7 officers and 597 men were wounded; but, in addition, gassing, exhaustion and other causes necessitated the evacuation to hospitals of not less than 643 men,²¹⁰ thus making the total casualties for those seven days 1,302.

Beyond the usual routine incident to such circumstances, the principal events of importance that day in the P. C. of the 33rd Division were the issuance of two training circulars²¹¹ and Confidential Memorandum No. 20 laying particular emphasis upon the necessity for economy in the consumption of artillery ammunition, and the receipt that evening of two orders from the Commander of the 17th French Army Corps. The operation order²¹² announced that the line reached that

day was broadly that of October 13, except that there had been an advance in the Bois d'Ormont, and that the "29th U. S. Infantry Division will execute at 8 A.M. the prescribed operation on the Grande Montagne." The 33rd American and the 18th French Divisions were to support this operation; the missions of the 26th French and 10th Colonial Divisions remained unchanged; and the 18th Division was to be relieved by the 26th American Division which had been placed at the disposal of the Corps Commander. The second order²¹³ gave detailed instructions for the operation next day in which the 29th Division, jumping off at 8 A.M., was to get possession by surprise of the fortified area constituting the clearing of the Molleville Ferme and its eastern and western outskirts, and to advance to the first exploitation objective, where it was to organize immediately a line of resistance. The artillery of the 33rd and 18th Divisions was to be coördinated with that of the 29th and supported by the guns of the 17th Army Corps, the preparation fire beginning at 7:30 A.M. The following instructions were given for the flanking divisions:

The 33rd U. S. and the 18th Infantry Divisions, aside from the assistance of their artillery directed in the plan of employment, will push forward respectively their right and left elements so as to accompany the attack of the 29th U. S. Infantry Division and in order to insure the continuity of the new front attained.²¹⁴

VI. OPERATIONS WITH THE 17TH FRENCH ARMY CORPS ASTRIDE THE MEUSE, OCTOBER 15 UNTIL RELIEF

On Tuesday, October 15, 1918, the mutual relief between the 65th and 66th Infantry Brigades was completed. Allusion has already been made to the relief of the 1st and 2nd Battalions and the Machine Gun Company of the 130th Infantry by the 132nd Infantry and Company D, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, during the night of October 14-15.¹ As the distance from the trenches east of Consenvoye to those in the Bois la Ville was about seven kilometers, while those in the Bois de la Côte Lemont were fully four kilometers farther, considerable time was consumed by both the relieving troops and those relieved in covering this distance. It was long after dark when the operation was begun and late when it was finished.² At its completion the 130th Infantry marched by way of the Bois de Forges, crossed by the bridge leading to Consenvoye, turned south, and took position in the Tranchée de Magabe.³

During the night of October 14-15, the 122nd Machine Gun Battalion and Company A, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, had left their stations in the vicinity of Consenvoye and crossed to the Bois de Forges,⁴ where Company C of the latter battalion was in position.⁵

The 131st Infantry left its positions in the neighborhood of Consenvoye, crossed during the morning to the west bank, and at noon Colonel Sanborn, acting for General Wolf, turned over the command of the sector of the 33rd Division east of

the Meuse to General King of the 65th Brigade. As the 131st Infantry was destined to compose the reserve of the 66th Brigade, it had been assigned positions in the Bois de Forges and the trench system extending from the southern point of that wood westward across the Béthincourt—Gercourt-et-Drillancourt road.⁶ Upon reaching their destination, the tired soldiers were made as comfortable as possible; supplies were issued to them, and they were given some much-needed clothing.⁷

Meanwhile, on the east bank, part of the 17th Army Corps was engaged in another attack. At 7:30 A.M. the artillery of the 33rd, 29th, and 18th French Divisions, supported by the corps guns, opened with preparation fire,⁸ and at 8 o'clock the 29th Division launched its attack. Simultaneously, the 2nd Battalion, 129th Infantry, advanced under heavy shell and machine-gun fire to its objective one thousand yards to the front, maintaining combat liaison with the 115th Infantry (58th Brigade) on its right by means of a detachment consisting of Company L and a section of Company A, 123rd Machine Gun Battalion. The left company of that battalion and the 3rd Battalion, 130th Infantry, made no movement but supported the attack by fire, while the 1st Battalion, 129th Infantry, joined the 3rd Battalion of that regiment in the trenches south of the Bois de Chaume at 7 A.M. and these two units constituted the reserve. As a matter of fact, the 29th Division encountered such strong enemy machine-gun nests, that it was quite unable to reach its first exploitation objective; indeed, it made practically no advance, except that it did succeed in getting possession of the line of works along the southern edge of the Bois de la Grande Montagne.⁹ In consequence, the advanced position of the 2nd Battalion, 129th Infantry, on its objective was perilously exposed and it had no alternative but to fall back to its former position

near the southern edge of the Bois Plat-Chêne and to make preparations for a resumption of the advance next day.¹⁰

The conclusion of this operation found the advanced troops of the 65th Brigade in the same positions as those which they had occupied early that morning, that is, the 3rd Battalion, 130th Infantry, in the trenches of the main line of resistance extending from the western edge of the Bois de Chaume at the extremity of the Tranchée de l'Hôpital to Grid line 23, its front prolonged eastward to Meridian 24 by the 2nd Battalion, 129th Infantry, and the entire position protected by a distribution of the machine gun company of this latter regiment¹¹ and Companies A and D, 123rd Machine Gun Battalion. In their rear the 1st Battalion on the left and the 3rd Battalion on the right occupied the south of the Bois de Chaume and the Bois Plat-Chêne as far east as Meridian 24.¹² The advance that day accomplished nothing except in so far as it served as a diversion; it resulted in a loss of thirty-nine killed and wounded.¹³

The P. C. of the 65th Brigade was transferred from Hill 281 to a dugout in the Tranchée de Heraclée southeast of Consenvoye.¹⁴ In its immediate neighborhood were the 1st and 2nd Battalions and the Machine Gun Company of the 130th Infantry, Company B, 124th Machine Gun Battalion,¹⁵ and the 1st Battalion Headquarters and three batteries of the 104th Field Artillery.¹⁶

From 6 until 11 A.M. the enemy artillery shelled the neighborhood of Consenvoye and during the afternoon and night devoted considerable attention with his 77s and 150-millimeter howitzers to the Bois de Chaume and the Consenvoye-Étraye road as far as Meridian 24, incidentally flooding that portion just east of the former place with gas about 7:30 P.M. The Allied artillery responded with counterbattery and harassing fire but,¹⁷ in the 33rd Division, the principal

activity was confined to the supporting group, whereas the rest of the 52nd Field Artillery Brigade spent an exceptionally quiet day.¹⁸

The night of October 15-16 was characterized by the relief of Company B, 123rd Machine Gun Battalion, in the Bois de Dannevoux sector by Company D, 124th Machine Gun Battalion,¹⁹ and by the transfer of two artillery units to more advanced positions, the 2nd Battalion, 104th Field Artillery, moving from the southwest corner of the Bois de Forges to the wood situated between the Bois Juré and the Bois de Septsarges, north of the Ruisseau de Menomme,²⁰ and the 1st Battalion, 106th Field Artillery (155s), proceeding from its stations north of the Forges-Béthincourt road to the southwestern part of the Bois Sachet.²¹

In the P. C. of the 33rd Division at La Hutte, that Tuesday was singularly devoid of interesting features until the arrival that evening of two communications from the Corps Headquarters at Regret. The first ran as follows:

HDQRS. the 15th October, 1918.

1ST U. S. A.

17TH ARMY CORPS

STAFF

3RD BUREAU

No. 626-S/3

ORDER NO. 10

- I. No change in the line reached the 14th October, except in the region of the Grande Montagne where the 29th I. D. U. S. has realized some progress. (Information still uncertain).
- II. Tomorrow 16th October, *29th I. D. U. S.*: mission will depend upon the results of the action of the 15th.
33rd I. D. U. S.: retains its mission in respect to the 29th I. D. U. S.

18th I. D.: will execute the operation prescribed in its Special Order No. 881/3 of the 14th October, with the object of getting possession of the head of the

ravines to the N. E. of the Bois d'Haumont.

26th I. D.: will support the action of the 18th I. D. under the conditions fixed by the latter.

Will also maintain close contact along its entire front.

The General commanding the 26th I. D. will realize, as quickly as possible, a disposition in depth corresponding to a close frontal contact, and no longer to a mission of attack.

10th C. I. D.: Mission unchanged.

(Signed) CLAUDEL.

By authorization. Chief of Staff
METOURNEUR.

The second communication read thus:

HEADQUARTERS the 15th October, 1918.

17TH ARMY CORPS

STAFF

1ST BUREAU.

GENERAL ORDER No. 135.

Officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers of the 29th and 33rd Infantry Divisions, U. S., 18th, 26th Infantry Divisions and 10th Colonial Infantry Division:

You have conquered la Wavrille, the Bois de Caures and that of Haumont. You have attained the crest of l'Ormont and got beyond le Richêne and the Bois de Chaume.

The Austro-Germans have lost, on an arc of 15 kilometers, these arrogant observatories which had defied the heroic defenders of Verdun.

The 8th October you advanced with a magnificent dash over formidable glacis and across powerful and deeply organized works.

On the following days you pursued a stubborn advance which overcame all the enemy's counter-attacks; you compelled him to bring up in haste numerous re-enforcements which did not succeed in taking from you one inch of ground.

5,800 prisoners, more than 50 guns, machine guns and *matériel* not yet counted, are the booty of these fine actions.

All of you, Infantrymen, Artillerymen, Engineers, Aviators, Staffs and Services, have had your part in the success.

American soldiers, French soldiers white and black, you have rivalled one another in valor and in the comradeship of

fighting to loosen the grip which still afflicts our immortal city.

I am proud to have commanded you.

The General commanding the XVII Army Corps,
H. CLAUDEL.

On Wednesday, October 16, 1918, the attack of the 17th Army Corps was renewed and was attended with more success on the part of the 29th Division than heretofore, inasmuch as it managed, after hard fighting, to carry the strongly organized enemy works in the clearing at the Molleville Ferme and to push its left forward to the first exploitation objective.²² Its movement was seconded by its own guns and those of the artillery group under Colonel Smith,²³ the 18th French Division and the corps, while its flanks were protected by advances on the east and west by the troops of the 18th and 33rd Divisions respectively. In the case of the latter this movement was made by the 2nd Battalion, 129th Infantry, beginning at 9:30 A.M., and close liaison was maintained on this occasion with the 58th Brigade. In consequence this battalion reached its objective about 1 P.M. and promptly proceeded to consolidate its new position.²⁴ Its attack was duly supported by the 3rd Battalion, 130th Infantry, and by the 1st and 3rd Battalions of its own regiment,²⁵ and was further protected by Companies A and B, 123rd Machine Gun Battalion, but none of these made any permanent change in their former positions.

There was likewise no change of station on the part of the 1st and 2nd Battalions and Machine Gun Company, 130th Infantry, nor on that of the 1st Battalion headquarters and three batteries of the 104th Field Artillery in the trenches south and southeast of Consenvoye.²⁶ That morning Company B, 123rd Machine Gun Battalion, which had been relieved in the Bois de Dannevoux during the preceding night, made a

short halt in this area but later in the day proceeded to a position farther in the rear near Brabant.²⁷

In the left sector of the 33rd Division west of the Meuse the advanced trenches in the Bois la Ville, Bois de Dannevoux, and the Bois de la Côte Lemont were held by the 132nd Infantry,²⁸ reënforced by Companies C and D, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, the former having relieved Company B, 123rd Machine Gun Battalion, the night before.²⁹ In their rear the entire 52nd Field Artillery Brigade, with the exception of the 1st Battalion, 104th Field Artillery (75s) near Consenvoye, was grouped within a triangle the apex of which was formed by the wood between the Bois Juré and the Bois de Septsarges and the base by that part of the Cuisy—Gercourt-et-Drillancourt road extending from the latter village westward to a point two kilometers distant and south of the Bois d'en Dela.³⁰ Less than a kilometer west and slightly north of this point is Côte 262, which was occupied that day by Company A, 124th Machine Gun Battalion,³¹ while the reserve of the 66th Brigade comprised the 131st Infantry in the trenches east of Côte 281 extending as far as the Bois de Forges,³² which was garrisoned by the 122nd Machine Gun Battalion,³³ and south of it Company B, 124th Machine Gun Battalion.³⁴

Save for the support given to the 29th Division by the special artillery group, divisional guns were in action very little that rainy day.³⁵ The enemy, however, shelled the Bois de Chaume and the front lines east of the Meuse during the afternoon as well as the Bois Juré, the Bois de Forges, and various other spots and roads in the division area on both banks, continuing his firing intermittently throughout the night of October 16–17.³⁶

Aside from an important memorandum dealing with hot meals, blankets, and proper clothing for the troops in the trenches,³⁷ there was no incident in the P. C. of the 33rd Divi-

sion worthy of note. During the evening Order No. 11 was received from the 17th Army Corps,³⁸ which announced the "front unchanged except in the sector of the 29th I. D., U. S. This latter has captured by hard fighting the organized region of the Clearing of Molleville." For October 17 the 33rd Division was directed to "continue to lend by its right the assistance which will be asked of it by the 29th I. D. U. S." which was in turn ordered to "pursue its advance methodically by its left (region of the Ravin de Moyemont and les Rapps) in liaison with the 33rd I. D. U. S." The relief of the 18th French Division by the 26th American Division was to continue; the 26th French Division was to maintain contact as usual; and the 10th Colonial Infantry Division was transferred to the 33rd French Army Corps. The final paragraph contained the following instructions:

III. The present conditions of temperature require that measures indispensable for the conservation of effectives be everywhere taken:

(a) Echelonment of troops—utilization of all shelters—interior reliefs at the proper time.

(b) Make every effort to procure warm food and drinks for all effectives.

On Thursday, October 17, 1918, the 29th Division effected a notable advance through the Bois de la Grande Montagne, which brought it to the summit of those heights. On the east the 18th French Division, in the process of relief by the 26th American Division, lent such assistance as was necessary to protect that flank and similarly on the west the troops of the 65th Brigade secured its left. The rain of the two preceding days continued with little interruption, as did the heavy shell and machine gun fire,³⁹ and the units in the main line of resistance in the Bois de Chaume and the Bois Plat-Chêne spent the day in improving their positions, a number of men being killed or wounded at their work.⁴⁰ That

night the 1st Battalion, 130th Infantry, relieved the 2nd Battalion, 129th Infantry, in the trenches in the Bois Plat-Chêne,⁴¹ but some casualties resulted from the heavy artillery and machine-gun barrage which the enemy put down from 6 until 9 P.M. during this relief. A hostile aeroplane flew over the forward positions firing its machine gun but, although patrols were sent out to discover the reason, not the slightest movement by the enemy infantry could be detected.⁴²

There were no changes of position by any of the other troops of the 65th Brigade on the east bank of the Meuse nor by those of the 66th Brigade west of that river and, with the exception of some harassing and neutralization fire by the 105th Field Artillery,⁴³ as well as some registration by the howitzers,⁴⁴ that Thursday was a *dies non* so far as the 52nd Field Artillery Brigade was concerned.⁴⁵ On the other hand, the enemy batteries, although quiet during the morning, as was sometimes the case, were increasingly active during the afternoon and evening, shelling the rear as well as the forward areas, the Bois Sachet, Bois Juré, and Drillancourt, and devoting considerable attention to Consenvoye and Gercourt-et-Drillancourt and their immediate vicinities.⁴⁶

In the P. C. of the 33rd Division at La Hutte three events are to be noted: the issuance of Confidential Memorandum No. 22, directing that the practice of exchanging machine guns in a relief be discontinued; the instructions to the commander of the 65th Brigade to send patrols next day to the second exploitation objective and to report the results;⁴⁷ and the receipt that evening of the following order:

AT THE HDQRS. the 17 October, 1918.

1ST U. S. A.

17TH ARMY CORPS

STAFF

3RD BUREAU

ORDER NO. 12

No. 639-S/3

I. The 29th I. D. U. S., pursuing obstinately its success of

yesterday, has attained by its left the region of the summit of la Grande Montagne (near Côte 370).

Our line ought to be staked from the West to East approximately as follows: Ravin de la Vaux de Mille-Mais—le-Différend—Grande-Montagne—Bois Bultruy (at 60.20)—Ravin de Molleville—the rest of the front without change.

II. Tomorrow 18th October:

33rd and 29th I. D. U. S.—in liaison, will insure the possession of the terrain acquired, will better their situation by the small operations which they deem useful and will have all reconnaissances made with a view to a resumption of the advance shortly.

These reconnaissances should be specially oriented toward the region of the Bois d'Étrayes, Bultruy and l'Houppy.

18th I. D. and 26 I. D. U. S. Completion of the relief; mission of liaison with the 29th I. D. U. S. and of reconnaissances to the North of the ravines of Molleville and de la Reine.

26th I. D.—Without change.

The General Commanding the 17th A. C.
(Signed) CLAUDEL.

B. A. The Chief of Staff
R. KASTLER.

On Friday, October 18, 1918, apart from the sending of patrols to the second exploitation objective for the purpose of reconnoitring the situation in advance of the normal line of patrols and aside from the occasional shelling to which the troops continued to be subjected, no incident of particular importance occurred in the right sector of the 33rd Division east of the Meuse. The relief of the 2nd Battalion, 129th Infantry, by the 1st Battalion, 130th Infantry, during the night of October 17–18 has already been mentioned.⁴⁸ Upon its completion the command of the outpost and defense zones passed from Colonel Myer to Colonel Clinnin,⁴⁹ and the night of October 18–19 witnessed a second relief whereby the 3rd Battalion, 130th Infantry, and Company A, 123rd Machine

Gun Battalion, were replaced in the Bois de Chaume by the 2nd Battalion and Machine Gun Company of the 130th Infantry respectively.⁵⁰ Before dawn on October 18 the 2nd Battalion, 129th Infantry, rejoined the rest of that regiment in position south of the Bois de Chaume and the entire command withdrew to the trenches south of Consenvoye. Thus reunited, they acted as the brigade reserve,⁵¹ but there were no changes of position on the part of the other troops of General King's command that day. For the 66th Infantry Brigade on the west bank of the Meuse that Friday was even more devoid of important episode.

The issuance of a confidential memorandum and two training circulars constituted the principal events of note in the P. C. of the 33rd Division, until the receipt of an order from the 17th Army Corps announcing its relief by the 15th Colonial Division beginning on the night of October 19-20 and terminating on the morning of October 21. Warning orders were consequently sent to the three brigades, the 108th Engineers, the Train Headquarters, and the Division Machine Gun Battalion⁵² and, during the evening, an operation order was received from the 17th Army Corps⁵³ which announced that there were "no changes in the line reached the 17th October" and which gave the following instructions:

Tomorrow, 19th October:

Mission of the Infantry Divisions unchanged: to conform to the provisions of Order No. 12 of the 17th October insofar as concerns the reconnaissances to be effected and the maintenance of close contact. To organize the conquered terrain. The Generals commanding the 26th and 29th I. D., U. S., will draw up the plans of action asked for by Secret Note No. 650-S/3 of the 18th October.⁵⁴

Saturday, October 19, 1918, was a comparatively uneventful day so far as active operations by the 65th Brigade on the east bank of the Meuse were concerned. The relief of the

3rd Battalion, 130th Infantry, and Company A, 123rd Machine Gun Battalion, by the 2nd Battalion and Machine Gun Company of the 130th Infantry was effected without unusual incident and at its conclusion the 3rd Battalion withdrew to the support positions, occupying the Tranchée du Câble and the Tranchée du Cabestan by two companies and the Ouvrage du Chanois north of Consenvoye by the two remaining.⁵⁵ Company A, 123rd Machine Gun Battalion, proceeded directly to the trenches south of Consenvoye,⁵⁶ where the entire 129th Infantry was located; the latter organization was suffering somewhat heavily from the enemy shell fire, which wounded eighty-six men that day.⁵⁷ In consequence of the reliefs effected on the nights of October 17-18 and 18-19, the entire forward positions were held by the 130th Infantry, its outpost line extending in a waving line from a point on the right bank of the Meuse a kilometer southwest of Sivry-sur-Meuse across the northern point of the Bois de Chaume and along the edge of the Bois Plat-Chêne to Meridian 24, while the main line of resistance was occupied by the 1st Battalion on the east and the 2nd Battalion on the west.⁵⁸ This defense system was also held by the Machine Gun Company of that regiment and by Companies C and D, 123rd Machine Gun Battalion.⁵⁹ The troops spent the day strengthening their positions and that night patrols were sent to reconnoitre the ridge south of the Sivry-sur-Meuse-Réville road.⁶⁰ In the rear, aside from the movements which have been mentioned, there were no changes of position and the 1st Battalion, 104th Field Artillery, spent a comparatively quiet day in the trenches southeast of Consenvoye, as did Company B, 123rd Machine Gun Battalion, near Brabant.⁶¹ To the tired troops who had been in the line nearly six weeks came that afternoon the welcome news that they would shortly be

relieved by the 15th Colonial Infantry Division, and the requisite orders were issued accordingly.⁶²

For the troops of the 66th Brigade in the left sector of the 33rd Division on the west bank of the Meuse the day was marked by the preparations for the approaching relief, which was, in the case of the majority of the units, to occur that very night. Upon the arrival of the 5th Colonial Infantry (French) the 3rd Battalion, 132nd Infantry, at Hill 281 formed the head of the column on the road through Béthincourt, Chattancourt, La Claire, and Fromeréville, and marched to Camp Moulin Brulé,⁶³ followed by the 131st Infantry and Company B, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, to the Bois de Nixéville⁶⁴ and the Bois Claude, and by the 122nd Machine Gun Battalion to Camp Moulin Brulé.⁶⁵ The headquarters, one battalion, and the train of the 108th Engineers proceeded by the road along the right bank from Cumières to the Citadel of Verdun.

The enemy artillery, quieter than usual during the morning, shelled the Bois de Chaume, Consenvoye and its neighborhood, Gercourt-et-Drillancourt, the Bois Juré, and the Bois Sachet intermittently during the rest of the day with high explosives, shrapnel, and gas.⁶⁶ The 52nd Field Artillery Brigade, restored to its normal organization by the dissolution of the supporting group which had operated more or less independently since the initial attack east of the Meuse on October 8, was more active than it had been during the days immediately preceding and devoted considerable attention to the vicinity of Vilosnes, as well as concentrating on Sivry-sur-Meuse about 9 P.M.⁶⁷

The division P. C. was more animated that Saturday than it had been for some time and additional warning orders were dispatched to the 66th Brigade, the 108th Engineers, and the 122nd Machine Gun Battalion. The arrangements

for the withdrawal of the troops were embodied in Field Order No. 30, issued that afternoon at 6:15;⁶⁸ the opening paragraph announced that "Under orders of the XVII French Corps this Division will be relieved by the 15th Colonial Infantry Division (French): the relief to be completed the morning of 21st October 1918."

During the evening an operation order was received from the 17th Army Corps,⁶⁹ which announced that there was no change in the line of the front and that on the following day the 33rd Division would make "movements preparatory to the relief." The mission of the 26th French Division was to remain as heretofore, while the 26th and 29th American Divisions were directed to continue their reconnaissances and preparations for a subsequent attack, as well as to effect the necessary work to strengthen the sector.

Sunday, October 20, 1918, was another chilly autumnal day, accompanied by a downpour of rain. About dawn the troops which had been relieved on the west bank of the Meuse during the preceding night reached the various destinations enumerated in the narrative for October 19.⁷⁰ Apart from the usual routine of trench life and preparations for further relief, the activities of the infantry and artillery of the 33rd Division that day were very light; even the guns were almost entirely silent.⁷¹ Similarly in the division P. C. at La Hutte there were only three incidents of importance. The first was the issuance at 3:45 P.M. of Addendum No. 1 to the field order of the previous day,⁷² which opened with the announcement that "Upon completion of the relief and moves directed in Field Order No. 30, this Division will be assembled in the rear zone of the XXXIII French Army Corps where it will remain under command of the XVII French Army Corps." This order was accompanied by a march table setting forth in detail the movements of the night of October 20-21, the fol-

lowing day and night, and the day of October 22, and it was specifically directed that "Movements will be carried out as a rule during the night. If the weather remains misty and dark, movements may begin after 3:30 P.M. and must be completed by 9 A.M."⁷³

The dispositions therein contained were based upon an order from the 17th Army Corps,⁷⁴ which stated that "In execution of the instructions of the General Commanding the 1st U. S. A., the 33rd I. D. U. S. after its relief which is to be terminated on the morning of the 21st, will be re-grouped in the rear zone of the 33rd A. C. [in the] region Faubourg Pavé-Dieue-Génicourt, where it will continue to be under the 17th A. C."

That evening an additional order was received from the corps⁷⁵ announcing that in its sector the situation that day was unchanged and that on October 21 there would be a "continuation of the operations of relief" between the 33rd and the 15th Colonial Infantry Division; that the mission of the 26th French Division remained as before; that the 26th and 29th American Divisions were to continue their "preparations for the operation for which the plans have today been co-ordinated at the Staff of the Army Corps."⁷⁶

With the exception of a few isolated units, all the remaining troops of the 33rd Division on both banks of the Meuse were relieved that night by the 15th Colonial Infantry Division. On the west bank the 1st and 2nd Battalions and Machine Gun Company of the 132nd Infantry, upon the arrival of the French relieving force, withdrew from the trenches in the Dannevoux and Bois de la Côte Lemont sectors and marched to the Bois de Forges, which was likewise occupied that night by Companies A, C, and D, 124th Machine Gun Battalion.⁷⁷ The 52nd Field Artillery Brigade, with the exception of the 105th Regiment which remained

near Gercourt until the following night, started about midnight for the Bois la Ville, the Bois de Nixéville, and Bois Claude.⁷⁸ Farther south the 108th Engineers were replaced in the Citadel of Verdun by Company D of that regiment from the neighborhood of La Claire and by Company E from Cumières, while the supply, ammunition and sanitary trains and the trench mortar battery were concentrated that night at the Casernes Bevaux and in the Faubourg Pavé in the environs of Verdun.⁷⁹

With the solitary exception of Company D, 123rd Machine Gun Battalion—which remained in the trenches in the Bois Plat-Chêne until twenty-four hours later—the relief of the entire 65th Infantry Brigade was accomplished in the single night of October 20–21.⁸⁰ The first body of troops to move was a column of the brigade reserve comprising the 129th Infantry and Companies B and C, 123rd Machine Gun Battalion, which proceeded about dark from the vicinity of Consenvoye across the river at Brabant to the Bois Delolime and the Bois du Chana, where it arrived about 11 P.M.⁸¹ The 130th Infantry and Company A, 123rd Machine Gun Battalion, composed the second column which, upon being relieved in the outpost and defense systems, moved to the Bois Bourrus,⁸² arriving about dawn on November 21.⁸³ The 1st Battalion of the 104th Field Artillery at the Tranchée de Heraclée formed an independent column and that night rejoined the rest of that regiment en route from the Bois Juré to its first staging area south of the Verdun–Dombasle road.

Of the troops which had been relieved on the west bank of the Meuse during the night of October 19–20 and which had withdrawn to staging areas south of this same road, Company B, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, marched from the Bois de Nixéville to Camp les Tamaris, which is situated north of the road from Récourt to Villers-sur-Meuse,⁸⁴ the

3rd Battalion, 132nd Infantry, from Moulin Brulé to Génicourt; and the 122nd Machine Gun Battalion made a long movement which brought it to the village of Rattentout, directly east of Dieue-sur-Meuse,⁸⁵ while the road along the left bank of the river was followed by the headquarters, Companies A, B, C, and D, and the train of the 108th Engineers, which proceeded from the Citadel of Verdun to Dugny, La Falouse and Belleray that night. The 131st Infantry made no movement but remained in the Bois de Nixéville and the Bois Claude until the morning of November 22.⁸⁶

On Monday, October 21, 1918, the P. C. of the 33rd Division was closed in the damp dugout at La Hutte in the Bois Bourrus at 8 A.M. and opened at the same hour in the comfortable Château Thomasseau de Cursey⁸⁷ at Dieue-sur-Meuse, ten kilometers south of Verdun, where it was joined by the headquarters troop and the various offices of the staff comprising the second echelon from Lempire. Apart from the usual work connected with such a movement as was then being made by the division, its activities that day were mainly confined to the issuance of a confidential memorandum on the subject of straggling and absenteeism and of a training circular prescribing a period of rest for three days for the purpose of putting the troops into proper condition after their long stay in the trenches, to be followed by a resumption of training.⁸⁸

During the morning Companies D and E, 108th Engineers, proceeded from the Citadel of Verdun to Haudainville and, far in their rear, the 108th Field Signal Battalion and the 108th Train Headquarters and Military Police began their march from Longbut to Ancemont. At 4 P.M. the 129th Infantry and Companies B and C, 123rd Machine Gun Battalion, left the Bois Delolime and the Bois du Chana for rest billets in the area of Sommedieue, where they arrived about

midnight⁸⁹ and were joined by the P. C. of the 65th Brigade which was established in that town.⁹⁰ This column was followed by another composed of the 130th Infantry and Company A, 123rd Machine Gun Battalion, which marched from the Bois Bourrus to the area of Rupt-en-Woëvre, arriving about 4 A.M. on November 22.⁹¹

Of the 66th Brigade, the 2nd Battalion, 132nd Infantry, and Companies A, C, and D, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, started after dark from the Bois de Forges for Haudainville,⁹² followed as far as the Citadel of Verdun by the headquarters and the 1st Battalion of the 132nd. The night of October 21–22 likewise witnessed the relief of the two remaining units of the 33rd Division, 105th Field Artillery, near the Bois Juré,⁹³ in the sector on the west bank where the command had been turned over that morning to the 15th Colonial Infantry Division⁹⁴ and Company D, 123rd Machine Gun Battalion, in the Bois Plat-Chêne, the former proceeding south to the Bois la Ville and the latter marching to the Bois Bourrus.⁹⁵

On Tuesday, October 22, 1918, the movement of the 33rd Division continued in the direction of the Meuse between Dieue and Tilly. During the day or the course of the ensuing night the troops were grouped as follows: the 65th Brigade was concentrated on the line Sommedieue–Rupt-en Woëvre;⁹⁶ the 122nd Machine Gun Battalion was at Rattentout—where it had arrived during the night of October 20–21;⁹⁷ the 52nd Field Artillery Brigade extended from Dieue-sur-Meuse to the Bois la Ville,⁹⁸ its ammunition train and the trench mortar battery remaining in the Faubourg Pavé at Verdun; the 66th Brigade occupied the area southwest of Souilly within the serrated boundary formed by the roads Les Monthairons-Ferme–Ravigny–Récourt–Rambluzin,⁹⁹ its P. C. being established at Génicourt and Companies A, C, and D, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, at le Petit Monthairon,¹⁰⁰ while Com-

pany B remained at Camp les Tamaris. The 108th Field Signal Battalion and the 108th Train Headquarters and Military Police occupied Ancemont, the 108th Engineers remained at Dugny, and the 108th Sanitary Train moved from Thierville to the Faubourg Pavé,¹⁰¹ while the extreme rear was brought up by Company D, 123rd Machine Gun Battalion, which was given a day of rest in the Bois Bourrus after its relief on the night of October 20-21.¹⁰²

The routine work in the P. C. of the 33rd Division at Dieue-sur-Meuse was enlivened by the receipt of an order from General Blondlat, commanding the 2nd French Colonial Army Corps,¹⁰³ received at 8:50 P.M., which announced that:

By order of the IInd Army U. S., the 33rd I. D. U. S. now assembled in the zone of Dieue (see table of stations attached) is placed at the disposal of the IInd C. A. C. so as to relieve the 79th I. D. U. S. in the sector of Troyon.

The movement of relief regulated by the General commanding the 79th I. D. U. S. will commence the 23rd October. . . .

In consequence of this information, warning orders were forthwith dispatched to the commanders of the 65th and 66th Brigades and the 130th and 131st Infantry to apprise them of the fact that the division had been transferred to the Second American Army and assigned to the 2nd Colonial Army Corps, as well as of the dispositions which they were to take in respect to this new relief.¹⁰⁴

Inasmuch as October 22, 1918, marked the termination of the stay of the 33rd Division in the sectors north of Verdun adjacent to the Meuse, a hasty résumé of its operations during that period may not be amiss. The first element of the division had entered the trenches there on the night of September 7-8, and the last unit was withdrawn on the night of October

21-22, a period of forty-four days. In the first instance the command passed to the 33rd Division on September 10 at 8 A.M.; in the latter it passed to the 15th Colonial Infantry Division on October 21, at 10 A.M. During the first few days the Verdun sector maintained its reputation of the preceding months as a "quiet sector" but, after the demonstration fire on September 12 at 1 A.M., it assumed a livelier aspect and the tremendous bombardment on the night of September 25-26 transformed it into as active a sector as existed on the entire Allied front. The attack of September 26, 1918, inaugurated a long and bitter struggle for the heights of the Meuse. During that six weeks, the enemy, heavily reënforced by every available reserve, fought with utmost desperation under orders to hold at all costs¹⁰⁵ the positions, which were vital to his forces, not only in that region but elsewhere on the western front. It was only by the most persistent and determined fighting for every foot of ground that any gain whatsoever was effected.¹⁰⁶ Of extraordinary natural strength and an important strategic point since Roman times, Verdun had been the scene of many a battle in bygone centuries and in 1916, of one of the most heroic struggles in history. For four years the heights north of the town and on both banks of the river had been occupied by the enemy who had fortified them with all the engineering skill that he possessed. The task of driving him from these powerful positions was therefore necessarily attended with heavy losses and, during the period that it was in the line in that sector, the 33rd Division alone suffered to the extent of 10 officers and 358 men killed; 94 officers and 4,569 men wounded, 49 men missing and 6 men captured, a total of 104 officers and 4,982 men. To these figures the attached units, such as the 52nd Field Artillery Brigade, added their quota of 3 officers and 106 men, so that the total

losses of the command during its operations at Verdun amounted to 107 officers and 5,088 men.¹⁰⁷

In the attack of September 26, the mission of the 33rd Division was to cross the Ruisseau de Forges and to capture the Bois de Forges as well as the sector extending along the left bank of the Meuse to the Laiterie de Belhame. The Forges Brook, an insignificant stream in the dry season, was at that time much swollen by the constant rains of the preceding week and its approaches, always marshy, had then been transformed into a species of morass. The Bois de Forges, a veritable fortress of machine-gun nests, was one of the most formidable positions in the entire region of Verdun. Yet in spite of its task and notwithstanding the heavy enemy fire of artillery and machine guns, in exactly four hours and thirty minutes after leaving its trenches south of the valley of the Forges the 66th Brigade had covered five kilometers with its right and seven kilometers with its left, the Bois de Forges had been taken, and the entire left bank of the river as far as Dannevoux was in its possession. A frontal attack, combined with a turning movement which took the position in the rear, had proved irresistible and had resulted in the capture in a few hours of this stronghold, which the enemy believed impregnable. So rapid was the advance of the American troops that the enemy found himself surrounded before he awoke to the situation¹⁰⁸ and even the enemy commander narrowly escaped being taken prisoner.¹⁰⁹ It is questionable if any plan other than that actually adopted could have achieved the same result in so short a time.¹¹⁰ Various factors contributed to the success for which the plan was primarily responsible. In addition to its speed, the attack was executed with a precision well-nigh incredible considering the attending circumstances and it was greatly assisted by the artillery support, by the relentless offensive shown by the troops—which, it is consid-

ered, was materially developed by their thorough training in bayonet work—by the judicious employment of such auxiliary weapons as the trench mortars and the 37-millimeter guns, and by the effectiveness of the machine guns. The commanders of these units displayed unusual initiative and resourcefulness in the barrage with which they completely smothered the enemy resistance.¹¹¹ Indeed, in this respect their work marked an innovation of sufficient merit to evoke the following remarks, under the heading, "Machine Guns," in the Notes on Recent Operations No. 3, published for the information of the American Expeditionary Forces:¹¹²

"One division made excellent use of its guns to neutralize a woods which it passed by and later attacked from the rear. A great number of prisoners were thus captured with very small losses."

During the period from September 27 to October 7, 1918, the active operations of the 33rd Division were reduced to the minimum, being confined to trench warfare incident to securing the right flank of the First American Army in its attacks in the vicinity of the Meuse in the so-called Meuse-Argonne battle. This period demanded much patience and fortitude on the part of the officers and men, who were limited to a passive rôle despite the incessant fire of the enemy's artillery and machine guns from the dominating positions on the east bank, as well as gas and aeroplane attacks; and who were without the satisfaction of any activity other than that of trench routine, rendered doubly uncomfortable by the almost constant rain.

On October 6, the 33rd Division was transferred from the IIIrd American Corps to the 17th French Army Corps and two days later part of the 66th Brigade participated in the initial attack of that corps east of the Meuse, in the region which had witnessed the most desperate fighting during the

great battle of Verdun in 1916. This delicate operation—which has already been described in detail—¹¹³ was fruitful in its results and on the following day the front of the 17th Army Corps had been advanced almost as far as the front of the IIIrd Corps had been at the conclusion of the second day of its attack nearly a fortnight earlier.¹¹⁴ As was customary with the troops of the 33rd Division, the forces under Colonel Davis attained the objective assigned them—the second exploitation objective—but their exposed right flank, unprotected owing to the inability of the 58th Infantry Brigade (29th American Division) to keep pace with them, invited attack and the enemy was quick to seize the opportunity thus presented. A vigorous counterattack delivered at the close of October 8 by picked German storm troops compelled the 132nd Infantry to fall back to the southern edge of the Bois de Chaume, although its extreme left was not relieved until later. The remainder of the 66th Brigade, reënforced by some units of the 65th Brigade, was at once thrown across the river, and at 10 A.M. next day the ground relinquished had been completely retaken. From that moment the enemy was powerless to dislodge General Wolf's command. Three times the second exploitation objective was reached and a farther advance could doubtless have been made had not the right flank remained exposed and unsupported.¹¹⁵ The dominating positions of the enemy enabled his artillery and machine guns to render this line untenable, but a sheltered position was consolidated a short distance in the rear, sufficiently near this objective to render abortive any attempt by the enemy to retake it. Under the most intense fire of artillery and machine guns, coupled with occasional counterattacks and constant gas and aeroplane attacks, the troops of the 66th Brigade held their ground with unflinching determination, and by so doing they rendered secure the possession of the sector immediately

adjacent to the right bank of the Meuse and served as a pivot upon which the Commander of the 17th Army Corps swung his centre and right northward and northeastward over a terrain which the enemy contested with a resistance frenzied in its desperation.

At the end of seven days the defense of this sector devolved upon the 65th Brigade in consequence of the mutual relief between it and the 66th Brigade. For six days¹¹⁶ its task was performed with similar vigor and determination, and the line in the Bois Plat-Chêne advanced by virtue of an operation on October 16 undertaken in conjunction with the 29th Division on the right.¹¹⁷ Although the lion's share of the fighting in the Verdun sector fell—largely through the chance of location—to the lot of the 66th Brigade, the 65th Brigade had executed its equally important, if less conspicuous, task with an efficiency in nowise inferior and under circumstances exacting great resoluteness on the part of the troops.¹¹⁸ Although restricted to a defensive rôle, patrols and raids were made constantly and, on the west bank of the Meuse, in spite of a decidedly exposed location, the outposts were pushed forward to the river's very edge.¹¹⁹ To the successes achieved the 65th Brigade contributed its full share, notwithstanding the difficult position in which it served. An excellent description of its situation is given by one of its regimental commanders:¹²⁰

The terrain in and around the Outpost Lines on the west bank of the Meuse in the Bois-de-la-Côte-Lemont and Bois-de-Dannevoux was a most difficult one to operate from, although it constituted an exceedingly strong defensive position. To the front and right flank was the low flatland along the west bank of the Meuse. The enemy occupied the woods and high hills to the north and northeast which afforded them superior observation. This coupled with their personal knowledge of the ground gave them a tremendous advantage

over our forces and proved costly to us because of the extreme accuracy of their artillery fire. Our aerial service was hampered because of lack of visibility and in many cases were not as aggressive as would be desired.

The terrain on the east bank of the Meuse occupied by our troops was similar to that on the west bank, our outpost lines being dug in, in the woods on the forward slope of a series of hills with the enemy in a commanding position in the Haraumont Heights where he had the advantage in observation and knowledge as to the exact nature of the ground occupied by our troops, again giving him superior advantage in artillery fire which cost us considerable losses by way of casualties.

In the face of an enemy on commanding heights which afford perfect observation and field of fire, to construct bridges and to force the passage of a river and a canal flanked by extensive marshes is a difficult operation. Yet such a feat was successfully accomplished at Brabant and Consenvoye on October 8 by the forces under the command of Colonel Davis, notwithstanding the presence of the enemy in great strength in the Bois de Consenvoye, the Bois de Chaume, and the dominating positions on the heights of Haraumont. Indeed, one of the most distinguished military writers of the present time has described this achievement as "one of the brilliant feats of the war."¹²¹

That all operations astride a river are of necessity fraught with risk is generally conceded. The difficulty of keeping liaison between the elements of a command separated by such an obstacle is recognized. That any mistake committed in such an operation is likely to prove disastrous if the enemy be powerful and alert has been demonstrated in many a defeat in the past. Nevertheless, from October 8 to 20 the 33rd Division maintained its positions astride the Meuse without the slightest interruption in its means of communication and without the loss of a foot of ground except during the

brief period between the enemy counterattack at the close of day on October 9 and ten o'clock the following morning. Against the vigor of the attack made on October 10 even picked German storm troops were powerless to stand, and their subsequent attempts proved equally unavailing. Throughout the entire time from that morning until its relief, the 33rd Division—in spite of the fact that its troops on the right bank were peculiarly exposed to attack—protected and firmly secured the right flank of the American Corps on the west bank and the left of the 17th French Army Corps on the east bank, thereby contributing materially to the successful issue of the battle that wrested from the enemy positions of exceptional strength of which he had held undisputed possession for more than four years.

VII. IN THE TROYON-SUR-MEUSE SECTOR WITH THE SECOND AMERICAN ARMY AND THE 2ND FRENCH COLONIAL ARMY CORPS

Wednesday, October 23, 1918, was a day of rest for the 33rd Division within the area Sommedieue-Génicourt-sur-Meuse-Rambluzin-Bois la Ville-Faubourg Pavé,¹ where it was rejoined late that afternoon by Company D, 123rd Machine Gun Battalion, from the Bois Bourrus where it had staged during the day succeeding its relief in the Bois Plat-Chêne on the night of October 21-22.² The tired troops were given such opportunity as the local facilities permitted to bathe and change the clothing which many of them had worn almost continuously for more than six weeks, and the day was spent in cleaning personal effects, equipment, harness, etc.,³ as well as in such reorganization as had become urgent after the long stay in the trenches.⁴ So far as the units were concerned the day was otherwise devoid of incidents worthy of mention, whereas the division P. C. at Dieue-sur-Meuse was the scene of decided activity.

In conformity with the order received on October 22 from the 2nd Colonial Army Corps,⁵ warning orders regarding the relief of the 79th Division were sent to the 65th and 66th Brigades, the 108th Engineers, and 122nd Machine Gun Battalion, followed at 6 P.M. by the issuance of Field Order No. 31,⁶ which directed that the 65th Brigade should relieve the 157th Brigade of the 79th Division in the subsector known as Connecticut, the 130th Infantry taking over the positions

of the 313th Infantry in the front lines and the 129th taking over those of the 314th Infantry in the rest area. Similarly the 66th Brigade was to relieve the 158th Brigade of the 79th Division in the subsector Massachusetts, the 132nd Infantry superseding the 316th Infantry in the advanced lines and the 131st Infantry relieving the 315th in the rest area. The 122nd Machine Gun Battalion, the 108th Engineers, and the 108th Field Signal Battalion were likewise to relieve corresponding units of the 79th Division. The 65th Brigade was to furnish two platoons of infantry and a section of machine guns as a reënforcement garrison at the Fort de Troyon, and the company of the 79th Division at Lavignéville was to be replaced by a similar unit from the 66th Brigade. Announcement was made that special orders concerning the artillery would be issued later⁷ and that the command in the three sectors would pass at 8 A.M. on October 26.⁸ In pursuance of these instructions the necessary orders were issued by the two brigades concerned⁹ and in consequence the 2nd Battalion, 130th Infantry, relieved the 1st Battalion, 313th Infantry, in reserve, including two companies in the Bois de Combres and two in the Bois des Éparges,¹⁰ while the 108th Engineers proceeded from the Dugny area to Rupt-en-Woëvre, Ranzières, and Mouilly where they staged until the following night, these movements taking place during daylight. During the night of October 23-24 the 131st Infantry marched from the area of Camp Monthairons southeast to the village and chateau of Thillombois, Woimbey, and Camp Gibraltar, where it relieved the 315th Infantry of the 79th Division in the rest area at those places,¹¹ and that same night two battalions of the 132nd Infantry advanced from the region of Les Monthairons and Génicourt-sur-Meuse east to Dommartin-sur-Montagne where they staged preparatory to the relief which they were to make next day.¹²

At 9:20 P.M. the following order reached the division P. C. at Dieue-sur-Meuse:

2ND C. A. C.
STAFF

AT THE H. Q. the 23 October, 1918.
Secret

3RD BUREAU MODIFICATION OF SPECIAL ORDER NO. 816.¹³
No. 3/396-T/3

By order of the 1st Army U. S., the 52nd Brigade of Field Artillery ceases to be attached to the 33rd I. D. U. S. and passes to the 79th I. D. U. S. The 55th Artillery Brigade ceases to be attached to the 79th I. D. U. S. and passes to the 33rd I. D. U. S.

In consequence:

1st. The 52nd Artillery Brigade will retain its present positions in the zone of Dieue.

2nd. The 55th Artillery Brigade is not relieved in the sector of Troyon.

By Order. The Chief of Staff,
ALAMBÉY.

It was not until Thursday, October 24, 1918, at 10:55 A.M. that the order directing the relief of the 79th Division by the 33rd, which had been issued by the Headquarters of the Second American Army at Toul on the twentieth,¹⁴ reached the division P. C. at Dieue-sur-Meuse. It was followed at 4:10 P.M. by a corrected copy of the same order¹⁵ bearing a like date and identical with the original order except that the first paragraph was modified by an insertion in two places so that it read:

"1. The 33rd Division (less Artillery) will relieve the 79th Division (less Artillery) in the Troyon Sector."¹⁶ Both the original and the corrected copy fixed this relief for the nights of October 24-25 and 25-26, but, as has already been seen, this operation had been begun on the twenty-third pursuant to the orders from the 2nd Colonial Army Corps.¹⁷ However, orders were promptly issued relieving the 52nd Field Artillery Brigade from the 33rd Division and attaching

it to the 79th Division,¹⁸ with which it marched back to Verdun and went back into the line on the nights of October 28 and 29, its positions on the morning of October 30 being all within a radius of less than two miles from the spot where the 1st Battalion of the 104th Field Artillery was relieved on the night of October 20-21.¹⁹

On October 24 all the necessary reconnaissances were made for the reliefs to be effected that night, and the 314th Infantry (157th Brigade, 79th Division) in the rest area of the Troyon sector was relieved before darkness by the 129th Infantry which occupied Ranzières, Ambly, Tilly-sur-Meuse and Récourt.²⁰ The night of October 24-25 witnessed several such operations whereby units of the 79th Division were replaced by similar organizations of the 33rd. On the north, the 2nd Battalion, 313th Infantry, which was holding the Bois des Éparges and the right section of the subsector Connecticut, known as the "Centre of Resistance Augusta," was relieved by the 3rd Battalion of the 130th Infantry²¹ and Company B, 123rd Machine Gun Battalion, took over a portion of the gun positions of the 311th Machine Gun Battalion (157th Brigade) in the same subsector.²² In the subsector Massachusetts on the south, the 2nd Battalion, 316th Infantry (158th Brigade, 79th Division), in the Centre of Resistance Concord and the 3rd Battalion of that regiment in Le Chanut Bois were relieved by two battalions of the 132nd Infantry,²³ while the remaining battalion of the 132nd moved forward to Dommartin-la-Montagne preparatory to relieving the 1st Battalion, 316th Infantry, on the following night.²⁴ In this same subsector, part of the positions of the 312th Machine Gun Battalion (158th Brigade) near the Longeau Ferme were taken over by the 124th Machine Gun Battalion but, as this latter command had a long distance to march, it was long after daylight before it occupied the support and reserve positions

and, as a matter of fact, the entire relief was not finished until next evening.²⁵ The engineer regiment and train of the 79th Division was relieved in the Grande Tranchée de Calonne—which runs in the rear of, and more or less parallel to, the advanced positions described above—by the 108th Engineers and 108th Engineer Train.²⁶ Still farther in the rear the 108th Field Signal Battalion replaced the corresponding unit of the outgoing division at Troyon-sur-Meuse,²⁷ and on the west bank the 122nd Machine Gun Battalion relieved the 310th Machine Gun Battalion of the 79th Division.²⁸

On Friday, October 25, 1918, there were no movements of importance by the 33rd Division except for the first stage of the relief effected by the 124th Machine Gun Battalion that morning, the reënforcing of the French garrison at the Fort de Troyon by a detachment from the 129th Infantry,²⁹ and the arrival at Troyon-sur-Meuse of the 108th Field Signal Battalion from Ancemont and the 108th Sanitary Train from Faubourg Pavé.³⁰ Incident to taking over a new sector, numerous arrangements were obviously necessary³¹ and during the course of the day instructions were received from General Blondlat, commanding the 2nd Colonial Army Corps, announcing that:

By order of the IIInd Army U. S., the 39th French I. D. will be relieved in its sector by the extension of the front of the 28th I. D. U. S. to the west and the 33rd I. D. U. S. to the east as far as the line:

Western edge of the Bois des Haravillers and du Rébois—Hattonchâtel (IVth A. C. U. S.)—Ailly-sur-Meuse (2nd C. A. C.)—Brasselte (IVth A. C. U. S.)—Mécrin (IVth A. C. U. S.) which after the completion of the relief will become the new limit between the 2nd C. A. C. and IVth A. C. U. S.³²

This relief, which was to be regulated by the general commanding the 39th French Infantry Division, to commence on October 27, and to terminate at 8 A.M. on October 29,

entailed the occupation of the outposts and positions of resistance west of this new boundary by one battalion of the 131st Infantry and by the two companies of the 122nd Machine Gun Battalion on the night of October 27-28, while one battalion of the 131st was to be posted in reserve, its staff and three companies at Chaillon and one company and the regimental band at St. Mihiel. The 62nd American Field Artillery Brigade (Brigadier General George W. Burr) at Mesnil-la-Tour was to be utilized, less its howitzer regiment, for the dual purpose of relieving the artillery of the 39th French Infantry Division and of furnishing one group to the 33rd American Division.

The night of October 25-26 saw the relief of the last units of the 79th Division on the Troyon-sur-Meuse sector. At 9 P.M. the 124th Machine Gun Battalion finished taking over the remaining positions of the 312th Machine Gun Battalion near the Longeau Ferme³³ and the 1st Battalion of the 316th Infantry was relieved in the Centre of Resistance Montpellier in the Massachusetts subsector by the battalion of the 132nd Infantry which had spent the day at Dommartin-sur-Montagne. In the Connecticut subsector on the north, the 3rd Battalion and Machine Gun Company, 313th Infantry, in the Centre of Resistance Providence was replaced by the 1st Battalion and Machine Gun Company of the 130th Infantry,³⁴ while Companies A, C, and D, 123rd Machine Gun Battalion, completed the relief of the machine-gun units of the 79th Division in that sector.³⁵

On Saturday, October 26, 1918, at eight o'clock in the morning the P. C. of the 33rd Division closed at Dieue-sur-Meuse and opened at the same hour at Troyon-sur-Meuse, at which time the entire command in the Troyon, Connecticut, and Massachusetts subsectors passed from the 79th Division to the Commanding General, 33rd Division, and to the com-

manders of the 65th and 66th Infantry Brigades respectively.³⁶ During the course of the morning the Division Commander, accompanied by his two Aides-de-Camp and his Adjutant, proceeded to St. Mihiel to report his arrival and to pay his respects to General Blondlat, commanding the 2nd Colonial Army Corps.³⁷

The interest that day in the P. C. of the 33rd Division was confined to the instructions given to the commanders of the 66th Brigade, the 131st Infantry, and the 122nd Machine Gun Battalion in respect to the extension of the front, the relief of the 39th French Division and the movements to be effected in consequence,³⁸ and to the receipt of an announcement from the 2nd Colonial Army Corps that "The Staff of the 62nd F. A. Brigade, U. S., is placed at the disposal of the General comdg. the 33rd I. D. U. S. to whom it will present itself during the course of the 27th October."³⁹

As has been seen, the 58th Field Artillery Brigade, which formed part of the 33rd Division and was trained with it at Camp Logan, Houston, Texas, separated from the division at that camp and, upon completion of its training at Ornans, France, was attached to various other divisions during the continuance of hostilities.⁴⁰ On the British front the 33rd Division was supported by British artillery; in the operations near Verdun the 52nd Field Artillery Brigade, belonging to the 27th Division, was attached to it for a period of seven weeks;⁴¹ upon reaching the Troyon sector the 33rd Division was given the 55th Field Artillery Brigade, belonging to the 30th Division⁴² and previously attached to the 79th Division, which was unable to move owing to scarcity of horses. By virtue of its location in the sector, the mission of supporting the 65th Brigade fell to the 114th Field Artillery (Colonel Luke Lea) on the north and a like task in respect to the 66th Brigade to the 113th Field Artillery (Colonel

Albert L. Cox) on the south, while the 115th Field Artillery, 155-millimeter howitzers (Colonel Harry S. Berry), devoted its activities to any point in the entire sector where they were required. The *modus operandi* of the 55th Field Artillery Brigade is thus described by its operations officer:⁴³

The Divisional front extended almost 12 kilometers. The line of outposts were from two to four kilometers in front of the main line of resistance which extended along the military crest of the Côtes de Meuse. On conference with the infantry a plan of Artillery Defense was developed whereby each infantry outpost support was protected by a barrage with density of fire 1 round per minute per 12 meters. The battery positions all being on the heights another barrage could be put down in front of the Line of Resistance in case the infantry had to fall back.

The plan of C. P. O. fire covered all points of assembly, communication trenches, etc. These were called for by name—also the Heavy C. P. O. was fired on barrage signal as part of the barrage. Both barrages and C. P. O.s were arranged as normal and eventuals so as to get concentration in case of local attacks.

A Plan of Reprisal fire was employed. Harassing fire was done mostly at night and according to schedule.

A plan of defense against tanks was developed so that all routes by which tanks could approach would be covered by enfilade fire. . . .

Counter battery work was done when possible. In some instances enemy batteries were located by the Artillery O. P. S. and by the S. R. S. but owing to our infantry operating in the vicinity we were not allowed to fire on them. The enemy employed roving guns which would operate from positions very close to the front line. We likewise used roving guns with considerable success.

The plan mentioned above grew out of a series of conferences beginning on October 27, to which General Bell summoned all his subordinate commanders and at which the endeavor was made to profit by, and to improve upon, the experience gained by other organizations which had occupied

that sector.⁴⁴ The plan thus evolved met with the approval of the Corps Commander⁴⁵ and proved extremely effective throughout hostilities.

For the troops of the 33rd Division, the ten days from October 27 to November 5, 1918, inclusive, afforded little of interest to break the monotony of trench life, except the constant harassing fire to which they were subjected by the enemy artillery⁴⁶ and the unusual activity in the way of continual patrols and frequent raids.⁴⁷ These were initiated as a result of orders from the Corps Commander on October 27 to make such reconnaissances as were necessary to determine the exact front held by the enemy, who was reported to have withdrawn his line of outposts in the sector opposite the 39th French Division.⁴⁸ They were followed next evening by instructions to "have reconnaissances executed this very night destined to sound the enemy lines and to bring back prisoners"⁴⁹ and by orders on October 29 from General Bullard, commanding the Second Army, "to take contact with the enemy by means of patrols" and "to make 1 or 2 raids as soon as possible in order to make prisoners."⁵⁰ The first of these operations took place on the night of October 28-29, and they were of daily occurrence thereafter,⁵¹ as will be seen in the subsequent narrative.

During this period of ten days several events transpired which deserve at least brief mention. On October 27 there was received from the 2nd Colonial Army Corps an important addition to the plan of defense for the zone of St. Mihiel⁵² and, in compliance with General Blondlat's instructions,⁵³ the commanders of the 65th and 66th Brigades were informed of the extension of the division boundary, the new limits were defined, and these officers were directed to make a study of this sector with a view to its reorganization. They were likewise notified that each brigade subsector was to be held by one regiment in the line and one regiment at rest. The commander of

the 55th Field Artillery Brigade was instructed to consult with his fellow brigadiers and to formulate a plan for the employment of his guns and for any change in the location of his units deemed advisable.⁵⁴ On the night of October 27–28 the 122nd Machine Gun Battalion relieved corresponding units of the 39th French Division in the sector to the south.⁵⁵

Monday, October 28, was noteworthy for the issuance of two confidential memoranda by the division P. C., and that night the 2nd Battalion, 132nd Infantry, relieved the 2nd Battalion of the 131st Infantry which proceeded to Deuxnouds, while the 3rd Battalion, with the exception of Company I and the regimental band which marched to St. Mihiel, moved to Chaillon.⁵⁶ During the day a reconnaissance was made by a small party from the 130th Infantry, while that night a similar operation was repeated by the same regiment and a patrol from the 132nd Infantry was successful in taking some prisoners.⁵⁷

Tuesday, October 29, 1918, was characterized by a few events of importance. Only a tentative scheme for the reorganization of the division sector was submitted to the Corps Commander and letters were sent to the commanding generals of the 65th and 66th Brigades informing them that "combat liaison with units of adjoining Divisions and Inter-Brigade and Regimental [units] will be assured by means of mixed posts."⁵⁸ That night the hearts of 1,200 men of the 33rd Division were gladdened when special trains from Villers-sur-Meuse carried them off for a leave of seven days at Aix-les-Bains.⁵⁹ Two daylight patrols by the 130th Infantry⁶⁰ were supplemented during the night of October 29–30 by a reconnaissance by a detachment from that regiment and by four other patrols, one from the 132nd Infantry being successful in taking a few prisoners, whereas another was stopped north of Doncourt-aux-Templiers by a heavy concentration of

gas.⁶¹ As a matter of fact there were a number of areas which were decidedly "unhealthy" that night owing to the greatly increased activity of the enemy artillery all along the front of the 33rd Division, particularly in the vicinity of Fresnes-en-Woëvre, where it concentrated more than 2,300 gas and high explosive shells between 10:15 P.M. and 1:10 A.M.⁶²

Wednesday, October 30, 1918, was a busier day in the P. C. of the 33rd Division at Troyon-sur-Meuse than those immediately preceding it. Instructions were sent to the Division Engineer Officer to maintain a liaison officer and detachment with each brigade, the latter to assist in the siting, tracing, and construction of positions. The commander of the 55th Field Artillery Brigade was directed to submit daily a report embodying the firing which he contemplated delivering during the ensuing twenty-four hours, together with the objectives proposed, and five confidential memoranda dealing with a variety of subjects were issued.⁶³ A note was received from the Chief of Staff of the 2nd Colonial Army Corps announcing that the Corps Commander approved of the tentative plan of occupation of the front submitted on October 29 but requested a map showing the positions of the troops in the line and the submission before November 5 of a plan embodying the entire program of defensive organizations.⁶⁴

Beyond a slight change of position by Company A, 123rd Machine Gun Battalion,⁶⁵ there were no movements of importance during the day, but that night the 122nd Machine Gun Battalion was relieved by Company D, 124th Machine Gun Battalion,⁶⁶ and this latter command took over all the gun positions of the subsector Massachusetts.⁶⁷ There were two patrols sent out during the day and one that night; two of these failed to obtain contact with the enemy

but the daylight patrol from the 130th Infantry had a lively fight in the Tranchée du Moulin de Saulx.⁶⁸

Thursday, October 31, was chiefly notable for the receipt of a letter from General Blondlat on the subject of the necessity for protection against gassed areas and for daily reports specifying such localities and the casualties resulting from gas shelling.⁶⁹ This caused the issuing of Training Circular No. 188 on the subject of the "New Gas Discipline" which was to be enforced in consequence,⁷⁰ and was followed by Confidential Memorandum No. 32 requiring all telephone lines in the division to be tested daily.⁷¹ Notification was also received that the 136th Field Artillery (less its 2nd Battalion) was en-route to join the 2nd Colonial Army Corps and upon its arrival would be assigned to the 33rd Division.⁷² At 7:15 A.M. telephonic instructions were received from the corps that the "Alarm Exercise" would begin immediately; the units were promptly apprised of that fact⁷³ and the entire division was held in readiness for any eventuality until 5:30 P.M., when the "recall" was sounded.⁷⁴

An interesting side light on the condition of the enemy forces opposite the 33rd Division was revealed in the interrogatory of two Austrian prisoners taken by the 132nd Infantry, which is thus described in the operations report issued by the division P. C. that day.⁷⁵

Statements of 2 prisoners 63rd Inf. Regt., 35th A. H. Div. This Regt. was stationed at La Beuville and small units sent forward to establish outposts in front of Bois des Épinés. Prisoners stated that at times these outposts were established 400 yds. out of the woods. They also stated that they had orders not to fire on patrols or small armed parties attempting to enter the woods, but to ambush them and take them prisoners. Prisoners stated that the Inf. in this vicinity was mostly Austro-Hungarian, but the Artillery was German. Morale was stated to be very low, food scarce and of poor quality and that the discipline and work exacted from German troops and

officers was unbearable. There has been no withdrawal of any of the positions occupied by the enemy on our front. This was established by observations and daylight reconnaissances. Patrols reported that the enemy is strengthening his positions in the vicinity of Hill 233, work was heard on the suspected posts, 46.8—58.4.

A number of patrols were made during the course of the day and night. The suspected enemy post east of the Woël-St. Benoît-en-Woëvre road at the northwest point of the Bois des Haudronvilles was discovered by patrols from the 130th Infantry to be actually occupied,⁷⁶ but a night patrol from the 132nd Infantry explored the plain in the region of St. Hilaire, Butgnéville, and the Bois de Warville without encountering or even seeing any signs of the enemy.⁷⁷

On the night of October 31–November 1 another detachment of 1,200 men from the 33rd Division entrained at Villers-sur-Meuse for Aix-les-Bains for a leave of seven days.⁷⁸

On Friday, November 1, 1918, aside from the customary daily routine work, the activities of the P. C. of the 33rd Division at Troyon-sur-Meuse were confined to the issuance of two training circulars⁷⁹ and the transmission to the commanders of the infantry brigades of the order from the 2nd Colonial Army Corps respecting reports on the subject of localities shelled with gas.⁸⁰ During the course of the day the following document was received:

AT THE H. Q. the 1st November, 1918.

Secret.

SERVICE NOTE.

The Staff [of Marshal] FOCH makes known that it is possible that the Armistice with AUSTRIA may be concluded shortly.

The Marshal gives the order that endeavor be made to learn what the Austrian Divisions are doing along our front [and]

To watch [them] very closely.

2ND C. A. C.
STAFF
2ND BUREAU
No. 822C/2

H. Q. the 1st November 1918.
True Copy Notified to the General
commanding the 33rd I. D. U. S.

It is therefore necessary to augment the
activity of the patrols and, more than ever,
to capture prisoners.

By Order. The Chief of Staff,
ALAMBEY.

During the course of the day an Austrian deserter gave information that the 63rd and 64th Austro-Hungarian Regiments had been relieved by German organizations. A patrol from the 132nd Infantry penetrated the plain as far as the Bois de Warville without discovering any indications of the enemy.⁸¹ One patrol from the 130th Infantry had a similar experience but the other failed to return that day;⁸² as a matter of fact, it had a variety of encounters which will be noted presently.

On Saturday, November 2, 1918, the division P. C. issued a confidential memorandum on the subject of the assignment of machine gun companies to infantry battalions, a memorandum relating to the grooming of horses, and an important amendment to Training Circular No. 190. The object was to develop leaders among the various units.⁸³

Beyond the relief of Company L, 132nd Infantry, in the outpost positions at Wadonville by Company M of the same regiment, there were no changes of position worthy of mention. The usual patrols were made that day and during the course of the ensuing night—one from the 132nd Infantry skirted the western edge of the Bois de Warville but failed to gain contact with the enemy.⁸⁴ The missing patrol sent out on Friday by the 3rd Battalion of the 130th Infantry returned during the course of the night after a somewhat checkered career and reported that it had found the enemy trenches and dugouts northeast of Saulx-en-Woëvre unoccupied but that it

had discovered extensive and carefully camouflaged works about eight hundred meters farther down the Longeau. An enemy patrol was encountered along this stream and a lively fight ended in its retreat with a loss of two men killed and one wounded. The American patrol then pushed on and at a point about one kilometer southwest of Marchéville collided with another enemy party about forty strong. Another lively fight resulted in the killing of four or five of the enemy who then beat a hasty retreat but formed in considerable strength under cover of machine-gun fire from the copse at the eastern terminus of the Tranchée du Moulin de Saulx. So heavy was this fire that the American patrol had no alternative but to withdraw to its own lines, its losses confined to two men missing.⁸⁵

The commanding officer of the 136th Field Artillery reported his arrival to General Kilbreth,⁸⁶ whose guns continued their customary firing—1,190 rounds being consumed that twenty-four hours ending at 6 P.M.—⁸⁷and that night concentrated heavily on the Bois d'Harville and the Bois de Moulotte in conformity with orders from the Second American Army.⁸⁸

That Saturday afternoon General Blondlat, the corps commander, paid a short visit to General Bell and expressed his wish that the 33rd Division undertake some operations of greater magnitude than the usual normal patrols.⁸⁹

Sunday, November 3, was singularly devoid of interesting events. The issuance of one training circular,⁹⁰ two inter-regimental reliefs,⁹¹ a number of patrols which were wholly unsuccessful in discovering any trace of the enemy,⁹² the usual fire of the divisional artillery, and a heavy enemy bombardment of the neighborhood of the village of Trésauvaux during the night of November 3–4,⁹³ constituted the only happenings worthy of even passing mention.

By contrast, Monday, November 4, 1918, was characterized by a number of episodes of importance. Apart from the daily routine, the division P. C. sent out Confidential Memorandum No. 34 prescribing the precautions to be taken against aerial observation and the securing of proper protection by means of camouflage, and a training circular dealing with the subject of casualties resulting from mustard gas. Orders were also dispatched to the commanders of the 66th Brigade and the 122nd Machine Gun Battalion to send certain detachments to the Fort du Camp des Romains and to the Fort des Paroches as reënforcement garrisons.⁹⁴ At 7:45 P.M. a "secret, urgent" order was received from the Corps Commander directing that reconnaissances strong enough to penetrate the enemy's outposts zone be launched against well-chosen points with a view to securing prisoners.⁹⁵ As a matter of fact, during that day and the ensuing night⁹⁶ numerous patrols were made which scoured most of the plain, especially between St. Hilaire and Jonville, captured or killed a number of the enemy, and secured some important identifications.⁹⁷

At 8:30 P.M. the commanding general of the 65th Infantry Brigade issued orders for a raid against the Chateau et Ferme d'Aulnois to be made by two companies of the 130th Infantry and, in transmitting a copy of this order to G-3 of the division, announced: "If able to pull it off Wednesday morning will do so."⁹⁸

That Monday a notable contribution to human history was made. At 3 P.M. the Austrian plenipotentiaries signed an armistice embodying all the terms imposed by the Allies and a cessation of hostilities between the forces of the Allies and those of the Imperial and Royal Austro-Hungarian Government on land and sea and in the air was officially announced⁹⁹ and on the following day went into actual effect on the various fronts.

On Tuesday, November 5, 1918, at 8:25 A.M. there was received at the message centre of the 33rd Division at Troyon-sur-Meuse a communication from General Blondlat, the corps commander, emphasizing the necessity for maintaining close contact with the enemy in the event of his withdrawal and specifying the dispositions which he wished to be taken to insure this desideratum.¹⁰⁰ Beyond the usual daily routine, there was substantially no event of importance that day at the division P. C., except that the complete plan of defense of the Troyon-Chaillon sector was finished and delivered to the Corps Headquarters at St. Mihiel.¹⁰¹ At 6 P.M. the 33rd Division passed from the 2nd Colonial Army Corps to the 17th French Army Corps,¹⁰² although the actual notification of this transfer was not received until the following morning.¹⁰³ The fire of the divisional artillery was reduced to a minimum owing to the fact that the front was covered by patrols,¹⁰⁴ but these had scant success in their operations and¹⁰⁵ nine men belonging to one patrol sent out by the 130th Infantry were surrounded by the enemy and captured.¹⁰⁶ The troops devoted a large part of the day to the training prescribed,¹⁰⁷ and the raid against the Chateau et Ferme d'Aulnois by two companies of the 130th Infantry was fixed for 5:45 A.M. on November 6 but was subsequently revoked. Later in the day the commanding general of the 65th Brigade, having completed the arrangements to his satisfaction, ordered it to be carried out on Thursday, November 7, at 5:45 A.M.¹⁰⁸ The 1st and 3rd Battalions of the 132nd Infantry in the front lines were relieved by the 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 131st Infantry during the night of November 5-6,¹⁰⁹ when the unusual activity of the enemy machine guns and the number of flares displayed in various parts of the opposing lines betokened either nervousness on the part of the foe or the occupation of the sector by new troops. As a matter of fact, the great amount of circulation observed tended to establish the correctness of the latter supposition.¹¹⁰

VIII. IN THE TROYON-SUR-MEUSE SECTOR WITH THE SECOND AMERICAN ARMY AND THE 17TH FRENCH ARMY CORPS

On Wednesday, November 6, 1918, the principal events in the P. C. of the 33rd Division were the issuing of Confidential Memorandum No. 36—which announced the transfer of the division to the 17th French Army Corps at 6 P.M. on November 5—and the arrival of letters for the commanders of the three brigades and the 108th Field Signal Battalion requesting them to submit the names of men to attend the school of liaison between aviation and line troops which had been newly established at Saizerais.¹

Preparatory to the raid on the morning of November 7 two companies of the reserve battalion of the 130th Infantry were moved up to reënforce the 1st Battalion, which occupied the positions of the two companies destined for the raid² and, similarly, Company D, 123rd Machine Gun Battalion, proceeded from its reserve position to Fresnes-en-Woëvre, where all its guns were in readiness before daylight.³ A patrol from the 130th Infantry narrowly escaped being ambushed in the copse at the extremity of the Tranchée du Moulin de Saulx, but took revenge by killing twelve and capturing one of the enemy, luckily without suffering any loss itself.⁴ On the right a patrol from the 131st Infantry penetrated the plain almost to Butgnéville but met no resistance anywhere.⁵ Such information as had been obtained at that time indicated that the troops immediately in front of the 33rd Division were principally machine gunners but all signs pointed to the fact that

the enemy had no intention of withdrawing at that time.⁶ The Machine Gun Company, 131st Infantry, occupied the Longeau Ferme and the 1st Battalion relieved the 2nd Battalion of the 132nd Infantry⁷ which rejoined its regiment in the rest area.⁸

Thursday, November 7, was ushered in to the accompaniment of considerable activity. From 11:30 P.M. on the sixth until 2 A.M. on the following day the enemy artillery gassed a large area around St. Rémy and thus greatly hampered the bringing up of ammunition for the 55th Field Artillery Brigade. The 113th Field Artillery was the principal sufferer, since the gassing of the terrain in its immediate vicinity prevented three batteries from obtaining the smoke shells needed for the raid and Battery C was completely neutralized by gas shells making direct hits on its casemates.⁹

At 2:40 that morning the "T. S. F." at the P. C. of the 33rd Division picked up the following wireless message from Marshal Foch to the German High Command:

The German plenipotentiaries desire to meet Marshal Foch to ask him for an armistice.

They will have to present themselves at the French outposts coming by the road Chimay-Formies-La Capelle-Guise.

Orders have been given to receive them and to direct them to the point of rendezvous.¹⁰

At 5:45 A.M. occurred the raid against the Chateau et Ferme d'Aulnois, in which Companies A and C, 130th Infantry, participated. Starting from the trenches east of Fresnes-en-Woëvre under cover of a heavy fire from seven batteries of 75s and four of 155s under the immediate command of Colonel Lea¹¹ and supported by the guns of Company D, 123rd Machine Gun Battalion,¹² Company A on the right and Company C on the left of the road running north to Ville-en-Woëvre advanced rapidly against the chateau, which is situ-

ated in the midst of the farm of the same name, east of the road just mentioned and about three hundred yards south of the highroad from Verdun through Haudiomont, Pintheville, and Harville to Metz. The Chateau d'Aulnois was occupied by a force of approximately a platoon from the 60th Landwehr Regiment of the 13th German Division, and these defenders were quickly overpowered, nine were killed, one officer and twenty-one men were made prisoners, and two heavy and four light machine guns were captured.¹³ At 6:25 A.M. the raiding companies were safely back in their own trenches, after an operation crowned with success—doubtless due to the fact that the carefully prepared plan for this affair had been carried out with extraordinary precision.¹⁴ In this raid only one man was slightly wounded; indeed the principal losses fell upon the artillery, which suffered seventeen casualties from gas shelling.¹⁵

That same morning two patrols from the 131st Infantry¹⁶ scoured the plain northeast of Doncourt-aux-Templiers but, although one remained out until nightfall, neither was successful in locating the enemy.¹⁷

Aside from the issuance of Training Circular No. 193 announcing the establishment of a course of training in liaison between aviation and line troops at Saizerais, the P. C. of the 33rd Division sent out two very important instructions.¹⁸ Field Order No. 32 announced:

Pursuant to orders from the Second Army, the IV Corps will develop the situation by reconnaissances in force by attacking on D day at H hour, with 2 Brigades of Infantry, in the direction of Bois de Warville.

The 65th Brigade was accordingly directed to attack Marchéville at the appointed time with one battalion, having another battalion in support, and the 66th Brigade was to attack the Bois d'Harville in like manner, while the division

artillery was instructed to support these operations by the requisite box and creeping barrages. Two battalions of artillery were to be placed at the disposal of the Commanding General of the IVth American Corps and the commanders of the infantry brigades were directed to submit plans for these raids not later than 5 P.M. that same day.¹⁹

Field Order No. 33 instructed the 129th Infantry to relieve the 130th in the Connecticut subsector beginning on November 9, and in consequence the necessary reconnaissances were made that day by the former regiment.²⁰

At 10:40 A.M. the ensuing telegram was received from the Chief of Staff of the Second American Army:

The following telegram received from G. H. Q. repeated for your compliance:

"H. A. E. F., Nov. 7, 1918, Commanding General, Second Army, A. E. F., November 7, 1918, 6:00 A.M., the following message from Marshal Foch's Headquarters transmitted for necessary action:

'If Parliamentarians present themselves at any point on the front to submit a request to Marshal Foch, they will be stopped at the front line Division. The Division will immediately inform Marshal Foch of their status and the object of their mission. They will be detained at the Division until Marshal Foch has made known his reply.' Acknowledge.

MCANDREWS,"

HEINTZELMAN.²¹

At 8:15 P.M. a communication was received from the 17th Army Corps²² quoting in English a telegram sent at 4:25 P.M. by the Chief of Staff of the Second American Army to the Corps Commander announcing that, inasmuch as the 35th American Division was to arrive in the area of the 17th Army Corps on November 9 and was to be billeted west of the Meuse, General Bullard "directs that all elements of the 33rd Division on the west bank of the Meuse and south of the line Thillombois-Woimbey both exclusive, be moved east of the

Meuse in the 33rd Division area before ten hours November 9th." In transmitting a true copy of the above order to General Bell for execution and the necessary instructions for the evacuation of the zone south of that line, the Chief of Staff of the 17th Army Corps announced that the battalions then cantoned at Récourt, Tilly, and Woimbey were not affected thereby; that the Corps Commander was contemplating a regrouping of the brigade reserve regiments on the right bank of the Meuse and accordingly desired that on November 10 a map be sent him embodying the requisite locations; but that no regiments were to be moved except upon orders of the Corps Commander.

Not to be outdone by his fellow brigadier, General Wolf had issued orders on November 6 to Colonel Sanborn to make a raid against St. Hilaire with two companies of the 131st Infantry, and during the course of November 7 the date and hour for this operation were fixed for November 8 at 5:30 A.M.²³

The night of November 7-8 witnessed the completion of the relief of the 35th Division by the 81st Division (Major General Charles J. Bailey) in the extreme right sector of the First American Army and immediately north of that held by the 33rd Division.²⁴

The night of November 7-8 was also noteworthy for four patrols which were attended with more than average success. Of the two sent out by the 130th Infantry, to operate between Champlon and Marchéville, the reconnoitring patrol was late in returning and achieved but little; the combat patrol cleaned up the copse at the eastern terminus of the Tranchée du Moulin de Saulx, a favorite lurking place for the enemy, and captured one man who was so badly wounded that he died on the way back.²⁵ The first patrol from the 131st Infantry encountered no one, whereas the second captured ten prisoners

and had a lively time getting back under heavy artillery and machine-gun fire.²⁶ Indeed the raid that Thursday morning stirred the enemy artillery into renewed activity²⁷ and that night certain of the divisional batteries were heavily shelled.²⁸

Friday, November 8, 1918, opened with another raid. The attacking force was composed of two provisional companies, numbering one hundred men each, from the 131st Infantry, the whole under the command of Captain William M. Wilson. The party assembled at the road junction in the Bois de Thillot and proceeded at 1:10 A.M. via St. Maurice, Woël, and Doncourt-aux-Templiers to the Ruisseau de Moutru, their movement impeded by a number of hindrances such as wire of various sorts, barricades, and a destroyed bridge. One platoon was sent to the Moncel sawmill southwest of St. Hilaire to cut off escape in that direction and the remainder of the force reached the east bank of the brook southeast of St. Hilaire at 5:35 A.M. Ten minutes later the barrage came down in front of it, stood for fifteen minutes, and began to creep forward,²⁹ whereupon the front rank plunged through the stream and formed on the jumping-off line. A reconnaissance to the front and a short distance forward along the Doncourt-St. Hilaire road revealed no trace of the enemy but a similar operation toward the St. Hilaire-Butgnéville road resulted in a white flare being sent up. This was immediately followed by a burst of enemy machine-gun fire, which forced the troops to take refuge in shell holes, and twenty-six other machine guns promptly opened upon them. This fire was apparently too much for thirty men, who started to fall back, whereupon orders for withdrawal were at once given by the officer in command. The retirement was made in perfect order, with frequent halts to permit volleys to be delivered. The route taken lay across country in order to minimize the casualties, but machine-gun fire was encountered, followed by

heavy shelling of the area in front of Wadonville, while the St. Hilaire-Doncourt road was deluged with "whizz bangs," large shells, and overhead shrapnel. In due time this raiding force got back to the lines of the 131st Infantry with a loss of only one man killed and three wounded. One lone prisoner constituted the sole capture made³⁰ but, inasmuch as he belonged to the 439th Regiment, the order of battle in that sector of St. Hilaire was confirmed.³¹

As a matter of fact the capture of this prisoner, coupled with that of the two noncommissioned officers and eight men of the 210th Regiment of the 45th German Division taken near the Bois de Warville by Patrol No. 5 of the 131st Infantry,³² confirmed the presumed order of battle of the enemy³³ and supplied extremely important information as to the composition of the hostile forces opposite the 33rd Division. This was announced in Bulletin No. 114 issued by the 117th Army Corps that afternoon³⁴ which contained the following account:

ORDER OF BATTLE.

The enemy opposes to our Division in line 3 Divisions on the front Chateau d'Hannoncelles-Jonville.

From the west to the east:—13th Landwehr Division, 94th Division, 45th Reserve Division.

The Order of Battle of the regiments of the 13th Landwehr Division and 94th Division has not changed. . . .

The prisoners of the 210th Regiment captured at the Bois de Wavrille declare that the regiment is in liaison with the 211th (Reserve Regiment) on their left. The 210th has only one battalion in the first line. It is probable that the 45th Reserve Division has its 3 Regiments in line echeloned in great depth.

The Order of Battle of this Division from west to east should be:—210th, 211th and 212th [regiments].

HISTORY OF THE 45TH RESERVE DIVISION.

[This Division] is composed of the 210th, 211th and 212th Reserve Regiments. Recruited in Pomerania.

Formed in September, 1914, the 45th Reserve Division participated in the Battle of Ypres and remained in Belgium until about the middle of 1916. In September it went through, with heavy losses, the British attack at Courcellette and Thiepval.

In 1917 this Division fought on the Aisne and at the Chémin des Dames, then held sectors at Épargès, in Flanders, north of St. Mihiel and in the region of Bohain.

It participated in the German offensive of the 21st March, 1918, in the direction of Ham. It was twice engaged near La Fère-en-Tardennois after the attack of the 27th of May and we found it again in the Argonne where it sought to arrest the American advance in the last days of September. Aside from serious losses in wounded, 412 prisoners remained in our hands during the first fortnight of October.

Relieved about the 20th of October, the 45th Reserve Division was reported in the Woëvre at the beginning of November in the sector of Jonville, previously occupied by the 35th Austro-Hungarian Division.

Until then this Division has been considered as a very good unit but its effectives in line do not now exceed 40 to 45 rifles per Company and it has not obtained any rest after its relief in the Argonne and its re-engagement in the Woëvre. . . .

INDICATIONS OF RETREAT:

The prisoners of the 210th Reserve (Regiment) have not heard any project of retreat mentioned.

Our constant observations report several fires in the region of Conflans and explosions in the region of Chambley and in the outskirts of Marchéville.

The daily routine in the division P. C. was relieved by a few communications out of the ordinary. Two letters were sent to the Corps Commander, one apprising him that the 1st Battalion, 135th Field Artillery (75s), and the 1st Battalion, 136th Field Artillery (155s), had been designated to be placed at the disposal of the IVth American Corps, the other relating to the garrisons for the forts in the sector. Two training circulars³⁵ and the annex to the plan of defense, entitled "Conduct in case of retreat of the enemy,"³⁶ were issued.³⁷ The

following interesting communication emanating from Marshal Foch was received at 8:15 P.M. that day:

Secret. STAFF [at] LAHEYCOURT—8 November 1918—
4 hours to STAFF [at] REGRET.

General Commanding-in-Chief telegraphs the 7th November as follows:

"It can happen that the enemy may spread the rumor that an armistice is signed in order to deceive us. There is none; let no one cease hostilities of any sort without information from the Marshal Commanding-in-Chief."

IND A. U. S.	True copy notified for execution to the
17TH ARMY CORPS	General commanding the 33rd I. D. U. S.
STAFF	At the H. Q. the 8 November 1918
3RD BUREAU	By Order. The Chief of Staff,
No. 823-S/3	R. KASTLER.
33RD I. D. U. S.	

During the hours of daylight that Friday no patrols were sent out by the 131st Infantry, which was engaged in preparations for a new raid against the village of St. Hilaire in conformity with orders from the commanding general of the 66th Brigade, by whom the date and hour were fixed as November 9 at 5:30 A.M.³⁸ On the other hand, the 130th Infantry was decidedly active that day. Company F drove the enemy out of the copse at the eastern extremity of the Tranchée du Moulin de Saulx, which was promptly occupied and held in spite of continuous shelling, while another patrol found Bussy deserted and proceeded to take possession of it.³⁹

For the majority of the troops of the 33rd Division the day was spent largely in the training prescribed and, except for a few minor changes of positions, there were no movements of any consequence. Preliminary to relieving the 130th Infantry⁴⁰ during the night of November 9-10, the 129th Infantry made the necessary reconnaissances and such other preparations as are requisite in an operation of this nature.⁴¹

That Friday was particularly notable for the arrival of

the German plenipotentiaries at the Chateau de Francfort, belonging to the Marquis de l'Aigle, where they were ushered into the presence of Marshal Foch, who was attended by General Weygand, his chief of staff, and Admiral Wemyss of the British Navy. The principal events of that brief conference were picked up by wireless at 12:50 P.M. that day and published to the 33rd Division by a G-2 bulletin which ran as follows:

The German plenipotentiaries have received, Friday morning, at the General Headquarters of the Allies, the conditions of an Armistice. Also gave them the privilege either to refuse or to accept them within 72 hours ending Monday morning at 11:00 A.M. (French time).

The German proposition for an immediate temporary suspension of arms was rejected by Marshal Foch.

A German courier carrying the text of the conditions for an Armistice was sent to Spa, no other way of communication being practical.

Please to acknowledge receipt and transmit as soon as possible, by courier, your latest instructions.

A new committee of delegates is not necessary for the present.

ERTZBERGER.

The German plenipotentiaries for an Armistice beg the German High Command to send immediately the two officers of the Navy and one officer of the General Staff.

Later, on November 8, a second G-2 bulletin was issued, containing the following information for the officers and men of the 33rd Division:

From: GERMAN PLENIPOTENTIARIES to the GERMAN HIGH COMMAND.

The courier, Captain Paul Helldorf, will cross the lines between 6:00 and 8:00 hours in the evening (French time) in a German automobile. He left La Capelle and followed the Haudroy-Roquigny-Fourmis-Trélon road. Please assure his passage.

Officers of the General Staff and 2 Naval Officers have crossed the lines and followed the same itinerary.

Please indicate by T. S. F. the day and hour of their arrival at the French advance posts.

The French High Command will take the necessary measures to assure their passage.

(Signed) VON WINTERFIELD.

A fair example of German methods which, in this instance, proved a temporary obstacle to one of their own plenipotentiaries, was the following wireless message picked up by the division station at 11:35 that evening:

TO THE GERMAN HIGH COMMAND:

The German Captain, von Helldorf, whose passage has been announced by General von Winterfeld, is waiting for the German fire to cease in order to enter the German lines by the La Capelle-Fourmies Road. The French have ceased firing at 18:00 hours.⁴²

Saturday, November 9, 1918, was an active day for the 33rd Division. At 3 A.M. a strong patrol, composed of an officer and forty other ranks, from the 131st Infantry pushed out into the plain but, upon reaching Wadonville, was confronted by an enemy barrage and therefore returned at 7 A.M. without having encountered any hostile parties or having learned anything of importance.⁴³

The second raid against St. Hilaire was organized by Major Francis M. Allen, commanding the 3rd Battalion of the 131st Infantry and, like the former, was composed of two provisional companies of one hundred men each. As Major Allen was taken ill, the raid was placed under the command of Captain James C. Stockwell. The zone of action, limits, and objective were identical with the raid of the previous morning. At 5 A.M. the divisional artillery opened with destructive fire against St. Hilaire which lasted for forty-five minutes. Smoke and high explosive shells were also thrown on Marchéville, Butgnéville and the southwest edge of the Bois d'Harville, this fire continuing until 6:30 A.M.⁴⁴ At 5:35 the

raiding companies were formed up across the St. Hilaire—Butgnéville road, facing the former village, and at 5:45 A.M. the raid was launched. The advance was made exactly as scheduled, the troops passing through and around the town, which was encircled with wire entanglements except at the point of entrance of the road from Maizeray. At no place was any resistance met and indeed the only enemy seen were two men who beat a hasty retreat at the commencement of the attack. Only wrecked machine-gun posts were discovered and at 8:30 A.M. the raiding companies reached their own positions empty-handed but luckily without having suffered casualties.⁴⁵

Aside from the usual daily routine, the situation and operation reports rendered to the Corps and General Headquarters and two confidential memoranda⁴⁶ constituted the only communications emanating from the division P. C. that Saturday⁴⁷ worthy of recording here. At 11:15 P.M. there was delivered at the message centre Secret Field Order No. 18, issued by the Headquarters Second Army on November 9, 1918, at 18:30 hours; this announced that the "reports received indicate that the enemy is withdrawing progressively on our front, from west to east, leaving a shell to cover his departure" and that "the First Army is pushing forward on our left." It therefore directed the Second Army to carry out the mission prescribed in Field Order No. 13 under date of November 1,⁴⁸ and ordered this movement to "commence at once." No change was made in the mission of the VIth Corps, while the following instructions were given for the others:

(b) The IV Corps will advance its left in liaison with the XVII Corps (Fr.) and will take advantage, in advancing its center, of preparations already made to carry out Field Orders No. 14.

(c) The XVII Corps will push the enemy's withdrawal

without delay, maintaining liaison with the right of the First Army (81st Division).

To this order was attached a memorandum which ran thus:

2ND A. U. S.

17TH ARMY CORPS

STAFF

Transmitted for execution

3RD BUREAU to the General commanding the 33rd I. D. U. S.
No. 845 S/3

The raids indicated for tomorrow morning on Marchéville (3cos.) and Warville-Htes. Épines (2cos.) will be carried out in the way that they have been planned. However, the General commanding the 33rd I. D. U. S. should prescribe supporting elements ready to exploit the results of these raids by pushing up to close contact with the enemy.

By order. The Chief of Staff,
R. KASTLER.

On November 9 the 81st American Division on the left (north) of the 33rd launched a general attack against the enemy and advantage was taken of the diversion thus created to send out patrols. The first to start was composed of two officers and forty other ranks from the 131st Infantry, who set out at 11 A.M. for the Bois de Warville. About 350 meters beyond the road from Doncourt-aux-Templiers to St. Hilaire they were greeted by machine-gun fire a point in advance of that wood but drove the enemy into Butgnéville. This movement carried the patrol into a species of pocket where it found itself under machine-gun fire from the front and flanks and an artillery barrage which progressed from the front of St. Hilaire down the road toward Doncourt in its rear under the direction of an enemy aeroplane. The futility of further advance was manifest and the detachment withdrew to its own lines at 4:30 P.M. without effecting any captures and having itself lost three men.

A second patrol, identical in force and composition with

the former, started out from Wadonville at 9:30 P.M. It proceeded to St. Hilaire, which was found flooded; caught sight of an enemy patrol in retreat and an enemy post on the east bank of the Moutru Brook carrying off a machine gun; encountered heavy fire from beyond the St. Hilaire-Butgnéville road; located an empty strong point and some machine-gun emplacements; and returned at 2:30 A.M. on November 10 to its own lines, without having taken any prisoners and with two wounded men.⁴⁹

At 1 P.M. the 130th Infantry began its operations by sending three patrols, an interesting account of which is given by Major Woodward:⁵⁰

On morning of November 9th the 81st Division on our left started a general attack along their front. At about 1:00 P.M. acting under orders of Brigade Commander, three patrols, of two platoons each, were started out from Fresnes, one in direction of Riaville, one to Pintheville, and one to Chateau d'Aulnois. The patrol to Riaville proceeded to within 50 yards of the entrance to [the] town where they were met by heavy machine gun fire and forced to retire, leaving two privates killed, one man severely wounded who was subsequently captured and two men slightly wounded. The patrol to Pintheville also met with heavy machine gun fire and returned without casualties. Patrol to Chateau d'Aulnois had only proceeded some few hundred yards from our out-post line when a German patrol of about sixty men was discovered to their left and rear. It was evident that this patrol had come out with the intention of working around the flank of the 81st Division. A fight ensued, our patrol retiring on our out-post line closely followed by the Germans but here they were repulsed, and our artillery put down a barrage which caught them retreating and inflicted heavy casualties. Immediately, two other patrols were sent out from our out-post line but were driven back by heavy machine gun fire along entire line from Chateau d'Aulnois to Riaville. The night of November 9/10th was marked with no activity with exception of harassing gas shelling by the enemy and our own protective patrols.

Allusion has already been made to the occupation of

Bussy and Saulx on November 8 by the 2nd Battalion of the 130th Infantry.⁵¹

On the morning of November 9th 1918, the Battalion P. C. was moved forward to Saulx. All companies moved forward, occupying dugouts and trenches adjacent to the town. At dusk two platoons of Co. H, under command of Lieut. Rawalt, left to raid Pintheville and two platoons of Co. F and two from Co. H started out to raid Marchéville. The outposts of the enemy were reached and engaged.

In the meantime orders were received to attack and hold Marchéville on the morning of November 10th 1918. Orders were immediately sent out for all troops except the outposts to withdraw to Saulx and preparations were made immediately for the attack on Marchéville.⁵²

The resistance which was everywhere encountered plainly indicated that the enemy positions were held by troops of another calibre from the indifferent Austro-Hungarians who had occupied the sector at the time when the 33rd Division relieved the 79th. This transformation in the nature of the opposition is thus described by Colonel Sanborn:⁵³

Following the signing of the armistice with Austria by the Allies all Austrian troops were shortly thereafter withdrawn from the front. In the sector on our immediate front they were replaced by Prussians and a considerable change was noticed in the character of the resistance as well as the efficiency of the troops. Prisoners did not come forward and give themselves up. Machine gunners were very active in occupying flanking positions and withdrawing promptly when threatened with envelopment. The N. C. O. of one machine gun company stated that he had observed our large patrols, one of which passed close to their nest in the dark without seeing it. He stated that when large patrols passed they kept perfectly quiet [and] afterwards made report of what they had seen. The group were afterwards captured by a night patrol, a member of which heard slight noise in the bushes and went over to investigate it. Localities that were occupied by numbers of machine guns were found deserted at other times. Evidently their efforts were directed in making dispositions which would cut off a patrol. They apparently studied

the routes usually taken. Once at least the enemy was in position on three sides of a patrol which retreated.

The raid and patrols above mentioned were not the only active operations that day. During the course of the day this officer received orders from the commanding general of the 66th Brigade at once to "send out two companies to gain and keep contact with the enemy" and to "clean out the Bois des Htes Épines and Bois de Warville." From these woods the units in question were to dispatch "strong patrols through Bois Vachère, Bois Vieux, toward Jonville, or until contact is made with enemy, which contact will be maintained." The Bertaucourt Ferme was also to be reconnoitred and emphasis was laid upon the necessity of keeping constant touch with the enemy and liaison with these companies in order to insure the obtaining of "all possible information" in respect to the enemy's strength. That this operation was considered exceptionally important is evidenced by the fact that Colonel Sanborn was notified that it would "be supported, if necessary, by the remainder of the Brigade."⁵⁴ The commanding officer of the 131st Infantry immediately proceeded to comply with these instructions and the sequel is briefly told by him⁵⁵ as follows:

Companies A & B, 1st Battalion, under command of Captain William M. Wilson, were detailed for this duty and left Doncourt about 7 P.M., marching Northeast in the direction of Bois des Hautes Épines. A detachment from Co. B preceded the column into the woods, followed by the remainder of the company. A few enemy were driven out. Complete possession was gained at 8 P.M. and Battalion P. C. established at 54.1—55.6 [i. e., about 1,100 yards southeast of Butgnéville, on the southern slopes of Côte 227 and just west of the enemy wire].

1st Lt. Herman B. Gegenback with Company A occupied Bois la Vachère about 10 P.M. A detail under 2nd Lt. Burl F. Hall attempted to occupy Bois Vieux, but on account of

wire entanglements and enemy resistance was obliged to withdraw.

2nd Lt. Patrick D. Cronin with a detail of forty men overcame enemy machine gun resistance in Bois de Warville, occupying same at 2 A.M. the 10th.

In addition to these dispositions, warning orders were received at 11:30 that morning from the brigade commander "to prepare for an advance and be ready to move out, fully equipped, when ordered."⁵⁶ This was followed by orders issued at 1 P.M. directing the 2nd Battalion and Machine Gun Company of the 132nd Infantry to move "at once" from Deuxnouds to St. Maurice and the 3rd Battalion from Woimbe to Deuxnouds, while the rest of the regiment was to hold itself "ready to move on instant notice."⁵⁷ Since the operations prescribed by the divisional Field Order No. 32⁵⁸ were destined to take place next day, an order was issued at 10 P.M. prescribing a raid to be made by the 131st Infantry "on 'D' day at 'H' hour in the direction of La Beuville" the mission of which was "to clean out Bois d'Harville, to take prisoners and kill Boches."⁵⁹ Upon receipt of these instructions shortly before midnight, Colonel Sanborn immediately issued orders that his three battalions and two companies of the 124th Machine Gun Battalion assemble at Doncourt next morning at five o'clock.⁶⁰

In the meantime the 65th Brigade had been scarcely less active. The order for an attack on Marchéville by the 130th Infantry issued by the brigade headquarters on November 8 was set in operation by a memorandum at 2:30 P.M. announcing that "'D' day will be November 10, 1918, and 'H' hour 5:45 A.M."⁶¹ During the day warning orders were also sent out to the various unit commanders apprising them of the movements to be made that day, preparatory to the attack of the morrow and in anticipation of a major operation in the near future. The dispositions for the latter were embodied in

Field Order No. 10 issued at seven o'clock that evening,⁶² which announced the withdrawal of the enemy and an advance in the general direction of Conflans by the 17th French Army Corps in liaison with the First American Army. As part of the French corps the 65th Brigade was to move forward through a zone bounded on the west by a line from Fresnes-en-Woëvre through Parfondrupt and on the east by Hannonville-sous-les-Côtes, the western edge of the Bois de Warville, the Bois de Harville, and the village of Bramville-en-Woëvre, but, as was customary, the date and hour for this advance were not fixed until later.

In conformity with the warning orders mentioned above there were a number of movements that day by units of the 65th Brigade. At 6:30 P.M. the entire 129th Infantry, with the exception of the supply company, was concentrated at Ranzières.⁶³ At four o'clock, Company D, 123rd Machine Gun Battalion, left the Bois de Ranzières for Fresnes-en-Woëvre to participate in the attack next morning by the 130th Infantry⁶⁴ and during the night the 3rd Battalion of that regiment moved up from the reserve to the support position and sent two companies forward to the hill at Combres.⁶⁵ Owing to some uncertainty as to the progress made that day by the 81st Division and particularly as to the exact whereabouts of its right, Colonel Clinnin was directed by a code telephone message at 8:40 P.M. to guard with care his own left flank. Furthermore, to assist his attack next morning General King took the precaution to request General Wolf to keep the neighborhood of St. Hilaire and the road from that place to Marchéville under machine-gun fire during that operation.⁶⁶

That wet, foggy Saturday was characterized by considerable activity on the part of the opposing artilleries. The enemy's guns expended some 1,800 rounds in the sector of the 33rd Division, principally in harassing fire of high explosives

and gas in the region of Fresnes, Trésauvaux, les Éparges, Combres, Saulx and Champlon,⁶⁷ to the manifest discomfiture of the troops of the 130th Infantry.⁶⁸

Sunday, November 10, 1918, was no day of rest in the Troyon-sur-Meuse sector, especially for the Boches. It opened at 5:40 A.M. with a concentration of fire on the town of Marchéville, coupled with a standing barrage in front of the enemy trenches from a point in advance of Côte 233 to another directly south of Marchéville,⁶⁹ executed by nine batteries of 75s and four batteries of 155s of the divisional artillery under the command of Colonel Lea.⁷⁰ Five minutes later had been designated as the "H" hour and at that minute the barrage began to roll forward to protect the 2nd Battalion of the 130th Infantry, which had been selected to make the advance.⁷¹ This attack, in which Company D, 123rd Machine Gun Battalion, played an important role, is thus briefly but graphically described by Major (then Captain) Gravenhorst, commanding the battalion:⁷²

All men were given a hot meal at 2:00 A.M. November 10th, the ammunition supply replenished and all preparations completed for the attack on Marchéville. The Battalion took up the designated position behind the barrage line and moved forward behind the barrage at 5:45 A.M. The assaulting waves consisted of Companies F and G, Companies E and H in support. As the attack progressed the enemy resistance became stronger, also he brought numerous machine guns into the fight, having machine guns placed in trees and concrete pillboxes. Our troops continued the advance, mopping up trenches, capturing pillboxes and inflicting heavy losses on the enemy. The resistance became so stubborn that it was necessary for Companies E and H to be brought forward at an early stage of the fight and all companies were heavily engaged during the entire day. Marchéville was captured and all the enemy were either killed, captured or driven out of the town by 10:00 A.M. The enemy kept up a heavy machine gun and artillery fire on the town and the trenches captured by our

troops, and launched a counter attack in the afternoon, which was repulsed. The Battalion held the place until relieved by a Battalion of the 129th Infantry at 4:00 A.M. November 11th 1918. The number of prisoners captured by our troops in this attack numbered six officers and eighty-four men.

This modest account scarcely conveys an adequate understanding of the importance of this operation. Marchéville was an integral part of the line of resistance of the enemy.⁷³ Naturally strong, it had been solidly fortified, both the town and the chateau being thoroughly protected by wire entanglements. It was held by the 5th and 6th Companies of the 2nd Battalion and a detachment of the machine gun company of the 365th German Infantry (94th German Division) who had orders to "hold at all costs"⁷⁴ and who were additionally protected by numerous machine guns securely sheltered in houses and concrete emplacements. Although smothered under the fire of the American artillery and apparently taken by surprise,⁷⁵ these troops put up such a stout opposition that two companies of the 3rd Battalion had to be sent to reënforce the attacking units.⁷⁶ Although the enemy suffered heavy casualties, lost twelve machine guns and a 150-millimeter howitzer,⁷⁷ was definitely driven out of Marchéville and his positions north of that place imperiled to such an extent that their abandonment was only a question of a short time, he nevertheless made a stiff resistance and was quick to retaliate.⁷⁸ His ability in the latter respect was manifested by four counterattacks, two of which culminated in driving the two companies of the 130th Infantry occupying Marchéville back to the trench system southeast of the village. Not content with this, he followed it up by two additional counterattacks coupled with terrific shelling but these were repulsed,⁷⁹ partly because of the accuracy of the fire of the divisional batteries which landed their shells squarely in the midst of the German waves.⁸⁰ In spite of this active fighting, which at times

threatened to become serious, several patrols were sent out that day in order to maintain close contact with the enemy and to gain all possible information as to his intentions, and liaison was also kept by means of a patrol with the 324th Infantry,⁸¹ forming the extreme right of the 81st Division, which was engaged in a general attack that day in the adjoining sector on the north.⁸²

In the P. C. of the 33rd Division a busy day was spent in preparations for the important attack against the Hindenburg line in the Troyon sector which, if successful, would open the road to Metz. In consequence of the orders from the Second American Army and the 17th French Army Corps received the previous evening at 11:15,⁸³ Field Order No. 34 was issued at 9 A.M., opening with the announcements that "reports received indicate that the enemy is withdrawing progressively on our front, from west to east, leaving a shell to cover his departure;" that "the 81st Div. is pushing forward on our left;" and that "the 28th Div. on our right and other Divisions of the Second Army pushed forward at 7:00 A.M. today." It then went on to direct that:

The 33rd Division will carry out the mission laid down in "Combat in case of Withdrawal of the Enemy," Annex No. 11, to Defense Scheme, Troyon—Chaillon Sector, dated Nov. 8th, 1918. The movement will commence at once.

The greatest expedition is necessary.⁸⁴

At 11:40 that morning there was received through the 17th Army Corps a true copy of Field Order No. 19 issued by the Headquarters of the Second Army at 1:30 A.M. that day.⁸⁵ It began with the declaration that "it is reported that the enemy, disorganized, is withdrawing along the entire front" and that "the First Army is pushing forward on our left," and stated that the Second Army would "attack at 7 hours, 10th November, and follow closely the enemy in his withdrawal, pushing him with all energy to secure decisive

results, and holding all ground taken." Instructions were given to the VIth Corps to advance "west of the Seille River along the heights on both banks of the Moselle River, in the direction of Corny," while the IVth Corps in the centre was to "attack in the direction of Vionville." The left was to be formed by the 17th French Army Corps, which was instructed to "attack in the direction of Conflans," its zone of action being limited by the western boundary of the IVth Corps⁸⁶ on one hand and the line "Fresnes-en-Woëvre (incl.)—Parfondrupt (excl.)—Lancefontaine (incl.)" on the other.

Aside from the customary daily situation and operations reports rendered to the French Army Corps and to the American General Headquarters, no further orders of major importance were issued during the course of the day, but by telephone and other means close communication with the 65th and 66th Brigades was maintained, so that every detail of their operations was known. At 6:40 that afternoon instructions were received from the 17th Army Corps⁸⁷ quoting the opening paragraphs of the "Order of Operations of the IIInd A. U. S. for the day of the 11th"⁸⁸ and adding thereto certain instruction as to the missions to be performed by the 33rd Division next day.⁸⁹ These provisions were promptly embodied in the following order,⁹⁰ which was at once dispatched to all the units concerned and additionally distributed to such other commanders as would in any wise be interested in the operations prescribed:

SECRET

FIELD ORDER

No. 35.

P. C. 33RD DIVISION, A. E. F.,
10 Nov., 1918.....11:00 p. m.

MAPS: VIGNEULLES "A" and "B" 1:20,000
METZ, S. W. & S. E. 1:50,000
COMMERCEY, N. W. & N. E. 1:50,000

1. (a) The attack is progressing on the whole front of the Second Army in spite of stubborn resistance.

- (b) The 28th Div. on our right has captured the north-east edge of Bois des Haudronvilles Bas and Bois des Haravillers.
- (c) The 81st Div. on our left holds the general line Fresnes-en-Woëvre—1 km. south of Ville-en-Woëvre—Southern edge of La Noire Haye Wood—southeastern edge of Bois de Manheulles.
- 2. Tomorrow, November 11, 1918, the 33rd Division will resume its attack and develop with energy the success already obtained.
- 3. (a) The 65th Inf. Brig., keeping liaison with the 81st Div. on its left will seize and hold Riaville, Pintheville, Maizeray and Harville.
- (b) The 66th Inf. Brig., keeping liaison with the 28th Div. on its right, will seize and hold the northeast edge of Bois d'Harville, small wood 1200 meters northeast of la Bertaucourt Fme., Jonville.
- (c) The 55th Field Artillery Brigade will so place its batteries as to support the various attacks.
- (d) The 65th Inf. Brig. will begin its attack at 5:00 A.M. and the 66th Brig. at 5:45 A.M.
- (e) All ground gained will be held and close contact will be maintained with the enemy.
- 4. Administrative details: No change.
- 5. P. C.'s: 33rd Division No change
 65th Brigade Combres after 5:00 A.M.
 66th Brigade No change
 Arty. Comdr. No change.

BELL

Major General.

Meanwhile, apart from its active operations in the region of Marchéville,⁹¹ other events of importance had occurred in the 65th Infantry Brigade. The arrival of the division Field Order No. 34 at the brigade headquarters at Mouilly decided General King to make a slight modification in the order which he had issued the previous evening at seven o'clock⁹² and to announce that it would be put into operation on November 11 at 5 A.M.—both of which were set forth in memorandum orders issued at 3:45 that afternoon.⁹³ Every

preparation was made for the important attack scheduled for the following morning and a thorough understanding of the general plan was obtained from the division Field Order No. 35 received during the night.⁹⁴

Preparatory to relieving the 130th Infantry in the front lines that night and to forming the leading element of the 65th Brigade in the attack next morning, the 129th Infantry started from Ranzières about 2 P.M.⁹⁵ A march of about ten miles brought it to Herbeuville, Fresnes, and Saulx before midnight and two hours earlier Colonel Myer's P. C. was established at the last-named place.⁹⁶ At 4:30 A.M. on November 11 the relief was completed,⁹⁷ with the exception of the 2nd Battalion of the 130th,⁹⁸ and the troops were held in readiness for the approaching attack.

In the meantime the 66th Brigade had contributed its share to the successes achieved that day. The orders hurriedly issued shortly before midnight by the commanding officer of the 131st Infantry⁹⁹ were embodied in formal written instructions covering the contemplated operation¹⁰⁰ and were sent out about 4 A.M. About an hour later the troops destined to make the attack against the Bois d'Harville were all assembled in the neighborhood of Doncourt-aux-Templiers, whence they moved forward to their appointed stations in the Bois des Hautes Épines and the Bois de Warville¹⁰¹—from which the enemy had been driven during the course of the night—¹⁰² and by 7:15 A.M. were reported as in position.¹⁰³

The Bois d'Harville, destined to be the scene of hard fighting that day and the next, is thus described by Colonel Sanborn:¹⁰⁴

This wood lies between the towns of Jonville and Harville, through which towns the enemy trench line extends. The southeastern edge of the wood lies 600 meters northeast from the northeast edge of the Bois de Warville. The wood is from 500 to 600 meters wide, extending northeast 1,700

meters, where it joins the Bois de Montelle. The Jonville—Harville Road crosses the woods in the rear of the enemy trench line about 800 meters from the southwest edge. It was recognized early in the operations of November 10th that this wood was a veritable stronghold, occupied in force. A prisoner stated that it was held by a Regiment of Infantry. Penetration into the wood developed the fact that strong wire entanglements ran through it in every direction, cleverly concealed by brushes and dominated by machine gun nests on the paths as well as on platforms in the trees. Strong wire and machine gun nests on the outer edges made penetration by our patrols impossible.

About daylight St. Hilaire was occupied without opposition by a company from the 2nd Battalion and four machine guns, in conformity with orders received the previous evening.¹⁰⁵ About 9 A.M. the commanding officer of the 131st Infantry directed his battalion commanders to inform him concerning their position.¹⁰⁶ At 10:35 Captain Wilson was instructed to "advance and occupy La Bertaucourt Farm and hold it as a flank protection to the troops attacking Harville Woods,"¹⁰⁷ and ten minutes later the disposition, requiring the 2nd and 3rd Battalions to withdraw after they had attained their objective, was revoked by instructions to Captain Stockwell to "select a position forward in Harville Woods and hold it."¹⁰⁸ To the inquiry as to when he would be ready this last officer made response that he "would attack at 2 P.M."¹⁰⁹

Early that morning the divisional artillery was busily occupied in supporting the attack of the 130th Infantry against Marchéville, and the shelling in the forward area of the 131st was therefore comparatively desultory,¹¹⁰ indeed so much so as to elicit inquiry from the commander of the 1st Battalion as to how long it would continue.¹¹¹ About 10 A.M. a number of the guns were turned on the Bois d'Harville but it was agreed that this fire should cease at eleven o'clock and information to that effect was dispatched to Captain Stockwell.¹¹²

At 11:05 A.M. Captain Wilson received the order to attack La Bertaucourt Ferme and accordingly designated Company A, under Lieutenant Gegenback, for that purpose, ordering it to advance on the right. At the same time Company D under Lieutenant Cronin was withdrawn from the Bois de Warville and directed to attack on the left, but at 11:20 word was received from Captain Magner that he had changed the time for the attack to 11:45 A.M. and both companies were therefore withdrawn to the edge of the Bois les Hautes Épinés. At the hour indicated the attack was launched but a heavy flanking fire was met from La Vachère Bois, which had meanwhile been occupied by the enemy. The progress of Company A was completely arrested but, nevertheless, it kept up a lively frontal fire against the farm in order to cover the right of the 3rd Battalion in its attack on the Bois d'Harville. However, when the latter fell back, Company A had no alternative but to follow suit and to take a more sheltered position in the Bois les Hautes Épinés.¹¹³

After this attack occurred a lull during which Company A, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, took position in the rear of the forming-up line¹¹⁴ and orders were issued to the commander of Company C to send a platoon of infantry and two machine guns to the northeastern edge of the Bois de Haravillers to establish liaison with the 110th Infantry of the 28th Division.¹¹⁵ At one o'clock Captain Magner was directed to assume command of the assaulting battalion, to attack and capture the Bois d'Harville, and an hour later he reported that his advance had begun.¹¹⁶ The troops had scarcely emerged from the Bois de Warville, about 2:18 P.M., when the enemy sent up a signal for his S. O. S. barrage and they were greeted by such a heavy artillery, machine-gun, and rifle fire that some of the troops were compelled to take to cover. The advance was quickly resumed by means of squad rushes

but about one hundred and fifty yards from the Bois d'Harville the enemy barrage descended in the midst of the leading troops, who retorted by a rush which drove the enemy infantry back and enabled them to seize the edge of the wood. In spite of all opposition, wire, and intense fire of every sort, the 3rd Battalion pushed sturdily forward, broke through the Hindenburg line, and about 3:20 P.M. reached their objective just beyond the sunken road.¹¹⁷

This success was not achieved unaided, for, apart from the protection afforded by Company A near La Bertaucourt Ferme, the first check caused the 2nd Battalion and Company B, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, to be sent forward in support, Company H being sent to the right as an additional protection to that flank. These reënforcements enabled the advance to be resumed and carried the attack forward to its goal,¹¹⁸ so that Captain Magner was enabled to telephone at 3:55 P.M. to Captain Malstrom, the operations officer of the 131st Infantry, that he had "reached objective" designated in the regimental field order.¹¹⁹ One officer and sixty-one other ranks were taken prisoners¹²⁰ and the capture of this portion of the Bois d'Harville, added to that of Marchéville seized by the 65th Brigade that morning, wrested from the enemy "two important elements of the principal line of resistance"¹²¹ which were vital to him in the retention of the Troyon sector.

This achievement, however, was not an unalloyed success for, as Colonel Sanborn remarked:¹²²

Further advance was checked and rendered impossible by heavy wire encountered. Many machine guns were forward of this wire in position, others were enfilading the position from the right and enemy shells were falling in increasing volume. An enemy detachment was observed approaching on the left from the direction of Butgnéville, threatening that flank. Troops held on to the position however until about 6 P.M. at which time gas became so dense that further occu-

pancy either by our own or enemy troops became impossible and they withdrew to the northeast edge of the Bois de Warville.

About six o'clock the enemy, who had infiltrated a considerable force into La Vachère Bois, was seen to be forming in three waves for an attack against the right and rear of the troops in the Bois d'Harville but, in spite of an enemy barrage on its position, Company A, which was still holding its ground opposite La Bertaucourt Ferme, was successful in breaking up this impending attack before it could be launched.¹²³ Its action contributed materially to warding off any interference by the enemy with the withdrawal of the troops in the Bois d'Harville, which began about 5:30 P.M. and terminated about eight o'clock, although two machine-gun platoons were unable to retire until long after midnight, owing to the violence with which the enemy shelled the open terrain between the Bois d'Harville and the Bois de Warville.¹²⁴

Meanwhile various events had occurred in the rear. Allusion has already been made to the movements of the 132nd Infantry on November 9 preparatory to supporting the 131st.¹²⁵ On the evening of November 10 that regiment was ordered forward to positions in the Bois les Hautes Épinés, at Doncourt, Woël, and Avillers where they spent the night of November 10-11.¹²⁶ Company H and a platoon of Company C, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, were sent to St. Hilaire¹²⁷ to reënforce Company F, 131st Infantry, and the third platoon of the same machine-gun company which had garrisoned that place during the day.¹²⁸ Company D, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, was to have marched with the 1st Battalion of the 132nd Infantry but underwent a variety of vicissitudes that day, although it eventually reached Woël at 11 P.M. and spent the night at that place.¹²⁹

At 9 A.M. General Wolf issued his orders with a view to

taking advantage of the ground gained in the Bois d'Harville and to attacking Jonville and Butgnéville next day.¹³⁰ Announcement was made that the mission of the 66th Brigade would be "to seize and hold the remainder of the Harville Woods and the village of Jonville and to maintain contact with the enemy." To this end he directed two attacks to be made on the morning of November 11. The first attack was to be delivered at 5:45 A.M. against Butgnéville by the two companies then in St. Hilaire under the command of Captain Wigglesworth. The second attack, scheduled for 8 A.M., was divided into two phases. It was to open with an attack by the 131st Infantry, less two companies, but reënforced by Companies A and B, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, which were to "seize and hold the remainder of the Bois d'Harville." The second phase was an attack against Jonville to be delivered by two columns. The 1st Battalion of the 132nd Infantry and Company D, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, on the north, were to pass through the 131st Infantry at the northern edge of the Bois d'Harville and to take Jonville from the rear. On the south the 3rd Battalion of the 132nd Infantry, reënforced by Company C, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, was to proceed from the Bois des Épines along the western edge of the Bois d'Harville, in liaison with the other force and to make a direct assault along the flanks of the enemy trenches against Jonville, which they were directed to seize and hold.

During the course of the evening the necessary orders were issued in conformity with the above instructions,¹³¹ among them directions to Captain Wigglesworth at St. Hilaire to attack and hold Butgnéville at the termination of the artillery bombardment.¹³² During the night of November 10-11 the 114th Field Artillery and the 1st Battalion, 115th Field Artillery, moved down from the heights into the plain in position to support the 65th Brigade next morning.¹³³

Throughout the occupation of the Troyon sector, the 108th Engineers had performed most efficiently work of such various kinds as falls to the lot of that arm of the service, and during November 10 had sent forward all necessary material, made all arrangements possible, and the requisite number of engineer companies were with the advanced forward units in readiness for the advance.¹³⁴

"Coming events cast their shadows before;" for several days prior to November 10 rumors had been persistently circulated that an armistice was on the eve of conclusion. That these rumors were not confined to the American and French troops is manifest from the interrogatories of prisoners that day and their testimony was the more interesting in that it revealed the dire straits in which the enemy found himself. A Landwehr lieutenant named Pfeiffer, who was captured at Marchéville and who belonged to the 6th Company, 2nd Battalion, 365th German Infantry Regiment, declared that their rations consisted of "750 grams of bread issued daily while the men are in line, issues in small quantities of butter, lard, marmalade alternate daily. Men are also issued cheese and sausage in small quantities. For the last three days the men in the Vorfeld (outpost) were practically without food. A direct hit had demolished the kitchen in Marchéville, the cook was killed and 11 men wounded. The men about town carried away the food, leaving the men in the outposts without rations."¹³⁵ A soldier named Wetzstein of the 15th Landwehr Regiment in Pintheville stated that the feeling was prevalent that "the soldiers have now come to their own; if war does not end in next few days, if Germany has no notion to quit, the soldiers will. They have no further interest in the war." A "Combat Secretary" named Schraum disclaimed any knowledge of the presence of any reserve except the rest battalion and declared that "peace must come soon" since "the morale of the men will not hold much longer."

The testimony of a Lieutenant Sigush of the 9th Company, 3rd Battalion, 210th Reserve Infantry Regiment of the 45th German Reserve Division, who was captured about 4:30 P.M. in the Bois d'Harville, was particularly valuable. He announced that his company "had already been filled with peace fever, and as a result most of them refused to fight and ran away" but he and a few men held out until surrounded. He made statements to the effect that:

1 extra company of reserve battalion had been sent into front line as punishment. During the past few nights, a battery of artillery was placed close to this infantry company. The infantry believed that the firing of this battery would draw retaliating fire. They requested the battery to move, and when they refused, a free-for-all fight was started. The company, in its entirety, was sentenced to extra duty in the front line. . . .

Prisoner claims that he repeatedly sent up flares, calling for barrage. Artillery did not respond until after the Americans had taken the position. The wire entanglements had not been touched by a shell. He claims that the position was of such strength that if the artillery had responded and his men put up any kind of resistance, it would have been physically impossible to penetrate the line. . . .

The news had spread yesterday afternoon that the armistice was signed and that the cessation of hostilities could be momentarily expected. They were instructed to hold the line and maintain order; that they would soon be permitted to return home. The morale was very low.

The companies of this regiment, with one or two exceptions, were commanded by N. C. O.s. There is a great scarcity of officers in the entire division.¹³⁶

A Pomeranian soldier named Arndt, belonging to the 10th Company of the 210th Reserve Infantry Regiment, confirmed the statements of other prisoners and declared that "the morale of the men was very low; could not be held in check much longer. Food has been of poor quality and insufficient. Men have suffered terribly from hunger."

The strategical importance of the Troyon sector, the

endeavor of the enemy's officers to put as bold a face as possible on their moribund hopes, and the unwitting disclosure that the incessant hammering of the Allies had exhausted the last reserves of their foes are manifest from the résumé at the end of Annex No. 1, already cited.¹³⁷ It ran as follows:

In conversation with a number of officers in an informal way, they maintained that the line in front of us is the key to Metz. It would be foolish to consider the idea of withdrawing this line, as it is generally understood that this is the only well organized position between the Americans and Metz.

A young "Unter offizier" states that they can and will hold this line unless the spirit manifested by the troops in the past four years is broken, a thing which he says is impossible.

There is no intimation from any of the prisoners that this line is to be sacrificed or that there are any reserves available.

Allusion has been made to the relief of the 130th Infantry by the 129th Infantry during the night of November 10-11 and its completion about 4:30 A.M. on the latter date.¹³⁸ The Division Commander had directed an attack to be made at 5 A.M. by the 65th Infantry Brigade, followed by a similar operation by the 66th Infantry Brigade at 5:45 A.M.¹³⁹ To the former had been allotted the task of seizing and holding Riaville, Pintheville, Maizeray, and Harville; to the latter this same mission was intrusted in respect to the northeastern edge of the Bois d'Harville, the little Bois la Dame, and Jonville. The joint operation was indeed a staggering undertaking in that it entailed combined attacks along a frontage of eleven and a half kilometers—approximately 7.2 miles—against five powerfully fortified towns and a formidable wood. The whole, constituting the enemy's principal system of defense in the Troyon sector and forming part of the Hindenburg line, had remained intact throughout four years of war except in so far as the capture of Marchéville and the southern portion of the Bois d'Harville on November 10 had affected

it.¹⁴⁰ To the Germans the loss of this line was synonymous with the fall of Metz and therefore every effort was put forth to hold it until the last extremity.

At 5 A.M. on Monday, November 11, 1918, the attack of the 65th Brigade was launched in a dense fog and without any preliminary artillery preparation, although it was protected by fire against enemy sensitive and strong points by the divisional batteries and by a barrage from all the machine-gun units belonging to the brigade. Supported by two companies of the 123rd Machine Gun Battalion, the 129th Infantry constituted the attacking force, its two battalions in the first line covering the entire brigade front¹⁴¹ which extended more than three and one-half miles. This regiment was formed in two columns, of which the left column—composed of the 2nd Battalion, Company A, 123rd Machine Gun Battalion, a platoon of Company D of the 108th Engineers, one section of light trench mortars, and a section of 37-millimeter guns—was given Pintheville as its first objective.¹⁴² The right column—comprising the 3rd Battalion, Company B, 123rd Machine Gun Battalion and other elements identical with those of the left column—was directed against Marchéville and St. Hilaire, supported by the 1st Battalion and Machine Gun Company of the 129th.¹⁴³ Additional support was given to these columns by the 1st Battalion and Machine Gun Company of the 130th Infantry moving in the direction of Pintheville and the Chateau d'Aulnois on the left,¹⁴⁴ by the 3rd Battalion of the same regiment and Company D, 123rd Machine Gun Battalion, in the centre;¹⁴⁵ and by the 2nd Battalion and part of the Headquarters Company of the 130th Infantry, Company C, 123rd Machine Gun Battalion, and Company F, 108th Engineers, on the extreme right moving from Herbeuville through Wadonville against St. Hilaire.¹⁴⁶

The heavy fog, the terrain inundated by the enemy, stub-

born resistance from a multitude of enemy machine-gun nests, and heavy fire from the hostile artillery militated against a rapid advance.¹⁴⁷ Indeed so great were the difficulties encountered that it was not until after 8:20 A.M. that the leading troops reached the line Marchéville—St. Hilaire¹⁴⁸ and not until considerably after nine o'clock that the 3rd Battalion of the 129th Infantry was able to force its way into Marchéville.¹⁴⁹ At that hour, however, the 65th Brigade had achieved a notable success. The Chateau d'Aulnois, Riaville, Marchéville, and St. Hilaire¹⁵⁰ were in its possession and all the terrain intervening between these towns and the Verdun-Metz road on a frontage of six kilometers was completely under its control.¹⁵¹

Meanwhile the 66th Infantry Brigade had likewise delivered an attack. As has been noted, General Wolf's purpose, as expressed in his orders of November 10, was to take all possible advantage of the ground gained in the Bois d'Harville.¹⁵² The general plan was a preliminary attack against Butgnéville at 5:45 A.M., followed at eight o'clock by an advance through the Bois d'Harville by the 3rd Battalion of the 131st Infantry. The 1st Battalion of the 132nd was to "leap-frog" at the northern edge of this wood, pivot on its right, capture the little Bois la Dame and, advancing inside the enemy's network of wire, attack Jonville from the rear, while a direct holding attack was to be delivered against that town from the west by the 3rd Battalion of the 132nd Infantry.¹⁵³ The circumstances which attended the final dispositions for these attacks are thus narrated by Colonel Sanborn:¹⁵⁴

Shortly after 4 o'clock the morning of Nov. 11th the Commanding Officer of the 131st Infantry established his forward battle station at Woël, where the Commanding General, 66th Brigade, arrived shortly after.¹⁵⁵ Steps were at

once taken to concentrate the 131st Infantry (less Co. F and four machine guns at St. Hilaire) and Company C which furnished the liaison, detailed to the 110th Infantry and other details for bringing up ammunition, etc. The 131st Infantry Machine Gun Co. reported at Woël during the night [of] November 10-11th. Sent two guns to relieve the detachment of the 124th M. G. Bn. on duty with the Liaison group, on the left of the 110th Infantry, remainder of the company were sent to Doncourt.¹⁵⁶ No changes were made in the general plan of attack except to place progressive artillery fire on the Bois de Harville, northeast of, and along, the Jonville-Harville Road, gradually moving forward and resting on the northeast edge of the woods in support of the advance, also continued fire along the northwest edge of the same wood.

The initial attack of the 66th Brigade was to be delivered against Butgnéville at 5:45 A.M. by the companies of the 131st and 132nd Infantry and the two platoons of Company C, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, under Captain Wigglesworth, then occupying St. Hilaire. This gallant but fruitless operation is thus described by the commanding officer of the 131st Infantry:¹⁵⁷

Company F, 1st Lieut. Carrol D. Schnepf commanding, with attached machine guns (2nd platoon Co. H, 132nd Inf. in reserve) left St. Hilaire at 5:20 A.M. the 11th, advancing northeast toward Butgnéville. After crossing the Rau de Moutru the scouts drew enemy fire, the first wave closed on the scout line and advanced. A number of flares were sent up by the enemy and machine gun fire increased. A trench mortar also opened fire on the advancing troops. Machine guns were placed on the flanks and under their fire an advance was made until wire entanglements in front of the town which were still intact were reached. Right of the advance was held up by machine gun fire. As the left advanced it was also met by machine gun fire. Heavy rifle and machine gun fire came from the town. The Company Commander stated he was receiving no artillery support. The shell fire which was supposed to be put on the town fell short and did little if any damage. The machine gun officer states that the barrage never fell and that the enemy outnumbered them. Six machine gun men were five

wounded.¹⁵⁸ Infantry casualties, one officer wounded, three other ranks killed, twenty wounded.¹⁵⁹ Troops returned to St. Hilaire at 9 A.M.

Of the other units of the 124th Machine Gun Battalion, Companies A and B retained their positions of the preceding night in the Bois de Warville and prepared for a resumption of the attack;¹⁶⁰ two platoons of Company C got as far as Doncourt,¹⁶¹ from which Company D, after being held up momentarily by artillery fire, proceeded to the Bois des Hautes Épines, where they went into position at 8 A.M.¹⁶² The 122nd Machine Gun Battalion was retained west of the Meuse at Camp Thillombois Sud as part of the divisional reserve.¹⁶³

The principal attack of the 66th Infantry Brigade, which was scheduled to take place in the Bois d'Harville and against Jonville at 8 A.M., was launched exactly at the "H" hour and, in spite of tremendous enemy artillery and machine-gun fire from the front and both flanks, the troops were making substantial progress which gave every promise of success in breaking through the Hindenburg line, the last fortified obstacle between them and Metz, when it was suddenly arrested by a most extraordinary event.

Meanwhile, at the P. C. of the 33rd Division at Troyon-sur-Meuse, the radio station picked up at 5:45 that morning the following wireless message in French, sent from the Allied Grand Headquarters at Guise:

MARSHAL FOCH

to the COMMANDERS-IN-CHIEF.

Hostilities will be stopped on the entire front beginning the eleventh November eleven hours (French time).

Until further order the Allied troops will not go beyond the line attained on that date and at that hour.

(Signed) Marshal FOCH.¹⁶⁴

At 6:45 A.M. the same message was received in English

and 7:05 A.M. the following radio message in French was picked up:

No. 18 W 89. GERMAN PLENIPOTENTIARIES to the GERMAN HIGH COMMAND to be communicated to all the authorities interested.

Radio 3,084 and ggg 2 No. 11,386 received.

Armistice has been signed at five o'clock in the morning "French time." It enters into effect at eleven o'clock in the morning (French time). Delay of evacuation prolonged twenty-four hours for the left bank of the Rhine in addition to the five days therefore thirty-one days in total. Modifications of the text compared with the one brought by Helldorf will be transmitted by radio.

(Signed) ERZBERGER No. 9.¹⁶⁵

At 7:50 A.M. a telephone message from Lieutenant-Colonel Kastler, chief of staff of the 17th Army Corps at St. Mihiel, was taken by Captain Roger Bader, one of the French liaison officers, to whom the former read a telegram just received by the Corps Commander from the general commanding the Second American Army, which read thus:

The Armistice is signed and becomes effective the 11th November at 11 o'clock.

At that hour or before, hostilities and the advance are to cease. Hold the line attained and give exact information as to the line attained at that hour. No communication will take place with the enemy. Acknowledge receipt.

By command of General BULLARD:

HEINTZELMAN,
Chief of Staff.

At 10:25 A.M. the exact text of this telegram in French was received in an urgent "Service Note" from the Chief of Staff of the 17th Army Corps¹⁶⁶ by whom it was "notified for execution," and, in the meantime, exactly an hour earlier, Lieutenant Colonel Simpson, G-3 of the 33rd Division, was handed a telegram from the Second Army thus worded:

PATTERSON 7,

Your map received. As soon as possible telephone to G-3, Second Army, the location at the time the front line troops have ceased to advance. If this can be furnished before 11:00 o'clock do it; otherwise before 1:00 o'clock.

G-3, Second Army.¹⁶⁷

Directly upon the receipt of the telephone message from the Chief of Staff of the 17th Army Corps at 7:50 A.M., this important information was transmitted by telephone and otherwise to the brigade commanders, supplemented by specific orders to arrest their advance immediately and to cease all firing absolutely, and two hours later the final instructions were embodied in this form:

G-3 *Secret*

FIELD ORDER
No. 36.

P. C. 33RD DIVISION, A. E, F.,
11th November, 1918

MAPS: VIGNEULLES "A" and "B", 1:20,000
 METZ, S. W. & S. E. 1:50,000
 COMMERCEY, N. W. & N. E. 1:50,000

1. (a) The Armistice has been signed and will become effective November 11, 1918, at 11:00 A.M.
- (b) All hostilities will cease at once and no farther advance will be made. All ground now occupied will be held.
2. No communication will take place with the enemy.
3. (a) The line reached will be organized for defense. The boundary between brigade sub-sectors remains unchanged. Troops in each sub-sector will be distributed in depth.
- (b) Each Brigade will at once make all arrangements to advance in appropriate formation with Advance Guards, in case orders are received to move forward to occupy surrendered territory. In such case troops in the Outpost Zone will constitute the Advance Guard.
4. The Comdg. General, 65th and 66th Inf. Brigades will each detail two officers at once to make a sketch, scale 1:20,000, showing the exact line reached by our troops.

This sketch must be at Division Hdqrs. by 12:00 Noon, November 11, 1918. (today).

BELL
Major General.¹⁶⁸

The information in respect to the signing of the armistice and the Division Commander's orders relative to the cessation of hostilities reached General King at his advanced P. C. on the hill at Combres at 8:21 A.M. and the action which was immediately taken is thus told in the Chronological Record of Events, 65th Infantry Brigade:

3rd Bn., 130th Inf., had reached the village of St. Hilaire at 8:21 A.M., when orders were received that armistice with the enemy had been signed, firing to cease and troops to remain in positions occupied at that time.

Regimental P. C. 129th Infantry, received orders at 9 A.M., that armistice had been signed and to discontinue hostilities at once. Runners were immediately dispatched to the various units, which were steadily advancing through inundated land and overcoming all enemy strong points.¹⁶⁹ Recall was sounded at 9:45 A.M., and all units remained in conquered positions. The enemy continued firing until 11:00 A.M., when all units, except one platoon per battalion, retired to locations of Battalion Headquarters.

The circumstances which attended the receipt of the news concerning the signing of the armistice and the cessation of hostilities are thus narrated by Colonel Sanborn:

While the troops were being assembled in the Bois de Warville, at 8:30 A.M. telephone notice was received that the armistice had been signed, that all firing on our part was to cease at once, except to repel counter attacks, which information was conveyed to troops in position and reinforcing battalions successively as they arrived.¹⁷⁰ The enemy gradually ceased fire from the trenches and machine gun positions,¹⁷¹ but it was not until 11 o'clock sharp that a complete cessation was noticed. One machine gunner ran out into a position and shot at everybody in sight up to the last moment.¹⁷² Artillery fire with shrapnel also did not cease until a few minutes after eleven.

A capital demonstration of the discipline in the 33rd Division was afforded by the fact that, after receipt of the orders to cease firing, literally not one shot left the ranks, some of which had to endure heavy shelling and machine-gun and rifle fire for more than an hour and a half without the satisfaction of replying for the last time. Under this fire a number of casualties occurred, but the wise precaution of the Division Commander forestalled any complaints such as were raised against certain troops on other parts of the Allied front.¹⁷³ The closing scene of this great drama was not devoid of pathos, so far as the 33rd Division was concerned. When the curtain descended at eleven o'clock that fateful Monday morning, 20 of its men lay dead on this its last battlefield, 73 men were wounded, 6 officers and 45 men had been gassed, one officer had been captured, and 28 men were missing.¹⁷⁴

The sequel is thus graphically described by Captain Dodd, commanding Company D of the 124th Machine Gun Battalion:¹⁷⁵

One minute after the hour of eleven A.M., firing of any consolidated nature ceased on the German side and from then on, until the hour of twelve noon, an occasional stray artillery explosion was heard in the distance to right and left. About the hour of one P.M. firing of any nature had ceased and we realized that, this time, the armistice was really and truly a fact.

Upon the cessation of the previously-mentioned machine gun fire upon our positions and just about two minutes after eleven A.M., a body of German soldiers, numbering somewhere in the neighborhood of sixty to one hundred men, ranking as non-commissioned officers and privates, came out of the trenches and positions they occupied directly in front of our line, and came across No-Man's Land towards our positions, cheering in rather a ragged manner and at the same time uttering cries of "America." Some of them cried out in French "La guerre est finie." They came to the advanced

part of our lines and upon finding that we would not hold parley with them, and instead ordered them back where they came from, as per our instructions from Pancake [code word for commanding officer, 132nd Infantry] to Parish [code word for commanding officer, 1st Battalion, 132nd Infantry] they retired to where they came from. But for a period covering perhaps an hour afterwards, prolonged and heavy cheering could be heard from the German positions directly to our front. During the remainder of the time we were in occupation of these positions, stray bodies of German soldiers, numbering from two to three men, came to our rear positions and offered us tobacco, cigarettes and cigars. None of them were accepted by us. They were in all cases ordered back to their own lines and were requested by Parish [i. e., the commanding officer, 1st Battalion, 132nd Infantry] to inform their officers that we were keeping, sacredly, our terms of the armistice and that we expected them to keep theirs, and that any further infiltration on their part would cause them to be taken prisoner. This action of Parish had the desired effect.

During the course of that afternoon and next morning occurred a general readjustment of the positions of the 33rd Division¹⁷⁶ with the twofold object of making the troops as comfortable as possible after their long tour of duty in the trenches in the Verdun and Troyon sectors¹⁷⁷ and of holding them in readiness for an instant advance into the conquered territory in the event that such a movement were ordered.¹⁷⁸

On the afternoon of that momentous Monday, the following communication was published to the command:

HEADQUARTERS 33RD DIVISION,
AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES. HSH/fbo
FRANCE, 11th November, 1918.

GENERAL ORDERS:
No. 144.

The Armistice has been signed and hostilities have ceased, at least for the present. The Division Commander takes this opportunity of expressing his appreciation and pride to all ranks for their efficient and effective work.

Shortly after leaving New York in May, 1918, the Divi-

sion took station with the British in the defense of Amiens. On the morning of July 4th, 1918, part of it attacked, and Americans for the first time in history were associated on the battlefield with Australians, winning the victory of Hamel—described by the Commanding General of the Australian Corps as “an historic event of such significance that it will live forever in the annals of our respective nations.” The dash and gallantry displayed on this occasion was recognized by the British Commander-in-Chief and rewarded by the King. The engagement had far reaching results. On the 9th of August at Gressaire Wood and Chipilly the Division materially assisted the beginning of what developed into the final British advance and were again honored by the British nation. On September 26th and October 9th as part of the First American Army, it carried all its objectives in the Verdun Sector and held the territory won on both sides of the Meuse. It has been awarded decorations by our Government and our former French Corps Commander has asked that recommendations be submitted for the Croix de Guerre. Such is the record of this Division.

The Commanding General congratulates officers and men, soldiers of the Great War, on these things done by them in the service of their country.

This order will be read to the troops at the first formation after receipt by the Commanding Officer of each unit.

By Command of Major General BELL:

William K. NAYLOR,
Brigadier General, General Staff,
Chief of Staff.

Official:

H. S. HOOKER,
Major, A. G.,
Act. Div. Adjutant.

During the brief period more than a month later when the 33rd Division formed part of the Army of Occupation and was on the march into Germany, its officers and men were gratified that to the tributes received from British and French commanders under whom they had served on the Somme and

the Meuse¹⁷⁹ had been added the following, which was thus officially announced to them:

HEADQUARTERS 33RD DIVISION,
AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES. FLH—grj
LUXEMBOURG, 16th December, 1918.

GENERAL ORDERS:

No. 150

1. The following letter is published to the Division in recognition of its work in the Troyon Sector:

“HEADQUARTERS SECOND ARMY
AMERICAN E. F.,
FRANCE, 12 December, 1918.

From: COMMANDING GENERAL, Second Army.

To: COMMANDING GENERAL, 33rd Division, American
E. F.

Subject: Activity of the 33rd Division prior to the Armistice.

1. Upon the transfer of the 33rd Division, from the Second to the Third American Army, I desire to express to you my gratification at the vigorous and successful activities of your division during the period of active operations preceding the Armistice.

2. The 33rd Division, although occupying a broad front, was called upon to advance toward Conflans, and was engaged in the performance of this mission at the time hostilities ceased.

3. On November 6 to 7, when accurate information of the enemy's intentions was greatly desired, raiding parties from your Division penetrated to Chateau d'Aulnois and captured 21 prisoners, including one officer. On November 7 to 8, your reconnaissance patrols entered Bois d'Harville and St. Hilaire and brought back 8 prisoners. On November 9 and 10, you drove the enemy from the towns of St. Hilaire and Marchéville and, at the time of cessation of Hostilities, your division had occupied these towns, as well as the towns of Butgnéville and Riaville.

4. The conduct of the 33rd Division exemplified its ability to execute promptly and thoroughly the tasks which were given to it. There was shown, on the part of both

officers and men, an efficiency and fighting spirit which are highly commendable.

(Signed) R. L. BULLARD,
Lieutenant General, U. S. A."

II. This order will be read to the troops at the first formation after receipt by the Commanding Officers of each unit.

By Command of Major General BELL:

Official: WILLIAM H. SIMPSON,
Lieut. Colonel, General Staff,
FREDERIC L. HUIDEKOPER, Chief of Staff.
Lieut. Colonel, A. G.,
Division Adjutant.

Later in the same month the 33rd was included, together with twenty-one other combatant divisions, in the thanks conveyed to them by the Commander-in-Chief of the American Expeditionary Forces in the following communication:

(Corrected Copy)

(Destroy all previous copies.)

(For Official Circulation Only.) (G. O. 232.)

G. H. Q.

AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES,
GENERAL ORDERS)

No. 232.)

FRANCE, Dec. 19, 1918.

It is with a sense of gratitude for its splendid accomplishment, which will live through all history, that I record in General Orders a tribute to the victory of the First Army in the Meuse-Argonne battle.

Tested and strengthened by the reduction of the St. Mihiel salient, for more than six weeks you battered against the pivot of the enemy line on the western front. It was a position of imposing natural strength, stretching on both sides of the Meuse River from the bitterly contested hills of Verdun to the almost impenetrable forest of the Argonne; a position, moreover, fortified by four years of labor designed to render it impregnable; a position held with the fullest resources of the enemy. That position you broke utterly, and thereby hastened the collapse of the enemy's military power.

Soldiers of all of the divisions engaged under the First, Third and Fifth American Corps—the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 26th, 28th, 29th, 32nd, 33rd, 35th, 37th, 42nd, 77th, 78th, 79th, 80th, 81st, 82nd, 89th, 90th and 91st American divisions, the 18th and 26th French divisions, and the 10th and 15th French Colonial divisions—you will be long remembered for the stubborn persistence of your progress, your storming of obstinately defended machine gun nests, your penetration, yard by yard, of woods and ravines, your heroic resistance in the face of counter-attacks supported by powerful artillery fire. For more than a month, from the initial attack of September 26th, you fought your way slowly through the Argonne, through the woods and over hills west of the Meuse; you slowly enlarged your hold on the Côtes de Meuse to the east, and then, on the 1st of November, your attack forced the enemy into flight. Pressing his retreat, you cleared the entire left bank of the Meuse south of Sedan, and then stormed the heights on the right bank and drove him into the plain beyond.

Soldiers of all army and corps troops engaged—to you no less credit is due; your steadfast adherence to duty and your dogged determination in the face of all obstacles made possible the heroic deeds cited above.

The achievement of the First Army which is scarcely to be equalled in American history, must remain a source of proud satisfaction to the troops who participated in the last campaign of the war. The American people will remember it as the realization of the hitherto potential strength of the American contribution toward the cause to which they had sworn allegiance. There can be no greater reward for a soldier or for a soldier's memory.

This order will be read to all organizations at the first assembly formation after its receipt.

JOHN J. PERSHING,

Official:

ROBERT C. DAVIS,
Adjutant General.

General, Commander in Chief,
American Expeditionary Forces.

IX. OPERATIONS OF THE 58TH FIELD ARTILLERY BRIGADE

Meanwhile, the 58th Field Artillery Brigade, under the command of Brigadier General Henry D. Todd, Jr.,¹ had had decidedly varied experiences. Its departure from Camp Logan occurred during the second week of May, 1918, following that of the rest of the 33rd Division, from which it was separated for eight months. The first stage of its movement terminated at Camp Merritt, Montclair, New Jersey, where it remained until the beginning of the fourth week in May. On the twenty-sixth of that month it sailed from Hoboken in a convoy comprising four transports, the *Kashmir*, the *Scotian*, the *Melita*, and the *City of Poona*, which arrived at Liverpool on June 8. As has been seen,² General Todd and his brigade headquarters followed in the *Mauretania*, reaching Liverpool on June 11. Upon its arrival in England, this brigade proceeded to Winchester and, after a brief stay, moved to Southampton, where it embarked and crossed the Channel to Havre, arriving on June 13. At Havre it entrained and proceeded to the artillery training areas of Valdahon and Ornans, which are situated in the eastern part of France about ten miles south of the fortress of Besançon. Two months were spent in training of the most intensive sort under French instructors, with the result that the 58th Field Artillery Brigade was brought to a high state of theoretical and practical efficiency, as its subsequent career demonstrated. On August 20, 1918, it started for the Toul sector, where it was attached to the 89th Division (Major General Winn). Its future activities until the armistice are recounted in the

following narrative, which was specially prepared for this history by First Lieutenant Leon Dessez, operations officer of the brigade.

Between the formal training of the 58th Field Artillery Brigade at Valdahon and its first real battle, the reduction of the St. Mihiel salient, a period of three weeks was spent in learning the real business of war in the first sector held by American troops—a sector northwest of Toul extending from Beaumont to Bouconville. The non-motorized organizations entrained at Valdahon and Besançon on August 21 and 22 and detrained at Foug and Pagny-sur-Meuse on August 24 and 25. The motorized organizations traveled overland to the same towns. From these towns the entire brigade marched into the Forêt de la Reine, where it was to remain hidden until the big attack of September 12. The brigade P. C. was established in Boucq. In this sector the brigade became well used to gas attacks, to the hardships of traffic jams on the roads during the night, when all the motor- as well as the horse-drawn vehicles traveled without showing lights and without sounding klaxons, and learned so to work in the day-time that German aerial observers could find nothing of value for the German information service and no targets for German machine-gun fire. On August 26, supporting the 89th Division, in the IVth American Army Corps, the 1st Battalion of the 122nd Field Artillery—Major Frank R. Schwengel commanding—took over the defense of the sector from a battalion of the 321st Field Artillery. Battery C took position south of Rambucourt (maps St. Mihiel-c-Mort Mare, scale 1/20,000), while Battery B and Battery A went into position in Le Joli Bois, southeast of Raulecourt. Cannoneers from Battery B, under command of First Lieutenant Oscar N. Schjerven took over one platoon of 90-millimeter guns, and a like group of men from Battery A, under command of First

Lieutenant John W. McCarthy, took over another platoon of 90-millimeter guns, both gun positions being in the northern end of the Forêt de la Reine, southeast of Rambucourt. On September 3, the two platoons joined at the Schjerven position. The guns were fired for registration and, during several days prior to the infantry assault, they dealt harassing fire on roads and trenches and also shelled the crossroads at Lahayville. Battery C—Captain Robert E. Myhrman, commanding—made an adjustment of fire from Observation Post No. 21 in Rambucourt. The battery delivered counteroffensive preparation fire and harassing fire daily on roads and trench crossings, made an adjustment of fire with aeroplane observation on the crossroads in Richecourt, and at all other times was ready to shield our infantry with a defensive barrage. In delivering this fire, all the gun squads of the battalion served at the pieces. On September 4 a few positions of the 122nd and 123rd Field Artillery were heavily shelled from hour 17:30 to hour 19:30 and two men of the 123rd Field Artillery were killed. All the regiments of the brigade were quietly digging gun pits under the camouflage in preparation for the attack and, aided by the 108th Ammunition Train, were hauling ammunition to the new positions.

When the Allied High Command determined to reduce the German salient at St. Mihiel, it chose for that task the Vth American Army Corps, the 2nd French Colonial Army Corps, the IVth American Army Corps, and the 1st American Army Corps, forming the First American Army. The Vth Corps on the west of the salient was to push forcefully over the hilly ground east of Les Éparges, the IVth Corps on the south of the salient was to make a thrust northward from Beaumont, the 1st Corps was to swing the attack on its hinge at Pont-à-Mousson, and the 2nd Colonial Army Corps was

to mop up the heights at the tip of the salient and to have the honor of taking the town of St. Mihiel.

The 58th Field Artillery Brigade, supporting the 1st Division, was at the far left of the IVth Corps sector. It was a sector in which an attack was very difficult. From the forest of Apremont on the west where the lines passed over the wooded hills of Le Mont, all the dominating heights were in the hands of the enemy. But the ambition of the American Army increased even the natural difficulties. It was desired not only to capture the ground of the St. Mihiel salient, but to capture a great number of German soldiers as well, and to accomplish this result the attack of the 2nd Colonial Army Corps was held back until one hour after the two American corps on its flanks had gone forward, when it was to proceed at a slower rate of advance. Thus, not only were the enemy observatories able at the outset to see the American assault, but for several hours they were to suffer no threat of attack. To blind and destroy these lines and thoroughly to defend our exposed left flank and, at the same time, to give our attacking infantry thorough and effective aid required not only a great massing of guns but a complicated and skillful plan of attack as well.

The divisional artillery of the 1st Division, under command of General Todd, was made up of the 58th Field Artillery Brigade, the 1st Field Artillery Brigade (Colonel Butner commanding), the 76th Regiment Field Artillery, 44th Regiment Colonial Army Corps, and French Artillery and was formed into five groupings: the Davis grouping, the Kennedy grouping, the Butner grouping, the Rivers grouping, and the Hackett grouping. The Davis grouping consisted of one battalion of 8-inch howitzers (44th Regiment Colonial Army Corps) and the 2nd Battalion of the 123rd Field Artillery (155-millimeter howitzers); the Kennedy grouping consisted

of the 5th Field Artillery. These two groupings of heavy guns were charged with the demolition of known strong points and of observatories, and in the preliminary bombardment the 155-millimeter guns were intrusted with the duty of delivering enfilade fire on the important *boyaux* and the 8-inch guns were to deliver fire on the chief trenches. The two groupings of direct support (the Butner grouping, consisting of the 6th and 7th Field Artillery and the Rivers grouping, consisting of the 76th Field Artillery and 122nd Field Artillery) were given the mission of cutting wire and firing the rolling barrage behind which the infantry were to advance. Because of the hindrances which were expected in crossing the Rupt-de-Madt and other difficult places, and because of the continuance of German observation from the western range of hills, a large proportion of smoke shells was to be used in the firing. In order to assure depth in the barrage, one battalion of each grouping was to fire two hundred meters beyond the line on which the other battalions were firing. The Hackett grouping (124th Field Artillery and the 2nd Battalion of the 123rd Field Artillery) was to enfilade certain German trenches in the Richecourt sector, supply a rolling barrage on the western edge of the sector, blind and destroy the observation posts on Mont Sec, and shield the left flank of the division from an expected counterattack from the west.

To perform these missions, the gun positions were very carefully chosen. The Hackett grouping was placed, roughly speaking, west of Bouconville, the Rivers grouping between Bouconville and Rambucourt, and the Butner grouping between Rambucourt and Beaumont. The Kennedy grouping was placed behind Rambucourt and the Davis grouping behind Beaumont and Bouconville. The reconnaissance of these positions, the digging of gun pits, and the laying in of two and one-half days' fire allowance of ammunition are operations

much easier to relate than they were to accomplish. The fine weather, the clear air, and the nearness of the German observation posts made necessary the performance of all work by night. But even night work was hard to do. Rockets and flares dropped by hostile aircraft cast intermittent floods of light on fields and roads. To avoid undue traffic congestion the circulation of vehicles took a counterclockwise direction, from the ammunition dump in the Forêt de la Reine, to Beaumont, Rambucourt, Bouconville, Broussey, and back again to the Forêt de la Reine. On the nights of September 8, 9, 10, and 11, the guns were drawn from the echeloned positions into the prepared gun positions and on September 11, the brigade P. C. was moved to Beaumont.

On September 12 at one o'clock in the morning the preliminary bombardment of four hours began. This bombardment, which included a large proportion of gas shells, was continuous and fierce. The enemy troops were so unnerved by it and so confused by the deadly and obscuring barrage fire that the advancing troops met with but scattered and futile resistance. The observation posts on Mont Sec were partly obscured by smoke and their telephone lines were cut. The troops reached their objectives on scheduled time, and on the second day the 26th Division of the Vth Corps, which had advanced eastward from Les Éparges, met the 1st Division near Vigneulles-lès-Hattonchâtel.

The battle had been won. Thousands of prisoners had been taken, the salient had been demolished. The counter-attack never came, and the regiments had no further occasion to fire. All the spectacular action was at an end, but much precautionary work had still to be done and this was exacting and exhausting business. From September 12 to September 14, the artillery regiments moving in echelon successively took up advanced positions to guard against the still threatened

attack from the west, until all the organizations, with caissons and wagons full of ammunition, reached Nonsard—a total advance of more than eleven kilometers over obstructed and shell-ruined roads. The disorganization of the German resistance in itself was proof of the excellence of the artillery fire, but General Summerall—whose command, the 1st Division, was reputed to be one of the best divisions in the Army—made official record of the brigade's accomplishments. He cited each of the three regiments in General Orders No. 58, September 19, 1918:

For great devotion to duty and efficiency in advancing over muddy and difficult roads under the worst weather conditions and rendering at all times invaluable support to the attacking infantry in the advance of September 12–13, 1918.

The importance of the battle in which the brigade took such a brilliant part is shown in the following telegram. It was sent by General Pershing to Major General Dickman, commanding the IVth American Army Corps:

Please accept my sincere congratulations on the successful and important part taken by the officers and men of the 4th Corps in the first offensive of the First American Army, on September 12th and 13th. The courageous dash and vigor of our troops has thrilled our countrymen and evoked the enthusiasm of our allies. Please convey to your command my heartfelt appreciation of their splendid work. I am proud of you all.

The junction of the 26th Division and the 1st Division resulted in the withdrawal of the 1st Division from the line. It was ordered to the Bois de la Belle Oxière for rest, reorganization, and reëquipment and along with it was to go its divisional artillery. The artillery organizations were in great need of rest. For three weeks they had been encamped in the wet woods, subjected to gas and bombing attacks; and in the latter part of that period men and animals had become well

tired out, the cannoneers from digging gun emplacements, the drivers and horses from hauling ammunition. Besides this they had had the added fatigue of the attack and subsequent and frequent changes of position. Before the regiments began to move, however, the order came detaching the 58th Field Artillery Brigade from the 1st Division and ordering it to report to the Second French Army. So, instead of rest, the brigade was to go through one of its most exacting experiences in the war, a period of long and tedious night marches and of day encampments in the wet woods, from St. Mihiel to the Argonne.

On September 14 the organizations marched from Non-sard to the woods near Broussey; September 15, they marched via Gironville, Mécrin, and Koeur-la-Petite to the woods near Koeur-la-Grande; September 16 they moved to Pierrefitte and towns nearby—Belrain, Nicey, and Villotte; September 17 and 18, going by way of Beuzée, Deuxnouds, Seraucourt, Fleury, and Froidos, they moved into the woods west of Autrécourt. On September 21 they finally reached the Bois de Parois. The total distance covered in the week was 104 kilometers.

The First American Army made three distinct efforts to pierce the German lines north of Verdun. The first, lasting from September 26 to October 4, and the second from October 4 to October 31, constituted a slow, creeping fight of great ferocity. The Germans were driven back from the organized defenses of their trench system to partly organized, but very effective natural defenses. Range on range of steep wooded hills separated by sharply-cut ravines, lent aid to the machine-gun defense of the enemy. The third, beginning November 1, was the mighty thrust which broke down the German organization and cut the Metz-Mézières Railroad, one of the two main lines of supply of the German Army. The 58th Field Artillery Brigade believes it was the first organiza-

tion to fire on the Metz-Mézières Railroad, which it attacked November 5. These three operations are called the Meuse-Argonne Offensive.

Roughly, the American sector was divided as follows: the 1st Corps attacked in the Aire Valley, and the Vth and IIIrd Corps in the west and east parts of the Grand Couronne. The 91st Division, supported by the 58th Field Artillery Brigade, was the left division of the Vth Corps, with the 37th and 79th Divisions on its right and on its left the 35th Division of the 1st Corps.

Opposite the 91st Division the situation was this: The German supply lines ran down deep ravines, perpendicular to the front; they had the cover afforded their artillery by successive ranges of wooded hills; their machine guns could enfilade all approaches. In some places they had organized these natural defenses with barbed wire and shallow trenches, as in the Kriemhild and Freya Stellungen. The experienced German Army Staff took advantage of every inch of this difficult terrain and organized an admirable defense, depending upon isolated machine guns and artillery of all calibres.

On the other hand, the American lines of supply were never particularly good, and during the advance their condition became steadily worse. Our troops in advancing were often in full view of the concealed German machine gunners and artillery observers. Our artillery advanced over the worst possible roads and only by superhuman efforts was it able to keep up with our attacking infantry. Our forces were under another disadvantage; they were operating in this sector for the first time.

The divisional artillery of the 91st Division, General Todd commanding, was organized in four groupings. The Trench Mortar grouping, under the command of Captain C. J. Kraft, consisted of the 108th Trench Mortar Battery, the

308th Trench Mortar Battery, and the 17th and 20th Batteries of the 176th Regiment of French Trench Artillery. It was to deliver enfilading and destructive fire on the highly organized trench systems just west of Avocourt and to cut gaps in the first wire entanglements. There were two groupings of heavy artillery, the 155-millimeter grouping, which consisted of the 123rd Field Artillery and the 36th Battery of the 8th Regiment of French Foot Artillery, under command of Colonel Charles G. Davis, and the 9.2-inch grouping, the 65th Regiment, Colonial Army Corps, under command of Colonel Howell. These units were to deliver preparation fire upon machine guns, dugouts, strong points, and the trenches farther back. During the attack they fired the covering barrage. The light artillery grouping, under command of Brigadier General Fleming, was in turn divided into two subgroupings, the Foreman subgrouping and the Hackett subgrouping. The former comprised the 122nd Field Artillery and the 1st Battalion of the 124th Field Artillery and supported the 181st Brigade in the right of the sector. The latter was made up of the 322nd Field Artillery and the 2nd Battalion of the 124th Field Artillery and was to support the 182nd Brigade in the left of the sector. The entire grouping was to deliver interdiction and harassing fire and during the preparation was to cut gaps in the wire entanglements. During the attack it was to furnish the rolling barrage. All the groupings were placed within the division sector in the Forêt de Hesse, midway between Vauquois and Avocourt, and those farthest back were within three kilometers of the enemy's front line trenches.

General Todd received instructions for the attack from the Corps Commander, Major General Cameron, and from the Corps Artillery Commander, Major General Alexandre, September 19 at the Vth Corps Headquarters in Ville-sur-

Cousances. On September 20 battery positions were reconnoitred and on September 21 the delivery of ammunition to the battery positions commenced. Because of the scarcity of trucks and the exhausted condition of the horses, the delivery of ammunition was one of the most serious problems faced. Great credit should be given to Lieutenant Colonel Fisher of the 108th Ammunition Train, Lieutenant Julien of General Alexandre's staff, First Lieutenant A. G. Ford of the brigade staff, and to the personnel of the brigade for putting the complete allowance of ammunition in place in so few days. On September 21 and 22 the 1st Battalion of the 124th Field Artillery took over the defense of the sector from the French. The brigade P. C. was moved to Bertramé Ferme, September 23, and on September 24 the division plan of attack was received. On September 26 at 2:30 A.M. the preliminary bombardment commenced; it continued until 5:30 with an intermission of five minutes, from 4:15 to 4:20, to permit the sound-ranging section to locate acting German batteries. From 4:20 to 4:30 German positions were gassed. At 5:30 the infantry attacked.

The day's objective for the division was the heights northwest of Gesnes. This meant an advance of fourteen kilometers over the most difficult sort of ground and beyond the fire of the divisional artillery. The troops did not reach this objective. The heights were finally captured about October 15. Although the division did fail to reach its goal, it fought well. It advanced six kilometers through the dense woods of Cheppy, through barrier after barrier of wire entanglements and resisted by nest after nest of machine guns, to the ridge northwest of Véry.

The advance of the infantry was remarkable, but the advance of the artillery was more so. It is quite reasonable that the infantry attack should succeed as long as the artillery

kept it in range. The artillery's successful effort to increase its range promptly by moving forward was the outstanding feature of the attack. Before dusk of the first day, three battalions of 75-millimeter guns had passed with full supplies of ammunition over a road pronounced impassable—the road through Avocourt—had gone into position from one-half to one and one-half kilometers behind the infantry outpost lines, had oriented their guns, and had laid them for fire. The next day the remaining battalion of the 124th Field Artillery and the 123rd Field Artillery with its attached French battalion moved into the same neighborhood, two kilometers southeast of Véry. Here the regiments fired upon all obstacles to the infantry advance, upon machine-gun nests, upon enemy batteries, and upon concentrations of enemy troops. On September 29, Colonel Horatio B. Hackett, commanding the 124th Field Artillery, while gallantly directing his regiment under heavy fire, was seriously wounded by shell splinters and was evacuated to the hospital.

By September 29 the infantry advance had warranted the further displacement of the regiments northward. The 2nd Battalion of the 124th Field Artillery moved to a position one-half kilometer west of Épinonville and the rest of the brigade moved to positions between Véry and Épinonville. The 123rd Field Artillery occupied positions just off the road connecting these towns. The 2nd Battalion of the 124th Field Artillery was in position west of the road and all the positions of the 122nd Field Artillery were east of the road. Here the brigade remained until October 11 and 12, when it was withdrawn for rest and reëquipment. The infantry supported by the brigade was making slow progress. This was not due to any fault of the infantry or to the lack of artillery support. At one time the left divisional flank was exposed for a kilometer and a half and only the strength and quickness of

a heavy defensive barrage saved our infantry from encirclement. Again, on September 30, behind a rolling barrage by the 58th Field Artillery Brigade, the 181st Infantry Brigade advanced and took Gesnes. The exposure of the flanks again threatened and our troops had to retire.

On October 4, the 91st Division Infantry was relieved by the 32nd Division, to which the 58th Field Artillery Brigade was then attached. The following extract from a letter from the Corps Commander gives the reasons for its relief:

Under orders from First Army, the 91st Division will be relieved from the front line tonight and placed in Corps Reserve.

The Corps Commander wishes you to understand that this relief results solely from a realization by higher command that your Division has done its full share in the recent success, and is entitled to a rest for reorganization. This especially as during the past three days it has incurred heavy casualties when circumstances would not permit either advance or withdrawal.

At a time when the divisions on its flank were faltering and even falling back, the Ninety-First pushed ahead and steadfastly clung to every yard gained.

In its initial performance, your Division has established itself firmly on the list of the Commander in Chief's reliable fighting units. Please extend to your officers and men my appreciation of their splendid behavior and my hearty congratulations on the brilliant record they have made.

GEO. H. CAMERON,
Major General, Commanding.

The 32nd Division continued to attack daily and the 58th Field Artillery continued to render assistance. At this time the second great German defensive system was pierced. The world-renowned Kriemhild Stellung, which bestrode the precipitous wooded slopes north of Gesnes, fell before the Allied troops after a bitter fight.

Throughout the whole period, the liaison officers with

the infantry units always displayed bold initiative and a fine courage and because of their efficient service, immediate and effective fire was brought to bear upon all the obstacles hindering our infantry advance. Deserving of special mention in this respect is the work of First Lieutenant Latimer Johns of the 122nd Field Artillery. Lieutenant Johns directed the supporting fire of his regiment for the attacking infantry from the initial assault of September 26 until his death; and during all the trying days he displayed an intrepidity which is shown only by the bravest of men. He was killed by shell fire on September 30 at Gesnes.

The high favor in which the artillery was held may be judged by two letters to General Todd from the 32nd Division Infantry Brigade commanders; the one from Brigadier General E. B. Winans, the other from Brigadier General Frank McCoy:

I desire to express my utmost satisfaction with the artillery support by your 58th Artillery Brigade in connection with the successful attack and capture by the 64th Infantry Brigade of the Bois de la Morine, the Bois du Chêne Sec, and the town of Gesnes. In this operation the barrage was precise and exactly timed, the destructive and the counter-battery fire effective, and the fire on fleeting targets prompt and accurate. The efficient liaison established by your liaison officers, Lieutenants Shields and Hunter, is deserving of high commendation. It will no doubt gratify you to know that not a single report of friendly "shorts" was received during this operation.

(Signed) WINANS.

During the first few days of the operation of my Brigade against the Kriemhilde Stellung in front of Romagne, I had the very effective support of your Brigade of Field Artillery, and I wish to express my appreciation to both yourself and your Colonels. I was keenly conscious of this support, not only when asked, but of the quick and fine initiative of yourself and staff, which made it a pleasure and satisfaction to work together.

(Signed) McCoy.

Two defensive systems had been crushed. The third was to fall later.

The brigade had been working to the point of exhaustion. Accordingly, on October 11, when the infantry advanced beyond the range of our guns, the brigade was relieved from line duty and was sent to the area in and near Ville-sur-Cousances for refitting. So great had been the losses of horses that the journey was made in easy stages. Brigade headquarters and the 123rd Field Artillery went to Ville-sur-Cousances, the 122nd Field Artillery to Jubécourt, the 124th Field Artillery to Brocourt, the 108th Ammunition Train to Brabant, and the 108th Trench Mortar Battery to Vraincourt.

After an inspection on October 17 by Major General McNair, and according to instructions from the Army, the 123rd Field Artillery turned over to the 122nd Field Artillery and to the 124th Field Artillery its rolling stock and animals. It began to move October 22 for the training area at Doulaincourt, where it was motorized. By this transaction the two light regiments became well horsed.

On October 23 the brigade was joined by the 11th Field Artillery (155-millimeter motorized), Colonel W. G. Peace commanding. The brigade went back into the familiar sector, the area north of Gesnes. It was still in the Vth Army Corps, but this time in support of the 89th Division. The brigade P. C. was located in Gesnes, which had been abandoned and subsequently retaken by the 32nd Division supported by the brigade. North of Gesnes and northwest of Romagne the regiments were placed in the well-defiladed, wooded valleys of the great Kriemhild Stellung. The enemy had organized the Bois de Hazois and La Dhuy Ferme as strong points of first resistance. Behind towered the formidable heights of Barri-court, thickly wooded and bristling with enemy batteries.

The regiments moved into position on the night of October 25 and from that time to the first of November engaged in harassing, interdiction, and counterbattery fire. The chief targets for harassing and interdiction fire were the woods of Hazois, L'Épasse, and Andevanne; for harassing fire only, the farms of La Bergerie, La Dhuy, and La Tuilerie and the town of Rémonville; for interdiction fire, the road crossings between Bantheville and Rémonville. During this period the information reports of Lieutenant K. K. Richardson of the 122nd Field Artillery were of great value not alone to the brigade, but to the army corps as well.

On October 30, General Todd, with his aide, Lieutenant Leon Dessez, and Lieutenant Colonel Frank R. Schwengel of the 122nd Field Artillery, and accompanied by Brigadier General Edward A. Millar, while making a personal reconnaissance of the roads and bridges which were to be used in the expected advance, went beyond the infantry outpost line in the western edge of the Bois de Bantheville. His party was immediately the target of observed enemy shell fire, and a shell splinter wounded the general in the face. Fortunately he was not killed; although weak from loss of blood he continued his reconnaissance and upon returning to his headquarters issued to the regimental commanders the instructions based on his reconnaissance. He refused to allow himself to be sent to the hospital until the brigade was about to move forward on November 1.

The artillery concentration for the offensive of November 1 was one of the greatest, if not the greatest, massing of guns of the war. The entire 57th and 58th Brigades and the 203rd French Regiment comprised the divisional artillery of the 89th Division. Besides, there was located in the sector a great number of guns of the corps and army artillery. In the divisional area two kilometers wide there were, along with

some large calibre railway guns, 32 batteries of 75-millimeter rifles, 9 batteries of 105-millimeter rifles, 21 batteries of 155-millimeter howitzers, 6 batteries of 155-millimeter Schneider rifles, 6 batteries of 155-millimeter G. P. F. rifles and 4 batteries of 8.2-inch howitzers, a total of 78 batteries. All the divisional artillery of the 89th Division was under the command of Brigadier General Irwin, commanding the 57th Brigade, until the battalions began to move forward, when only the 58th Brigade and the 203rd French Regiment were to constitute the divisional artillery of the 89th Division under the command of Brigadier General E. A. Millar, 6th Field Artillery Brigade, who temporarily succeeded General Todd in command.

At 3:30 A.M. the preliminary bombardment started and at 5:30 the infantry attack began. The heavy guns fired upon known strong points and upon sensitive points at great range. The 155-millimeter howitzers furnished the accompanying barrage and the 75-millimeter rifles fired the rolling barrage. The rolling barrage was quite remarkable. One battery in each battalion fired shrapnel only, and one-fourth of all the guns fired smoke shells. At 7:30 the rear battalion of the 122nd Field Artillery ceased firing and advanced to a position near La Dhuy Ferme. It was followed a half hour later by the forward battalion, which advanced also to La Dhuy Ferme and went into position there. From these positions the regiments took up the rolling barrage at 12:30 according to schedule and continued it to and beyond the day's objective. The 124th Field Artillery commenced to move at 11:30 and was ready to fire from positions northeast of La Dhuy Ferme by the middle of the afternoon. The 11th Field Artillery left its position northwest of Romagne in the afternoon and marched to its new position south of Rémonville before day-break November 2. In the afternoon, General Millar's head-

quarters moved to La Dhuy Ferme. The day's attack was conspicuously successful along the entire front of the army. The Allied troops reached all their objectives and in doing so pierced the last German defensive system before Sedan, the Freya Stellung on the heights of Barricourt. The 89th Division with the support of the 58th Field Artillery Brigade captured 1,500 prisoners, many machine guns, fieldpieces, and great quantities of ammunition, and was one of the divisions which made the greatest progress of the day. Brigadier General Dwight B. Aultman, chief of artillery of the Vth Corps, wrote to General Millar:

I transmit herewith letter of commendation from the Corps Commander regarding the action of the Artillery in the Operations of November 1st. In transmitting this letter I desire to add my own thanks and appreciation to you and to the officers and men of your Brigade for the hearty coöperation that has resulted in such a brilliant success. To have enabled our infantry to advance in one day over a distance of nine kilometers, with small losses, capturing over a hundred guns, two hundred machine guns and more than two thousand prisoners is an achievement which the artillery may well be proud of, and I congratulate your entire command on having so well performed its share in the operation. I desire that the contents of the letter of the Corps Commander be made known to the officers and men of your command, as well as my own appreciation of their own splendid conduct.

The letter referred to, from Major General Summerall, commanding the Vth Army Corps, was as follows:

I desire to convey to you and to the officers and soldiers of all artillery serving in this Corps my profound appreciation and my admiration of the brilliant manner in which the artillery of all classes has performed the difficult part allotted to it, especially during the advance of November 1st. Although the artillery has been constantly in action day and night, sustaining the battle since the beginning of the present offensive, it has responded with self sacrificing devotion to duty with superb efficiency that is beyond all praise. While our daunt-

less infantry have advanced against the enemy's prepared positions with a courage that elicits our greatest admiration, it must be recognized that without the powerful and skillful operation of the artillery it would have been impossible to accomplish the results which they have so brilliantly achieved. The tremendous volume of fire, the skillful arrangement of all objectives, and the perfect coördination with the infantry and machine guns have made the action of November 1st a model of completeness, and it must stand as a tribute to the able administrative officers who conceived the plans and to the technical ability and fidelity to duty of those who executed them. I beg that you convey to the officers and soldiers of all units of all artillery the foregoing sentiments and assure them of my abiding wishes for their continued success in the campaigns that lie before them.

On November 2 the 122nd Field Artillery advanced again to positions near Rémonville. At 5:30 A.M. the infantry continued the attack protected by the rolling barrage of the two light regiments and the covering fire of the 11th Field Artillery. During the rest of the day the two light regiments in liaison with the infantry fired on all targets reported, while the 11th Field Artillery and the corps artillery shelled sensitive areas and counterbattered enemy guns reported in action. The day's advance was five kilometers.

From this time until November 6, the advance continued rapidly, the infantry pressing ahead all the while, the advancing batteries occupying position after position. With effective artillery support the infantry penetrated and captured the Forêt de Dieulet and reached the Meuse. The brigade P. C. moved from La Dhuy Ferme to Rémonville, then to Barri-court, and then to Taily. On November 5 General Todd returned from the hospital and resumed command of the brigade. The same day the 203rd French Regiment attached to the brigade opened fire on the main artery of the German communication in the east, the Metz-Mézières Railroad. On November 7, in anticipation of supporting the river crossing,

all regiments took up positions northwest of the Laneuville-Beaumont road. The 11th Field Artillery took up and continued to fire on the Metz-Mézières Railroad. Ammunition was brought up and all the regiments were well stocked with supplies, General Todd completed the artillery plan of attack.

On the night of November 10 a crossing of the Meuse was to be forced from Pouilly on the left to Stenay on the right. The eastern heights of the river were to be seized. To support this movement the divisional artillery was divided into three tactical groupings: the Foreman grouping, composed of the 122nd Field Artillery and 1st Battalion of the 124th Field Artillery; the Rogers grouping, composed of the 2nd Battalion of the 124th Field Artillery and the Battalion of the 203rd French Field Artillery; and the Peace grouping, or the 11th Field Artillery. The commanders of the first two groupings arranged with the infantry commanders for the support of the left and right crossings respectively. The Peace grouping remained under the control of the Divisional Artillery Commander. It was planned to have it pass to the control of the Corps Artillery Commander after the objectives had been reached, but the armistice ended hostilities before this happened.

The attack started at 21:30 hours on November 10. By the morning of November 11 the troops were mopping up Pouilly and Stenay and were on the heights north of Pouilly. On November 11 at 11:00 hours the guns were silent. Germany had agreed to the terms of the Allied armistice. Announcement of the German acceptance reached brigade headquarters at 9:30; at 10:45 the light guns ceased fire and at 11:00 hours the Peace grouping ceased fire. An unknown calm came upon the country.

The time between November 5 and November 11 was most trying for the brigade. The only route of supplies and

ammunition was through Laneuville, a route constantly subjected to murderous enfilade shell fire. That it was possible to keep the regiments supplied was due only to the dauntless bravery of officers and men alike.

A word of special praise is due to First Lieutenant Joseph Z. Burgee, brigade communications officer. Throughout the advance, brigade headquarters kept in constant touch with the regiments and with the infantry. For one day at least all the division communications were sent over the brigade telephone lines. In handling this troublesome problem and by maintaining lines through heavily shelled areas, Lieutenant Burgee displayed not only initiative and daring, but great brilliancy as well.

Adequately to assess the accomplishment of the first of November offensive, it is again necessary to quote Major General Summerall:

The announcement of a general armistice with the enemy brings to a temporary suspension the brilliant advance of the 5th Corps which commenced November 1st. The Corps Commander, therefore, takes this occasion to congratulate the officers and soldiers of the troops engaged with the Corps upon the fortitude, the courage, the endurance, the skill and the determination that characterized their conduct throughout the operation. The Corps Commander further desires to express his gratitude for the loyalty with which the troops have responded to every demand which has been made upon them and to assure them of the deep sense of his pride and the honor that has come to him in commanding such superb organizations.

Commencing November 1st the troops have advanced more than thirty kilometers against the strongest opposition that the enemy could offer by his best troops. They have broken through the last vestige of the Hindenburg Line and the Freya Stellung, captured many prisoners, numerous guns, large quantities of war material and have dispersed and destroyed the enemy organizations. On the very night preceding the armistice the troops of this Corps made a brilliant

passage of the river Meuse and occupied the high ground constituting the bridgehead to the east of that river.

Notwithstanding that since the last days of August these troops have been constantly marching and fighting, sleeping in the open and even at times going without their regular supplies of food, and subjected to rain, cold, and exposure in the mud, there has been no fault nor complaint, but with a singleness of purpose they have devoted themselves to the great mission that devolves upon them.

By their progress they have contributed immeasurably to the total defeat of the enemy and compelled him to sue for terms. Prior to the advance, the Corps Commander took occasion to assure the troops that great results must follow upon their actions and that they must expect to capture large numbers of prisoners and booty. The success in compelling the enemy to sue for peace has been beyond our greatest expectations. History will accord to the troops of this Corps their abundant share in the fruits of victory. All officers and soldiers who participated in this campaign must feel a just pride in the privilege that came to them and the place they must occupy in the gratitude and affection of our people. To those of our comrades that have laid down their lives, or who have suffered wounds or sickness, we and our nation will ever afford those sentiments of reverence and honor that they have justly earned.

X. OPERATIONS OF THE 33RD DIVISION FROM THE ARMISTICE UNTIL ITS DEPARTURE FROM LUXEMBOURG

On Tuesday, November 12, 1918, the 33rd Division was definitely established in the positions which it was destined to occupy, with few modifications, for nearly a month.¹ Every effort was exerted to make the troops as comfortable as possible as well as to locate them in such a manner as to be in readiness for any advance.² The day was chiefly spent in organizing the positions and in picketing the lines so as to prevent fraternization on the part of the enemy, who seemed determined to establish friendly relations in spite of the stringent order received to prevent any communication between the opposing forces.³ That Tuesday inaugurated a period of routine camp duties and constant training throughout the division which lasted until the first week in December and which was devoid of special interest so far as the troops were concerned except for a few changes of position and for the days devoted to salvaging and policing the areas occupied.

The night of November 11-12 was characterized by an illumination caused by pyrotechnics of every description, which extended along the enemy lines for miles; it was accompanied by sounds strongly akin to those of drunken revelry which floated across No Man's Land from the German positions. Beginning at 4 P.M. on November 12 and lasting until midnight, and again shortly before dawn on November 13 similar phenomena were witnessed.⁴

On Wednesday, November 13, the following telephone message was received from the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Second Army at Toul:

Instructions [have been] received from G. H. Q. that any Italians, Poles or Russian prisoners released by the Germans on our front and come into our lines be received and treated with kindness and given shelter, food and medical attention, if needed. They are, however, to be kept segregated and not allowed to wander around or mingle with our men and they are to have no communication whatever with our soldiers.

They will at once be investigated by G-2 and a report made direct to Army Headquarters, giving result of investigation. Particular attention will be given by G-2 to ascertaining the section of the country from which these people came and every effort will be made to determine whether they manifest any Bolchevism tendencies.

G-2.

As a matter of fact, these unfortunates were beginning to present themselves in considerable numbers and at 3 P.M. that day 7 Russians, 30 French, and 367 Italians had been received on the division front.⁵

During the course of the day several important communications were received from the Headquarters of the 17th French Army Corps. One announced that at 8 P.M. the 33rd Division, exclusive of the 62nd Field Artillery Brigade, would be transferred to the IVth American Corps;⁶ another directed the immediate withdrawal of that brigade which was to be cantoned near the Troyon-St. Mihiel Railway and the detail of sufficient personnel from the 55th Field Artillery Brigade to accompany the motor transport proceeding to it from the 167th Field Artillery Brigade;⁷ the third gave instructions relative to the transmission of reports from the enemy respecting the location of mines;⁸ and the fourth contained specific directions concerning the treatment of German soldiers and bearers of flags of truce.⁹

The principal communication of importance on Thursday, November 14, was the following telegram which was

received at 8 A.M. from the Chief of Staff of the Second Army:

WABASH Nov. 13-18.

C. G. 33rd Divn.

A. E. F.

19:30 hours. Number 172 G-3. Following telegram received this afternoon from G. H. Q. is repeated for your information and guidance quote: In accordance with the terms of the Armistice, certain German officers carrying documents relative to the release [of] establishments of the line of communication [railroad, water-ways, telegraph and telephone] are [to] confer with French authorities at the railroad station at Nancy at 14:00 hours on the fourteenth, fifteenth and sixteenth of November. The French authorities request that if the German representatives arrive at any point of the American Army such representatives be given all facilities of crossing the lines and that they be accompanied by an officer to the railroad station of Nancy. You will then comply with the request of the French authorities in the event the German representatives present themselves before your lines. By orders. CONNER.

HEINTZELMAN.

The influx of released prisoners continued unabated along the entire division front and some difficulty was experienced in supplying them as was desired. Some valuable information was obtained from them and, according to their statements, "it appears that the greater part of the territory for 30 kilometers east of Woël has been evacuated and that only a few Germans remain in this area," while others declared that "Conflans is being evacuated today."¹⁰

November 15 passed without event of importance save the issuance from Division Headquarters of two training circulars and orders for a thorough policing next day of all billets, camps, horse-lines, and the areas adjacent to them.¹¹ Some relief was obtained in the locations congested by the numbers of released prisoners by sending 439 of them to the inclosure of the IVth Corps at Woinville, near St. Mihiel.¹²

At 5 A.M. on Sunday, November 17, the 33rd Division passed out of the IVth American Army Corps and into the Second Army Reserve.¹³ At that same hour the newly-created American Army of Occupation—officially designated as the Third Army—began its advance toward Luxembourg en route into Germany and took over the fronts of the First and Second Armies, which were destined to remain in reserve and to devote their time to training.¹⁴ Reports of poisoned wells and various diabolical devices employed by the enemy caused a warning to be given to the entire Second Army against the indiscriminate handling of boxes abandoned by the Germans.¹⁵

November 18 was chiefly notable for the orders issued for the salvaging of the entire division area, for the appointment of Lieutenant Colonel William H. Simpson as acting Chief of Staff of the division, in place of Brigadier General W. K. Naylor, who had been made the Chief of Staff of the IXth Corps, and the appointment of Major Roane Waring, adjutant of the 65th Infantry Brigade, as G-3 of the division to fill the place vacated by Lieutenant Colonel Simpson.¹⁶ Major O. T. Troster also succeeded Lieutenant Colonel William C. Gardenhire as G-1 of the division.

Salvaging and policing formed the main interest of the division during the ensuing four days.¹⁷ On November 23, however, additional instructions were issued respecting the training to be pursued during the next four weeks.¹⁸ General Bell spent part of that afternoon at Stenay in conference with General Todd of the 58th Field Artillery Brigade and, upon his return to Troyon-sur-Meuse that evening at 9:20, received a stinging reprimand from the Commander-in-Chief, dated November 20, 1918,¹⁹ for "the condition of the billets and camping area at La Fourche, Le Calvaire, Benoitte Vaux and Route de Issoncourt."²⁰ The 33rd Division, it was stated, "occupied the aforesaid billets and area just prior to October

14 and 15, 1918" and "left the billets and the camping area in a most disgraceful, unsanitary condition." General Bell was censured for his lack of control, administration, and the discipline of his command, and was informed that "the reports referred to and this letter are now a part of the official records" at General Headquarters. This communication terminated with this sentence: "The receipt, without further remark or explanation on your part, will be acknowledged at once by courier letter addressed to the Chief of Staff, A. E. F., A. P. O. 706."

On October 14 and 15, 1918, the entire 33rd Division was hotly engaged on both banks of the Meuse north of Verdun, as has already been seen.²¹ At no time during its existence did the 33rd Division occupy the billets and camping area specified. The charges made by the Commander-in-Chief were therefore without the slightest foundation in fact. The number and volume of the papers connected with these groundless accusations are such as to preclude their incorporation in the text. They have accordingly been inserted in appendix 37, where the reader who is interested in this case can examine them in detail.

The remaining days of November, 1918, possessed little of interest save the transfer of the division from the IVth to the IXth Corps on November 26,²² the innovation in the appointment of an executive officer in all regiments and companies, several tactical manoeuvres, certain changes of position by some of the units, and further policing of the area occupied by the command.²³

This work was continued throughout the opening days of December until the entire division area had been thoroughly policed.²⁴ On the first of the month the 65th Infantry Brigade was concentrated in rest billets in the area of the Fort de Troyon.²⁵ On December 2 orders were received to send a

battalion to Metz to participate in the review to be held there on December 8 by President Poincaré.²⁶ The following day division, brigade, and regimental commanders and most of the Division Staff motored to Toul, where they were conducted through the Headquarters of the Second Army and a demonstration was given them of the proper functioning of an army headquarters.²⁷ On December 4, the entire 33rd Division participated in a manoeuvre in the Troyon sector.²⁸ On December 5 notification was received that at 3 P.M. that day the division would be transferred out of the IXth Corps and placed in the Army Reserve, and warning orders were issued for the movement of the command from its present area to that of Étain and Conflans.²⁹ On the following day, in conformity with instructions from the Second Army,³⁰ there were issued Field Order No. 37, the March Tables for the advance on December 7 and 8, and three memoranda bearing upon this movement.³¹

The advance toward Luxembourg of the Third Army, which was destined to become the American Army of Occupation in Germany,³² has been mentioned. To provide the Third Army with the necessary transport the First and Second Armies were stripped of a large number of trucks, so that the 33rd Division found itself reduced to about one-half the transport authorized by the Tables of Organization.³³ Prior to its departure from the Troyon sector, every effort was made to put this transport into the best condition possible under the circumstances and to procure such spare parts as were most urgently needed.³⁴ These endeavors were attended with scant success,³⁵ and the movement of the division was correspondingly handicapped.

The advance toward Luxembourg began Saturday, December 7, 1918³⁶—a cold, wretched day—and that afternoon the line Thillot–Labry was reached.³⁷ The next day the move-

ment was continued and the Étain–Conflans area attained, the Division Headquarters being transferred from Troyon-sur-Meuse to Conflans.³⁸ Orders were issued that day by the Headquarters of the Second Army for detachments of the 33rd to relieve all elements of the 5th (Regular) Division doing guard and police duty in the Hollerich area and the detachments at Esch, Remich, Bettembourg,³⁹ and near-by places. By all odds the most important event of that Sunday was the formal occupation of the provinces of Alsace and Lorraine, which took place at Metz and was attended by President Poincaré, M. Clémenceau, the French premier, Marshals Joffre, Foch, and Pétain, Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig, Lord Derby, and other notable personages. This historic ceremony opened, about 9:30 A.M., with an inspection of the troops by the President of the French Republic and his party, who were received with full honors. The color bearers then formed in the Place de la République opposite the reviewing stand and were addressed by the President, who thereupon summoned General Pétain and invested him with the baton of a marshal of France. A grand review followed, the procession being composed almost wholly of battalions from famous French divisions. The only body of foreign troops was a provisional battalion of 32 officers and 735 men from the 131st Infantry, under the command of Colonel Joseph B. Sanborn, selected out of the entire American Expeditionary Forces to represent the United States, and to it was accorded the place of honor at the head of the parade.⁴⁰ It is gratifying to be able to record that the appearance of the American troops was in keeping with their conspicuous achievements and excited favorable comment.⁴¹

The movement of the 33rd Division was resumed Monday, December 9, and the line Norroy–Mancieulles was reached.⁴² The principal episode of importance was the

receipt of a telegraphic notification that the division had been transferred from the Second to the Third Army but that the actual date of the passing of command would be arranged between the commanders of those two armies.⁴³

The march of December 10, 11, and 12, was attended by very disagreeable weather—cold with rain and fog—which did not add to the comfort of the troops. On December 10 the division P. C. was transferred from Conflans to Aumetz and two days later to Esch. Instructions were received on December 11 from the VIIth Corps countermanding the original destination and directing that the 33rd Division remain south of the line Luxembourg–Remich until further orders.⁴⁴ At the termination of the advance made during these three days the entire command was located in a sector roughly resembling a crescent and extending from the northeast to the west of the city of Luxembourg, between it and the Moselle. At noon on December 12, the 33rd Division passed into the VIIth Corps and became part of the Third Army, better known as the American Army of Occupation.⁴⁵

Friday, December 13, 1918, was a day of rest for the weary troops, who were decidedly fatigued after six days of continuous marching over muddy roads in a never-ceasing downpour of rain; the only movement on this day was that of the 108th Train Headquarters and Military Police from Berchem to Hesperingen. In accordance with instructions from the Headquarters of the Third Army, the necessary orders were issued for the advance of the division to the Saarburg area in Rhenish Germany, accompanied by a march table for the first day.⁴⁶

The movement was resumed Saturday, December 14, and that afternoon the leading units reached the Moselle River, which constitutes the boundary between the Grand

Duchy of Luxembourg and the German Palatinate of the Rhine.⁴⁷

The first fair weather encountered since leaving the Troyon sector came on Sunday, December 15,⁴⁸ when the advance of the division carried the 66th Infantry Brigade across the Moselle and into the picturesque valley of the Saar, while the artillery reached Remich and the 65th Infantry Brigade got beyond Manternach. About noon, however, telegraphic instructions from the Third Army, transmitted by the VIIth Corps, were received, announcing that, inasmuch as the number of divisions to enter Germany had been restricted to eight, the 33rd would be transferred at a subsequent date to the Second Army; in consequence its advance was to be immediately suspended and any units which had crossed the German frontier were to be withdrawn into Luxembourg.⁴⁹ The necessary orders were at once issued,⁵⁰ and that afternoon General Bell, accompanied by the Division Adjutant, motored from Esch to Saarburg in order to make certain that General Wolf had received instructions to withdraw all elements of the 66th Infantry Brigade west of the Moselle. Saarburg was found swarming with French troops, who were apparently greatly relishing the occupation of German territory after a lapse of forty-eight years.⁵¹

On Monday, December 16, 1918, a cloudy day with some fog,⁵² practically the entire division stood fast in the positions which had been reached the day before. As a precautionary measure, the orders of the preceding day were supplemented by telegrams directing that all elements which had crossed the German frontier be withdrawn.⁵³ The 66th Infantry Brigade *in toto* had attained the region of Saarburg, as has already been seen, but only two of the leading units of the 65th Infantry Brigade had got over the Moselle on Sunday. Upon receipt of these telegraphic instructions, the latter were

promptly countermarched across the river;⁵⁴ owing to the congestion of troops in the Saarburg area and the scarcity of supplies resulting from the lack of transport, however, the entire 66th Infantry Brigade was not withdrawn from German territory until next day. In view of the unexpected turn in events, General Bell deemed it advisable to ascertain in person from General Haan, the Commander of the VIIth Corps, or from his Chief of Staff, the exact conditions and status of the 33rd Division and, accordingly, motored that Monday afternoon to Trèves, where he obtained the information desired.⁵⁵

To the tributes already received from British and French commanders under whom the 33rd Division had served was added the following letter, which reached General Bell on December 15 and which was published to the command on the next day in General Order No. 150:

HEADQUARTERS SECOND ARMY

AMERICAN E. F.

FRANCE, 12 December, 1918.

From: COMMANDING GENERAL, Second Army.

To: COMMANDING GENERAL, 33rd Division, American E. F.

Subject: Activity of the 33rd Division prior to the Armistice.

1. Upon the transfer of the 33rd Division, from the Second to the Third American Army, I desire to express to you my gratification at the vigorous and successful activities of your division during the period of active operations preceding the Armistice.

2. The 33rd Division, although occupying a broad front, was called upon to advance towards Conflans, and was engaged in the performance of this mission at the time that hostilities ceased.

3. On November 6 to 7, when accurate information of the enemy's intentions was greatly desired, raiding parties from your Division penetrated to Chateau d'Aulnois and captured 21 prisoners, including one officer. On November 7 to 8, your reconnaissance patrols entered Bois d'Harville and

St. Hilaire and brought back 8 prisoners. On November 9 to 10, you drove the enemy from the towns of St. Hilaire and Marchéville and, at the time of cessation of Hostilities, your division had occupied these towns, as well as the towns of Butgnéville and Riaville.

4. The conduct of the 33rd Division exemplified its ability to execute promptly and thoroughly the tasks which were given to it. There was shown, on the part of both officers and men, an efficiency and fighting spirit which are highly commendable.

(Signed) R. L. BULLARD,
Lieutenant General, U. S. A.

At noon Tuesday, December 17, 1918, the 33rd Division passed out of the VIIth Corps and the Army of Occupation and became part of the reserve of the Second Army.⁵⁶ The entire 66th Infantry Brigade was withdrawn from German territory and was concentrated just west of the Moselle in the neighborhood of Remich, which was somewhat congested that night, having been occupied since December 14 by the 55th Field Artillery Brigade. The eventual destination of the division was a region in the northern part of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg extending from the Moselle to Arlon in Belgium, and the advance in that direction was inaugurated that Tuesday by the transfer of the division P. C. and Headquarters Troop from Esch to Grevenmacher. Orders were issued that four of the units, which were located in the direction of this new advance, reach their final destinations December 18,⁵⁷ and that Tuesday afternoon the Division Commander made a personal reconnaissance of the region as far as Diekirch, Colmar-Berg, Mersch, and Larochette with a view to ascertaining what facilities for billets were offered.⁵⁸

On Wednesday, December 18, the Engineer Regiment, the Field Signal Battalion and the Train Headquarters and Military Police moved from their former positions to Medernach, Heffingen, and Diekirch respectively, while the rest of

the division remained in its billets, well sheltered from the deluge of rain which continued throughout the day and night.⁵⁹ Having acquired the habit, as it were, of being transferred from one corps or army to another, the passing of the 33rd Division from the Second Army Reserve to the VIth Corps, which took place at noon that day,⁶⁰ scarcely excited comment. Orders were issued for a general movement of all three brigades next day, followed on December 20 by the march of the 66th Brigade and Division Machine Gun Battalion to their ultimate destinations.⁶¹ The principal communication received that day from higher authority was a telegram to the Commanding General of the 33rd Division from the Chief of Staff of the Second Army, the date of which, December 16, 1918, plainly showed delay in transmission. It ran as follows:

15.15 hours period Number 339 G-3 period Instructions will be issued you shortly assigning to your Division an area for guard and police comma including the portion of the American zone within the Duchy of Luxembourg north of the line Remich to Rédange both inclusive period It is desired that your Division be held within that area pending further instructions as to billeting zone to be assigned you period Third Army reports your headquarters are at Grevenmacher period Esch is within billeting area assigned to Fifth Division and is not available for your Division period Acknowledge
HEINTZELMAN.⁶²

The miserable weather of the preceding days continued throughout Thursday, December 19, when the major portion of the 33rd Division advanced into the northern part of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg and occupied the region where it was destined to spend four months. The Division Headquarters were installed at Diekirch, which was likewise occupied by the Headquarters Troop, the 108th Field Signal Battalion, the 108th Train Headquarters and Military Police—the latter having arrived the day before—and by the 108th

Sanitary Train. The 65th Infantry Brigade was located a short distance farther west, its headquarters being established at Ettelbruck, about three kilometers from Diekirch, while farther east Medernach was occupied by the 108th Engineers and Remich by the 55th Field Artillery Brigade. In the territory adjacent to Remich was the 66th Infantry Brigade and at Canach the 122nd Machine Gun Battalion, neither of which made any movement that day.⁶³ The march was devoid of any unusual feature and, indeed, the only event of special importance that Thursday was the brief visit of Lieutenant General Bullard, commanding the Second Army, who reached Diekirch within an hour of General Bell's arrival, held a conference with him, and expressed his approval of the dispositions which had been made for the occupation of the area.⁶⁴

The movement of the 33rd Division into the Diekirch area terminated Friday, December 20, 1918, the various elements of the 65th Infantry Brigade reaching their destinations⁶⁵ and the 66th Infantry Brigade resuming its advance, which carried it from Remich to the region surrounding Schonfels, General Wolf's P. C. being established at the Chateau de Meysembourg.⁶⁶ The southern part of the duchy was occupied by the 5th Division, with headquarters in the city of Luxembourg, and, as reciprocal action between the two commands was essential to carry out the instructions from higher authority, Major General Hanson E. Ely motored to Diekirch for a conference with General Bell and lunched with him that day.⁶⁷ Two important communications were received from the Second Army; one directed the requisite precautions to quell any disturbances which might arise, especially in the neighborhood of Echternach,⁶⁸ and the other instructed General Bell to assume command of the VIth Army Corps.⁶⁹ Frequent requests for food on the part of civilians had already caused the issuance of orders prohibiting

supplies being given to them in view of the agreement between the French and American authorities. There was, apparently, no abatement in these requests, so that definite action was taken by Brigadier General Moseley, G-4 of the American Expeditionary Force, and his specific instructions were published to the 33rd Division in General Order No. 152 on December 20.⁷⁰

From December 21 until the last day of the year the troops were given as much rest as possible and their activities were confined to the ordinary routine duties, a thorough cleaning of all equipment, and such training as was prescribed.⁷¹ As a matter of fact, beginning with Christmas a respite of seven days was enjoyed, in conformity with instructions from the Second Army.⁷² On December 21 General Bell proceeded to Saizerais to assume command of the VIth Corps, but returned for a few hours two days later⁷³ and reported by wire to the Army Commander that the situation in the region of Echternach was well in hand and that no trouble need be apprehended there. The response made that day merely called his attention to the orders from General Headquarters requiring him to "stand ready to suppress any disorders in that vicinity should they occur."⁷⁴ General Bell's tenure of office as Corps Commander was decidedly brief, being cut short by a telegram on December 24 announcing that it had been decided at General Headquarters that "no Corps Commander will be designated" and that the VIth Corps would accordingly function under the immediate command of Lieutenant General Bullard pending the appointment of a corps commander by General Headquarters.⁷⁵

Christmas was a joyous day for the officers and men of the 33rd Division, who found themselves established in unusually comfortable billets in an interesting country, among people who showed remarkable friendliness. On

December 26 it was visited by Lieutenant General Bullard, who was accompanied by his Aide-de-Camp and by Colonel Edgar T. Collins, chief of staff of the VIth Corps.⁷⁶ On the following day orders were received from the Second Army directing the 58th Field Artillery Brigade to rejoin the 33rd Division and detaching the 55th Field Artillery Brigade, which was instructed to join the 28th Division in the area of Woinville.⁷⁷ On December 28, Lieutenant John Pettit, General Todd's aide-de-camp, arrived from Stenay and reported the condition of the 58th Field Artillery Brigade;⁷⁸ the day following notification was received that the movement of that brigade had been delayed,⁷⁹ and on December 31 General Todd arrived in person from Stenay, conferred with General Bell respecting the billets to be occupied by his command upon its arrival, and reported its condition in detail.⁸⁰ That same day notification was received of the reassignment of the 55th Field Artillery Brigade,⁸¹ and the Headquarters of the Second Army issued orders detaching it from the 33rd Division and directing that its movement to join the 28th Division begin on January 6, while the delayed movement of the 58th Field Artillery Brigade was to commence on January 4.⁸²

The opening of the year 1919 found the units of the 33rd Division occupying the positions in the northern part of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, where they were destined to remain for four months.⁸³ Certain minor changes of location were subsequently made and during the first fortnight of January important movements by two brigades occurred, but these will be alluded to at the proper time.⁸⁴

To stimulate interest in the transport of the various organizations a series of horse shows took place, beginning on New Year's Day with an excellent exhibition by the 130th Infantry at Bettendorf. The following day Lieutenant General Bullard, commanding the Second Army, paid a visit to

General Bell,⁸⁵ and two days later announcements were made that a period of training lasting for four weeks would begin on January 6 and that the horse transport of the units would be subjected to a succession of inspections at which the animals, leather, vehicles, and equipment would be marked according to their merit and the ratings of all organizations subsequently published, the purpose being to bring the entire transport of the division to the highest possible standard under the stimulus of competition.⁸⁶ Indeed the month of January, 1919, was characterized by a number of inspections either by officers of the division or by others from the Corps, Army, or General Headquarters, the first of the latter category being made on January 6 and 7 by Colonels James B. Gowen and Lewis W. Cass of the G-5 (Training) Section of General Headquarters.⁸⁷

On January 4, the 58th Field Artillery Brigade (Brigadier General Henry D. Todd, Jr.) began its march from Stenay to rejoin the 33rd Division,⁸⁸ from which it had been separated since the departure of both commands from Camp Logan, Houston, Texas, in May, 1918; and on the day following the 55th Field Artillery Brigade (Brigadier General Oliver L. Spalding, Jr.) started for Woinville to join the 28th Division.⁸⁹ On January 8 the latter had left the division area and the former had arrived,⁹⁰ although it was not until January 10 that all the elements of General Todd's command reached their final destinations and were billeted at Schonfels, Bissen, Lintgen, Berschbach, and Tuntingen.⁹¹ The separation of eight months was terminated at last, to the delight of both commands, and the 58th Field Artillery Brigade returned to its own with an enviable reputation for efficiency, gallantry, initiative, and *esprit de corps* acquired under peculiarly difficult circumstances.

On January 8 an official announcement was received con-

taining the sad news of the death of Theodore Roosevelt, former president of the United States, and that afternoon full honors were paid to his memory.⁹²

The friendliness manifested by the inhabitants of Luxembourg toward the 33rd Division—partly attributable, no doubt, to an appreciation that the prompt arrival of the first American troops had prevented the Grand Duchy from being pillaged indiscriminately by the Germans in their retreat—took a delightful form in a dance given by the people of Diekirch to the officers of the division in the Hotel de l'Europe at Diekirch on the evening of Thursday, January 9. This proved to be a most enjoyable affair, and was the precursor of many other dances given during the ensuing weeks while the 33rd Division remained in that area.⁹³

On January 11, the 66th Infantry Brigade moved from the vicinity of Meysembourg to the region of Echternach, where its headquarters were established.⁹⁴ So far as the troops were concerned the month of January, 1919, was largely devoted to drill, training, and special rifle instruction, varied by terrain exercises and such manoeuvres as the wet weather and restricted areas not under cultivation would permit. Division educational schools were established in the picturesque medieval village of Vianden⁹⁵ and the courses were largely attended by officers and men. Frequent inspections of transport, which were virtually horse shows, were held and the keenest of competition was excited thereby, each unit exerting every possible effort to attain the highest rating. In addition to the division theatrical troupe, similar troupes were organized in the various units and their entertainments afforded abundant diversion and amusement to officers and men alike.⁹⁶

The closing days of the first fortnight in January were marked by the receipt of five telegrams from the Chief of

Staff of the VIth Corps bearing upon certain conditions then existing in Luxembourg; but, inasmuch as they dealt mainly with the internal politics of the Grand Duchy, they are not germane to a purely military history and will not, accordingly, be inserted here.

During the last fortnight in January, 1919, interest was centered principally in the subject of decorations awarded to officers and men of the 33rd Division. Orders were issued on January 19 directing the following soldiers to report to the Adjutant General at General Headquarters on or before January 25 to receive the Medal of Honor:

First Sergeant Johannes S. Anderson, Company B, 132nd Infantry,

First Sergeant Sidney G. Gumpertz, Company C, 132nd Infantry,

Sergeant Willie Sandling, Company A, 132nd Infantry,

Private Berger Loman, Company H, 132nd Infantry,

Private Clayton K. Slack, Company D, 124th Machine Gun Battalion.⁹⁷

These orders were published to the entire command that day.⁹⁸

The same day was also notable for the arrival of Brigadier General C. M. Wagstaff of the British Expeditionary Forces, who had been delegated to present the British decorations awarded by the King of England to certain officers and men of the 131st Infantry for their gallantry at Chipilly Ridge and Gressaire Wood on August 9, 1918, when the attack of that regiment penetrated the German line in the valley of the Somme and gained the first noteworthy success in the great British offensive. He arrived about noon at the Division Headquarters, where the division and brigade commanders were awaiting him, lunched with General Bell, visited several of the units, and dined with the Division Commander, Generals Todd, Wolf, and King being invited to meet him.

On Monday, January 20, at 10 A.M. at the village Larochette, General Wagstaff inspected the 131st Infantry, which was formed on three sides of the principal square. The inspection over, the men who were to receive the decorations were drawn up in line in front of the regimental colors and were addressed by General Wagstaff. In an extremely graceful speech, he expressed to them the thanks of the King who had delegated him to confer the decorations in token of His Majesty's appreciation for what they had done. Colonel Sanborn was then decorated with the Distinguished Service Order and Second Lieutenant George W. Sherwood with the Military Cross; to three men the Distinguished Conduct Medal was given⁹⁹ and fifteen others received the Military Medal.¹⁰⁰ At the termination of the ceremony, General Wagstaff took leave of General Bell and the officers accompanying him and, as his automobile drove away, the band of the 131st Infantry struck up "Auld Lang Syne" in memory of the days when the 33rd Division had fought in the valley of the Somme side by side with its British friends and comrades in arms.¹⁰¹

The last week in January, 1919, was chiefly noteworthy for the issuance of a corrected copy just received from General Headquarters of General Pershing's thanks to the troops which had fought under his command;¹⁰² during the same period orders came from the Headquarters of the VIth Corps defining its area in Luxembourg as well as the areas assigned to the 33rd, 5th, and 7th Divisions and to the French 11th Army Corps.¹⁰³

For the troops the month of February, 1919, was almost the counterpart of January so far as drills, training, and amusement were concerned.¹⁰⁴ Terrain exercises were held by the 66th Infantry Brigade on February 6 and by the 65th Infantry Brigade next day, by the entire division on February 13, by the 129th, 130th, and 131st Infantry a week

later, and by the 132nd on February 21.¹⁰⁵ The third period of training prescribed by General Headquarters began February 3.¹⁰⁶ Two weeks later announcement was made that tactical walks would be substituted for brigade terrain exercises,¹⁰⁷ and on February 27 the schedule of training for March was issued.¹⁰⁸

Interest in schools was greatly stimulated during the month, until the number of officers and men detached from the units and sent to schools of various sorts either within the division or elsewhere reached very large proportions. Mention has already been made of the opening on January 13 of the schools embraced in the Division Training Centre at Vianden.¹⁰⁹ On February 11 announcement was made of the conditions under which officers and men would be permitted to enter French and British universities¹¹⁰ and a considerable number hastened to avail themselves of the opportunity thus offered. On February 25 the scheme of an infantry training school for enlisted men of the ammunition, supply, and sanitary trains and of the transport sections of such of those units as were equipped with animal transport was made known to the command.¹¹¹ Three days later two telegrams from General Headquarters were published, one relating to the American Expeditionary Forces universities for officers and men established at Beaune, Côte d'Or, the other respecting officers and men qualified to act as instructors in these institutions, and announcement was made that all applications either to attend these universities or to act as instructors must be delivered to G-3 by noon on March 4.¹¹² The number who made application further depleted many units, capping the climax which had been reached on February 22 when, pursuant to instructions from the VIth Corps, 28 officers and 29 enlisted men, all but one sergeants or corporals, were ordered to report on February 24 to General Bjornstad at Ménil-la-Tour, France, for a

course of instruction at Royaumeix, Meurthe-et-Moselle, in a new species of game called "Doughboy."¹¹³

The month of February, 1919, was characterized by a number of other events of sufficient importance to merit chronicling. On February 1 a report made on January 4 by Major M. B. Southwick, commanding the 122nd Machine Gun Battalion, on the subject of the condition of the motor transport issued to his battalion, was forwarded to the Army Commander by General Bell; in his indorsement to this report the latter gave a succinct but striking account of the motor transport of the division, pointing out the difficulties encountered in his constant endeavor to keep it in the best possible state.¹¹⁴ Since good motor transport is vital to proper functioning of any command in the field, the reader who is interested in this extremely important auxiliary will find both the report and the indorsement given in full in appendix 38.

On February 3, Major M. B. Southwick was designated as Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, to replace Major Waring, who had been ordered to the United States for discharge.¹¹⁵ There was also published to the command a telegram from General Cronkhite expressing his congratulations on the excellence of the theatrical troupe of the 33rd Division and requesting that the appreciation of the Headquarters of the VIth Corps be conveyed to the members of the troupe for the "splendid performance" given at Villerupt; to this the Division Commander added his own felicitations.¹¹⁶ On February 4 General Bell assumed command of the VIth Corps, which he retained two weeks while General Cronkhite was absent on leave.¹¹⁷ On February 7 orders were issued by that corps defining the modifications in its area and in that of the 33rd Division, which were to go into effect two days later.¹¹⁸

So successful had been the results obtained from the competition between the various units in the rating of their

animal transport¹¹⁹ that the Division Commander resolved to apply the same method to the troops themselves with a view to attaining the highest possible standard in their appearance, the condition of their equipment, and their knowledge of the School of the Soldier. To that end instructions were issued on February 12¹²⁰ for the necessary inspections and for the system of marking to be used.¹²¹

On February 20 announcement was made that the shortage in hay had become critical, since there was only a week's supply in all France, and that the hay rations would accordingly be reduced one-half.¹²² Three days later the following letter and the indorsement by which it was forwarded were published to the division "in recognition of its work in the Verdun Sector while it formed a part of the IIIrd (American) Corps:"

HEADQUARTERS SECOND ARMY
AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES
OFFICE OF COMMANDING GENERAL

18th February, 1919.

From: LIEUTENANT GENERAL R. L. BULLARD,
To: MAJOR GENERAL GEORGE BELL, JR., Command-
ing 33rd Division
(Through Commanding General, VI Corps).
Subject: Commendation of the Commanding General, 33rd
Division, and of his Division.

1. I desire to make of record the fact that as Commanding General of the III Corps in the battle of the Meuse-Argonne I repeatedly took occasion between September 26, and October 7, to commend in high terms your own command of the 33rd Division and the valiant and efficient conduct of that Division in the great battle in which you were taking part at that time. Every duty, every mission assigned to you and to your Division was executed with zeal, skill, smoothness and valor that deserved the highest commendation. I so stated to you at that time, as you will remember, but you and your Division on October 7 were unexpectedly to me detached from the III Corps. I then expected and hoped that in a few

days you would be returned to my Command and that I would have opportunity then to commend the conduct of your Division in this battle; but I myself was separated from this Command unexpectedly a few days later and this opportunity thus never came. I take it now.

I would appreciate it, if you will communicate this to your Division.

R. L. BULLARD,
Lieut. General, U. S. A.,
Commanding 2nd Army.¹²³

RLB:s

201.1-Commendations. Ist Ind.

HDQRS. VI ARMY CORPS. APO 783, AMERICAN E. F.,

20 February 1919,—

To the COMMANDING GENERAL, 33rd Division, American E. F.

1. It gives me great pleasure to forward this acknowledgment of the service rendered by your division, knowing that the commendation has been justly earned.

The esprit which enabled the accomplishment of such marked success in active service, still maintains the division, in time of peace, at a standard of efficiency excelled by none.

A. CRONKHITE,
Major General, U. S. A.,
Commanding.

Two days later the following communication was made known to the command:

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES

G-5
HRR

FRANCE, February 17th, 1919.

15924-A 139

From: THE ADJUTANT GENERAL, American E. F.,
To: THE COMMANDING GENERAL, 2nd Army,
Subject: Condition of the animals and transport of the 33rd
Division.

1. In connection with a general inspection and supervision of the instruction of the divisions of the A. E. F. in matters pertaining to the care of animals and the upkeep of leather equipment and the transport, the Staff Officer at these Headquarters charged with this duty, reports as follows:

"The 33rd Division was inspected December fifth. There was a well organized system of supervision of the care of animals, a sympathetic attention to their every need in such matters as grooming, feeding, watering, shelter, shoeing and standings, which began with the Division Commander and extended through all the grades down to the riders and drivers. The Division Commander was familiar with every detail of this important phase of instruction and administration in his command, very especially with the efforts of all concerned to ameliorate conditions and the difficulties encountered by them. Great credit is due him personally for the splendid state of affairs in his Division on that date, (December 5th, 1918)—which stood as a perfect model of the standards that ought to exist in these matters throughout the army."

2. The regiment inspected was the 130th Infantry, Colonel John V. Clinnin, Commanding.

By Command of General PERSHING:

J. M. WOOLFOLK,
Adjutant General.¹²⁴

On Thursday, February 27, 1919, the horse show of the 33rd Division took place in the principal square of Diekirch, beginning at one o'clock in the afternoon. In spite of the cold and a downpour of rain, the affair was a remarkable success, and was rendered doubly interesting by the presence of Her Royal Highness, the Grand Duchess of Luxembourg, and a number of members of her immediate suite, who were received with full honors, conducted by Colonel Henry A. Allen of the 108th Engineers from their automobiles through an avenue formed by the Guard of Honor to the place where General Bell, accompanied by Generals Todd and King and certain officers of his staff, welcomed them and escorted them to their boxes. Somewhat later they were followed by the Corps Commander, the Chief of Staff of the Second Army, General Bullard's Aide-de-Camp, and Colonel Henry R. Richmond, from General Headquarters.¹²⁵ The horse show was managed with exceptional ability by Lieutenant Colonel Frank

R. Schwengel of the 122nd Field Artillery and the officers acting under his supervision,¹²⁶ the awards of the judges received universal approval and the affair was enlivened by music furnished by combined bands and trumpeters of the three brigades massed in different places outside the ring. At the conclusion of the last class, the "Major General George Bell, Jr., Trophy," a handsome miniature bronze statue of Napoleon, given for the best team of six horses shown to a *fourgon*, was formally presented by the Division Commander to Colonel Foreman as the representative of the Headquarters Company of the 122nd Field Artillery by which it had been won.¹²⁷ The brigade bands were then massed in front of the boxes and played the national anthem, while the Grand Duchess, escorted by General Bell and General Cronkhite, proceeded through the lines of the Guard of Honor to the adjoining street where her automobile was awaiting.¹²⁸

The drills and training of the troops during the month of March, 1919, repeated in large part the experiences of February.¹²⁹ There were a number of terrain exercises, the principal one, in which the entire division participated, taking place on March 28.¹³⁰ The matter of schools was paramount throughout the month and formed the subject of a large number of circulars and orders. On March 4 Major George E. Roth, of the 58th Field Artillery Brigade Headquarters, was appointed Division Education Officer and as such assumed charge of the 33rd Division Educational Centre at Vianden.¹³¹ Every Saturday a detail of enlisted men was sent to the Division Infantry School at Redingen,¹³² where a sanitary school was in addition inaugurated on March 17,¹³³ and a riding and driving school was established at Dommeldigen under the supervision of the commander of the Headquarters Troop.¹³⁴ There were post and division schools, a motor mechanics' school, a school for illiterates,¹³⁵ and so many others that the

division was rapidly coming to resemble an English university in the number and variety of its schools. The attendance was not confined to schools within the division; on March 10, 148 men were sent to the American Expeditionary Forces University at Beaune, Côte d'Or, France, as students, followed by one officer and five men as instructors; a week later a number of officers left for the Second Army School for the Care and Management of Animals; and at the end of the month other officers were sent to the Army Artillery School at Valdahon.¹³⁶

Great numbers of leaves to enlisted men—especially the so-called "Class C" leave¹³⁷ of three days in Paris, exclusive of travel—continued to be granted.¹³⁸ Every effort was made to stimulate entertainment,¹³⁹ and the division theatrical troupe achieved a notable success in Paris, where it played for several weeks to houses crowded to overflowing. On March 20, the VIth Corps held a horse show in the city of Luxembourg at which the 33rd Division carried off the honors, winning more prizes than the 5th or 7th Division or the Corps Troops.¹⁴⁰ The horse show of the Second Army had to be called off on account of the transfer of the divisions composing that army,¹⁴¹ but on March 27 the 33rd Division held a very successful motor transport show at Diekirch.¹⁴²

A number of events occurred during the month which deserve special mention. On the first, information was received by telegraph from the Chief of Staff of the VIth Corps that, in conformity with Marshal Foch's arrangements, the entire Belgian territory embraced between the British zone on the north, the American zone on the south, the Luxembourg frontier on the east, and the French frontier on the west would be turned over to the Belgian army, thus bringing that army and the American forces into juxtaposition.¹⁴³ On March 4, Lieutenant General Bullard arrived for a conference with

General Bell, spent the night at Diekirch, and left next day for Toul.¹⁴⁴ On March 9, the following letter was published to the division:¹⁴⁵

HEADQUARTERS SECOND ARMY
AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES,
OFFICE COMMANDING GENERAL.

3 March, 1919.

From: COMMANDING GENERAL, Second Army.
To: COMMANDING GENERAL, 33rd Division.
Subject: Horse Show.

1. The reports that have come to me of the splendid success of your Divisional Horse Show at Diekirch last Thursday, 27th February, have given me the greatest pleasure.

2. Please accept my congratulations for yourself and all officers and men of your Command, not only on the zeal and efficiency with which the show was managed and the generally creditable appearance and high class of all exhibits and exhibitors, but also on the magnificent appearance of your chosen Guard of Honor and the military smartness of all concerned. The show was in itself proof of thorough and far-seeing plans well made and of a most praiseworthy attention to details.

3. It was truly a task well done and my only regret is that I could not have been personally present.

(Signed) R. L. BULLARD
Lieutenant General, U. S. A.

On the evening of Monday, March 10,¹⁴⁶ boxing and wrestling matches for the championship of the VIth Corps were held at Esch and a large number of officers and men took advantage of the special train provided to carry them to Esch.¹⁴⁷ On March 12 the ratings of the various units as established by the inspections of their horse transport were announced, the highest being that of the 33rd Military Police Company, with a total of 279.48 out of a possible 300.¹⁴⁸ The same day unit commanders were directed to report when all precautions had been taken to prevent explosives of any sort from coming into the possession of unauthorized persons.¹⁴⁹

On March 13, orders were issued that all historical documents no longer needed be forwarded through channels to the Historical Section at General Headquarters; similar action was to be taken in the case of one copy of all histories of regiments or other organizations, the writing of which, it was stated, was encouraged by the Division Commander, and it was suggested that units which had not already undertaken such a work do so at an early date.¹⁵⁰

Awards of decorations—American, British, and French—to officers and men of the 33rd Division had been made in constantly increasing numbers during the months of January, February, and March, and the presentation of Medals of Honor to five men at Chaumont on February 10 has already been mentioned.¹⁵¹ On March 17, the Division Commander officially published four letters from the Adjutant General containing the citations upon which the Medal of Honor had been awarded to the following men, Captain George H. Mallon, 132nd Infantry, Corporal Ralyn Hill, Company H, 129th Infantry, Corporal Jake Alex, Company H, 131st Infantry, and Corporal Thomas A. Pope, Company E, 131st Infantry, and announced that on that date nine Medals of Honor had been granted to members of the 33rd Division.¹⁵²

The last event of importance during March was the announcement made on March 29 that the division, as part of the VIth Corps, would be transferred to the Third Army on the first of April.¹⁵³

The month of April, 1919, was noteworthy for a number of events of vital interest to the officers and men of the 33rd Division. On the last day of March the troops began their final period of training under the conditions prescribed by General Headquarters;¹⁵⁴ on April 16 a divisional competition in rifle and pistol shooting was held for the purpose of

developing individual entrants for the American Expeditionary Forces matches;¹⁵⁵ on the following day a competition between infantry platoons from the 65th and 66th Infantry Brigades took place at the rifle range of the 130th Infantry at Erpeldingen; machine gun matches were held in each infantry brigade and in the 122nd Machine Gun Battalion; and in addition individuals were selected from each infantry regiment to compete at the automatic rifle match at Le Mans.¹⁵⁶

As in the preceding months, the various schools were the object of much attention. On April 1, announcement was made of the courses in mechanical trades given at different plants under the supervision of the Services of Supply; the next day the status of the post schools were reported to G-3 of the VIth Corps; on April 3 a telegram was sent to the Third Army specifying that there were three hundred applicants for the courses in mechanical trades at service of supply plants; on April 5 announcement was made that instruction in the preparation of food would be given to mess sergeants and cooks—a thing sadly needed in the American army;¹⁵⁷ and on April 7 the scope of the Division Education Office was extended and applications were solicited from officers and men desiring employment in civil life upon their discharge from military service.¹⁵⁸ On April 8, however, orders were suddenly issued directing the dissolution of the Division Training Centre at Vianden, the Sanitary School at Redingen, and the Riding and Driving School at Dommeldingen on the following day, and the discontinuance of the Infantry Training School at Redingen on April 10.¹⁵⁹

During the course of the month several important movements of troops occurred. On April 3, the 272nd Military Police Company, having been detached from the VIth Corps on March 31, left the division area by truck for Longwy, where its arrival was reported to the Provost Marshal of the

Second Army.¹⁶⁰ The receipt, on April 4, of a notification that the Headquarters of the VIth Corps would occupy Echternach caused the evacuation of that place by the headquarters of the 66th Infantry Brigade, which was transferred to Dommeldingen at 3 P.M. on April 7, while the 1st Battalion of the 108th Engineers and the Engineer Train were moved from Echternach to Remich, with the exception of Company B, which was ordered to Steinsel. Companies B and C of the 131st Infantry likewise evacuated Wasserbillig and Grevenmacher and were billeted in or near Wormeldingen. The 130th Ambulance Company was directed to proceed from Echternach to Steinsel on April 11, but a notification, received April 10, that the transfer of the Corps Headquarters was not to be effected caused a revocation of this order.¹⁶¹ On April 14, seven service of supply units, which had been on duty with the division, were detached to the Third Army,¹⁶² but three days later, the transfer of Mobile Veterinary Section 110 having been revoked by the Third Army, it was instructed to rejoin the division preparatory to returning to the United States.¹⁶³ On April 15 came a telegram from the advanced embarkation section containing the welcome news that the movement of the 33rd Division to Brest¹⁶⁴ would commence on April 24.¹⁶⁵

On April 10, orders were received from the Third Army transferring the 33rd Division from that army and from the VIth Corps to the service of supply on April 12, and this information was published to the command next day,¹⁶⁶ together with the announcement that although there would be no cessation in the training, it would be subordinated to the preparations for embarkation.¹⁶⁷ In view of the approaching departure, dispositions had necessarily to be taken to relieve the detachments guarding various dumps of ammunition and

other material, so that several reports were made and orders issued respecting them.¹⁶⁸

During the month the decorations awarded to officers and men of the division formed the subject of keen interest. On the morning of Sunday, April 6, General Desticker, first assistant chief of staff of Marshal Foch, arrived at Diekirch and formally presented the Croix de Guerre of various classes to nine officers and twenty-five men of the 33rd Division.¹⁶⁹ On April 10 the announcement was made of the posthumous award of a Distinguished Service Cross to Corporal Victor A. Cleveland, Company L, 130th Infantry, for "extraordinary heroism in action in the Bois-de-Chaume, France, October 12, 1918," where he was killed in the endeavor to rescue a wounded officer.¹⁷⁰ On April 16 the Division Commander published the War Department citations whereby Distinguished Service Crosses were granted to Captain Fred G. Givens, Corporals Herman B. Bartels and Vincenzo Caserta of Company F, and Private (first-class) Elmer J. Kilcher of Company D, all of the 130th Infantry.¹⁷¹

During the early part of April, there was distributed to every officer and man a printed pamphlet of thirty-two pages entitled *33rd Division, A. E. F.*, giving in condensed form the history of the command¹⁷² and accompanied by a short introduction by General Bell.¹⁷³ During the course of the month,¹⁷⁴ the Division Commander reviewed the 66th Infantry Brigade at Junglinster on April 9 and the 65th Infantry Brigade at Ettelbruck on the following day;¹⁷⁵ on April 11, the VIth Corps held a motor show at Luxembourg, in which the 33rd Division carried off the premier honors;¹⁷⁶ and at the International Horse Show, which formed part of the "Carnival" given by the Third Army at Coblenz, Germany, April 23-27, the 33rd—which was the only entrant as a division—was

awarded second place, scoring a total of twenty-eight points to the winner's thirty-two.¹⁷⁷

That the Commander-in-Chief made a practice of inspecting and reviewing divisions before their departure for the United States was generally known among all the troops and in February it was ascertained that the 33rd Division was destined to follow the 42nd and 32nd Divisions to the port of embarkation.¹⁷⁸ Preparations for a review had been begun on April 9¹⁷⁹ and were accordingly well under way when, on April 16, a telegram was received from General Headquarters announcing that the Commander-in-Chief would inspect and review the 33rd Division on Monday, April 21.¹⁸⁰ The final arrangements were completed forty-eight hours before his arrival, a day later than originally expected.

This event was one of the notable episodes in the history of the 33rd Division. On the afternoon of Tuesday, April 22, 1919, at Ettelbruck in the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Commander-in-Chief of the American Expeditionary Forces in France, General John J. Pershing, reviewed the entire 33rd Division in the presence of a large assembly; among the spectators were such distinguished personages as His Royal Highness the Crown Prince Leopold of Belgium, the Honorable Newton D. Baker, secretary of war, and Major General Kepel-Bethel of the British Expeditionary Forces. The troops presented a magnificent appearance and excited unusual praise. At the termination of the review, the Commander-in-Chief personally presented to each officer and man the decoration awarded to him. To Major General George Bell, Jr., the division commander, and Brigadier General Paul A. Wolf, commanding the 66th Infantry Brigade, were given the Distinguished Service Medal;¹⁸¹ to Sergeant Jake Alex, 131st Infantry, Sergeant Ralyn Hill, 129th Infantry, and Corporal Thomas A. Pope, the coveted Medal of Honor; and the Dis-

tinguished Service Cross was presented to twenty-two officers and eighty-one enlisted men. During this presentation Secretary Baker strolled about the command inspecting or asking questions of various officers and men. At the conclusion of the ceremony, General Pershing and the members of his party left for Trèves.

Late that same evening General Order No. 50 was issued, specifying the decorations bestowed and the name, grade, and organization of each recipient. It also announced that the British Commander-in-Chief had awarded the Military Medal to two officers and two men of the division; that the Commander of the French Armies of the East had conferred the Croix de Guerre upon three officers and one man; that His Majesty, the King of the Belgians, had bestowed the Belgian Cross (Chevalier de l'Ordre de la Couronne) upon one officer; and that, by direction of the Commander-in-Chief, streamers would be placed upon the colors of the four infantry regiments, the 108th Engineers, the three machine gun battalions, the 108th Field Signal Battalion, and the three regiments of the 58th Field Artillery Brigade.¹⁸²

That the Commander-in-Chief had found conditions to his liking is attested by the letter that he wrote next day, which, in its corrected form,¹⁸³ ran as follows:

AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES.
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF.

FRANCE, April 23, 1919.

MAJOR GENERAL GEORGE BELL,
Commanding 33rd Division,
American E. F.

MY DEAR GENERAL BELL:

It afforded me great satisfaction to inspect the 33rd Division at Ettelbruck on April 22nd, and to extend at that time, to the officers and men of your command my congratulations on their fine appearance and appreciation of their splendid record while in France.

The Division has had an interesting and varied battle experience. One of those to be schooled with the British Expeditionary forces, it arrived in France towards the end of May, 1918, where it trained with the 4th Army. Although, as a Division, it did not enter the line here, yet the majority of the organizations had hard fighting experience before they left the British Sector. On July 4, parts of the 131st and 132nd Regiments of Infantry, brigaded with Australian troops, successfully attacked Hamel and the Hamel and Vaire woods. On August 9, the 131st Infantry, under the 58th British Division, successfully attacked Chipilly Ridge and the Gressaire Woods, an operation made especially difficult by the character of the terrain. Towards the end of August the division joined the First American Army in the Toul Sector, remaining in reserve until September 5th. On September 10th, it relieved a French Division in the Blercourt area, southwest of Verdun. It took part in the opening of the great Meuse-Argonne offensive, capturing the Bois de Forges, and occupying the sector facing the Meuse River. Beginning with October 8th, it participated in the operations east of the Meuse, pressing vigorous attacks on the 11th, 12th, 13th in the vicinity of Consenvoie and the Bois de Chaume and the Bois de Plat Chêne. It remained astride of the Meuse until it was relieved on October 21st, during which entire period it was constantly subjected to heavy artillery and machine gun fire from the heights of the west bank, and was continually in action. On October 26th, it re-entered the line in the Troyon Sector where it took part in the attack of the Second Army, driving the enemy from the towns of St. Hilaire and Marchéville and occupying the towns of Butgnéville and Riaville. The Division was advancing when hostilities ended with the Armistice.

It is gratifying to see your troops in such good physical shape and still more to know that the moral tone of all ranks is so high. I believe that they will return with this high standard to perform in the same way whatever tasks may lie before them in civil life. They should go home proud of themselves and of the part they have played, and conscious of the respect and admiration of their comrades throughout the American Expeditionary Forces,

Sincerely yours,
JOHN J. PERSHING.

On April 23, the hearts of all ranks of the 33rd Division were gladdened by the issuance of Field Order No. 39, which opened with the following announcement:

This Div. with attached units moves to Brest, France, for return to the U. S. Div. will entrain commencing 24th Apr. Entraining stations, Mersch and Ettelbruck. The move will be made by rail; duration of journey, three days.¹⁸⁴

It was not until April 25, however, that the first trains were available and that the leading units started for Brest. This operation was continued throughout the six days terminating on April 30, and by the first day of May the entire 33rd Division had left the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg,¹⁸⁵ where it had spent more than four months—a sojourn so filled with charming memories of the kindness and hospitality received from the inhabitants and of the friendships formed that it made the parting painful in spite of the delight at being homeward bound.

The journey to the port of embarkation was without particular incident and the stay at Brest was devoid of interesting features save for the ceremony which took place on May 7, when Vice Admiral Moreau conferred the Legion of Honor upon Generals Bell, Wolf, and King, and Colonel Sanborn,¹⁸⁶ and for the receipt of the following letter:

FRENCH REPUBLIC.

THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL
Minister of War.

PARIS, the 5th May, 1919.

TO THE GENERAL COMMANDING THE 33RD DIVISION.
MY DEAR GENERAL,

At the hour when the 33rd Division is embarking for the United States, I am thinking with gratitude of the battles in which it has been engaged and displayed so much valor.

After having seen its initial service with our British Allies, it was near Verdun that the 33rd Division first came under fire with its French comrades. The capture of the Bois

de Forges, on the 27th of September, revealed its dash. Several days later, at the Bois de Chaume, the 8th of October, the 33rd Division asserted its tenacity in repulsing by stubborn counter-attacks the enemy who was endeavoring in vain to re-take the ground lost.

Of this spirit of enterprise your Division again gave an example during the last days before the Armistice when it was at the heels of the adversary in retreat.

We shall treasure in memory the exploits of your splendid soldiers. I here tender to them the expression of the gratitude of the Government of the Republic, which unites in the same thought of thankfulness the living and the dead.

Believe, my dear General, in the assurance of my very devoted sentiments.

For the PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL
and by his order,

The Commissioner-General of the
Franco-American War Affairs.

ANDRÉ TARDIEU.

PRESIDENCY OF THE COUNCIL

(Seal)

Com. Gen. of F. A. W. A.

The embarkation began on May 9, when the Division Commander, together with his Staff, the 132nd Infantry, and the 122nd and 124th Machine Gun Battalions, sailed in the *Mount Vernon*.¹⁸⁷ The other units followed in rapid succession¹⁸⁸ and on May 18 the last transport carrying troops of the 33rd Division left Brest.¹⁸⁹

The homeward voyage was without unusual incident and on the morning of Saturday, May 17, 1919, the *Mount Vernon* entered New York Bay. On this day General Order No. 54, quoting the letters from General Pershing and Monsieur André Tardieu, was issued and a printed copy was given to every officer and man of the command.¹⁹⁰ At Staten Island the ship was met by a delegation of Illinois officials, headed by Governor Lowden, who in behalf of the people of the state welcomed the 33rd Division home. Upon reaching Hoboken,

the troops were promptly disembarked and proceeded to Camp Mills, Long Island.¹⁹¹ That afternoon a reception to General Bell was given by the women of the Illinois Welcome Committee at 107 East 34th Street, New York, and on the following morning the leading newspapers of Chicago, New York, the principal cities of the east and indeed all over the country published long accounts of the "Prairie Division" and its splendid achievements. During the following week, General Bell spent three days in Washington on official business but rejoined the troops before the departure of the first contingent on May 25.

Notwithstanding every effort on the part of Governor Lowden and other Illinois officials, the War Department refused permission for a review of the entire division but consented to three smaller reviews to be held as the successive increments reached Chicago. The dates of these reviews and the troops participating in them were as follows:

Tuesday, May 27, 1919:

Division Headquarters (Major General George Bell, Jr.),

Headquarters Troop (Captain Herbert W. Styles),
65th Infantry Brigade Headquarters (Brigadier General Edward L. King),

132nd Infantry (Colonel Abel Davis),
130th Infantry (Colonel John V. Clinnin),
124th Machine Gun Battalion (Major Floyd F. Putnam),

123rd Machine Gun Battalion (Major Albert L. Culbertson),

122nd Machine Gun Battalion (Captain E. C. Daly),
Railhead Detachment (First Lieutenant
108th Mobile Ordnance Repair Shop Clay M. Donner).

Monday, June 2, 1919:

66th Infantry Brigade Headquarters,
131st Infantry (Colonel Joseph B. Sanborn),

129th Infantry (Colonel Edgar A. Myer),
108th Train Headquarters and Military Police (Colonel Charles D. Center),
108th Ammunition Train (Lieutenant Colonel Walter A. Fisher),
108th Supply Train (Major William Hendrie).

Thursday, June 5, 1919:

58th Field Artillery Brigade Headquarters (Brigadier General Henry D. Todd, Jr.),
122nd Field Artillery (Colonel Milton J. Foreman),
123rd Field Artillery (Colonel Charles G. Davis),
124th Field Artillery (Lieutenant Colonel Joseph A. Rogers),
108th Engineers (Colonel Henry A. Allen),
108th Engineer Train (First Lieutenant Magnus P. Thompson),
108th Field Signal Battalion (Major Milan A. Loosley),
108th Sanitary Train (Lieutenant Colonel George C. Amerson).

Upon detraining at various stations in Chicago,¹⁹² the troops in each instance marched to Grant Park, where a reception, lasting an hour and a half or more, was held by their relatives. At 11 A.M. began the parade, headed in each case by General Bell and his Staff and reviewed by the Governor of Illinois from a stand erected at the Art Institute on Michigan Avenue.¹⁹³ Never in the history of the state have Illinois troops been given such a welcome as that which marked these three processions; their line of march was ablaze with flags and decorations of every sort and the enthusiasm of the crowds which packed the streets beggared description. The troops, wearing service uniforms and trench helmets—marked with the yellow cross, the insignia of the 33rd Division—and equipped with rifles, bayonets, and light packs, presented a magnificent appearance. Each parade was followed by ban-

quets for the officers and men at the "Loop" hotels, and during the afternoon the troops entrained and proceeded to Camp Grant, Rockford, Illinois.¹⁹⁴

At that camp all officers and men who were not of the Regular Establishment and who had not expressed a desire to remain in the Army were speedily and "honorably discharged" from the military service of the United States. Before the end of June, 1919, this demobilization had been completed and the "Prairie Division" passed into history.

XI. CONCLUSION

In certain respects the 33rd Division was unique. It was the only division in the American Expeditionary Forces in Europe—and, therefore, in American history—which fought with, and under, the British, the Americans, and the French. It was the first American division to be engaged along with the British in a battle of any magnitude,¹ and the first to fight by the side of the Australian troops.² It was the only American division to have its officers and men decorated by the King of England in person.

During its twelve months in Europe, the 33rd Division served in five armies and twelve army corps, in some of them more than once.³ It was the sixteenth of the American divisions to reach France, and was one of the twenty-nine combat divisions.⁴ In the number of kilometers advanced against the enemy, it has been officially rated as the ninth among the American divisions; in the number of prisoners captured, it was placed fourth; in the number of its own troops killed in action, it was the twentieth on the list; and in the number of its wounded, it was ranked the twelfth—⁵these last two classifications affording proof of the skill with which it was handled in battle.⁶ The German High Command evidently considered it decidedly efficient since they included it among the five American divisions which they rated as "first-class."

From June 22 until November 11, 1918, a period of nearly five months in which was included the long movement by rail from the British front to the Toul sector,⁷ there were only eighteen days when the 33rd Division, in whole or in

part, was not actually occupying a portion of the Allied line on the western front. Apart from minor operations such as Hamel, it participated in the beginning of the British Somme offensive, of which the first notable success was achieved by the 131st Infantry at Chipilly Ridge and Gressaire Wood on August 9, 1918. It was originally destined to take an active part in the St. Mihiel offensive commencing on September 12 but was subsequently placed in reserve in that major operation. In the Meuse-Argonne battle, it was actively engaged and held a portion of the American front-line trenches from September 26 until the armistice, except for the two days which elapsed between its withdrawal from the Verdun sector and its occupation of the Troyon-sur-Meuse sector.⁸ Upon its departure from the British front, after three months of training and fighting there, General Sir Henry Rawlinson, commanding the Fourth British Army, prophesied that it would "render brilliant service to the Allied cause wherever . . . employed as a fighting Division in the face of the enemy."⁹ In the Meuse-Argonne battle, every mission intrusted to it was—to quote the words of Lieutenant General Bullard—"executed with zeal, skill, smoothness and valor that deserved the highest commendation."¹⁰ Never once in all its desperate fighting did the 33rd Division appeal for reënforcements or help. It was the boast of the soldiers of the 33rd that they were never given an order in battle which they did not execute and that they were never assigned an objective which they did not take on scheduled time. Their claim is justified by the facts.

Perfection, particularly in war, is beyond human power to attain; nevertheless, in the 33rd Division the machinery functioned and was able at all times to cope with the situation, no matter how difficult. Throughout its active operations there were very few occasions when the men in the trenches were not fed hot meals. Rations were always furnished in

abundance, even under the most critical circumstances, and the supply of artillery and small-arms ammunition never ran short of requirements.

The death rate in the 33rd Division while at Camp Logan was the lowest in the American army. In Europe, its health rate was among the very highest in the American Expeditionary Forces. During active operations it was conspicuous for its care and management of the sick and wounded.

The discipline and spirit in the 33rd Division were of the highest order. From the date of its departure from Texas until the armistice—a period of nearly six months—no enlisted man was tried by a general court-martial and only two officers were thus tried—an enviable record for any command of similar size.

It is a well-known maxim in war that the infantry constitutes the backbone of an army. Irresistible in attack, tenacious to the last degree in defense, efficient in everything it undertook, the infantry of the 33rd Division proved itself superb. Hamel, Chipilly Ridge, and Gressaire Wood, the Bois de Forges, the Bois de Chaume, the Bois Plat-Chêne, and the successes in its operations during the last days before the armistice are achievements which will long endure in the history of American arms.

On the British front, the 33rd Division was supported by British and Australian artillery; at Verdun, by the 52nd Field Artillery Brigade (Brigadier General George Albert Wingate), belonging to the 27th Division; and in the Troyon-sur-Meuse sector by the 55th Field Artillery Brigade (Brigadier General J. W. Kilbreth), of the 30th Division. For loyalty, team play, and service efficiently rendered, these artillery units earned the deepest gratitude of the infantry whose operations they so effectually protected. The 58th Field Artillery Brigade, under Brigadier General Henry D. Todd, Jr.,

formed part of the 33rd Division but was separated from it during the eight months following its departure from Camp Logan. After a period of training at Valdahon and Ornans, this brigade fought with four different divisions¹¹ and was subsequently attached to a fifth.¹² It was not until January 10, 1919, that it rejoined the 33rd Division in Luxembourg to the delight of both commands, having acquired a most enviable record for efficiency, gallantry, initiative, and *esprit de corps*.

The machine gun units in the 33rd Division were conspicuous for their energy, resourcefulness, and originality. They were the first in this war to make use of a machine-gun barrage to neutralize the enemy nests in a wood while the infantry turned the position.¹³ The manner in which their machine guns were kept in the very front of the infantry during the various attacks was extraordinary. In no two operations did they employ the same method, with the result that the enemy was constantly at a loss to know how to meet them—a fact repeatedly attested by the prisoners captured. To their daring and originality are to be attributed in large measure the remarkable successes achieved by these units.

The 108th Engineers proved themselves one of the most efficient organizations of that arm of the service in the American Expeditionary Forces. Indefatigable, resourceful, always a model of cheerfulness, and eager to undertake any task no matter how difficult, every mission intrusted to them was performed with signal ability and thoroughness. Apart from innumerable other tasks, their construction of the bridges at Brabant and Consenvoye on October 8, 1918, was an extraordinary feat. Indeed, in everything they undertook they fully earned the Division Commander's encomium that "the work of the 108th Engineers has been magnificent."

The 108th Field Signal Battalion, the signal corps, and

liaison detachments belonging or attached to the various units, and the 108th Train Headquarters and Military Police all showed remarkable efficiency and deserve high praise for the manner in which they rendered their excellent service.

To the officers and men of the 108th Engineer Train, the 108th Supply Train, the 108th Sanitary Train, and the ammunition trains serving with the 33rd Division—especially to the truck and ambulance drivers—the highest possible credit is due. In the blackness of the night, in rain and storm, without lights to guide their way, often under shell fire of the heaviest sort, and subjected to hardships untold, their difficult tasks were performed with a fidelity, zeal, and courage for which no praise is too great. Without the excitement which stimulates the fighting man, denied the glamor with which his deeds are always invested, through their splendid devotion to duty they rendered a service without which the efforts of the fighting men would have been in vain.

Equally meritorious was the work of the officers and men of the 108th Sanitary Train, the field hospitals, and ambulance companies, particularly those at the dressing stations and in the ambulances. By their self-sacrifice and steadfast adherence to duty under the most trying circumstances many a life was saved and the sufferings of many a wounded man were alleviated. The stretcher-bearers, too—many of them bandsmen who were employed or who volunteered for this dangerous service—showed a devotion and heroism often unrewarded but none the less superb.

In the 33rd Division the officers of the staff were at all times imbued with a realization that their rôle was wholly and solely that of servants of the fighting men. Frequently worked to the limit of human endurance, confronted by obstacles apparently insurmountable, they labored unceasingly for the welfare of the troops. Whatever their shortcomings,

their functions were performed in such a manner as to elicit from the French Corps Commander at Verdun¹⁴—who had abundant opportunity to test them under distinctly critical conditions—the declaration that “General Bell had an excellent Staff” and that its work was “most satisfactory.”¹⁵ The Division Staff is indebted for a large measure of this success to the army field clerks and the enlisted men attached to the various staff departments, who never failed them under any circumstances.

To the British and French officers and men who acted as instructors at Camp Logan, and to those who were attached to the division in Europe, the utmost gratitude is due for the inestimable service rendered by them which contributed so much toward developing the efficiency of the command.

No relations could have been more cordial, more amicable, or more satisfactory than those which prevailed between the 33rd Division on one hand and, on the other, the officers and other ranks of the British and French forces with which it served and fought on the Somme, at Verdun, and in the St. Mihiel salient. The kindness, consideration, invaluable training, timely suggestions, and never-failing assistance received at their hands, coupled with genial comradeship, created mutual admiration and affection which rarely failed to ripen into lasting friendships. In those brief months ties were cemented which will endure for the good of the world during generations to come.

As was the case with their Allies and other American troops, the bravery displayed by the officers and men of the 33rd Division was often sublime. Every meritorious case was recommended for a suitable decoration, but a large number of officers and men were refused by the Decorations Section at General Headquarters the recognition to which, after thorough investigation, it was considered in the division that

they were justly entitled. Three hundred and eighty officers and men were, however, rewarded with decorations of various sorts, American and foreign.¹⁶ Of these the most coveted was the Congressional Medal of Honor, which is conferred for extraordinary heroism only. During the war, seventy-eight Medals of Honor were granted by the American military authorities, sixteen of these being posthumous awards; of the sixty-two conferred upon living men, nine were bestowed upon officers and men of the 33rd Division—a number exceeded by only one other division in the American Expeditionary Forces.¹⁷

In efficiency, gallantry, devotion to duty, indomitable resolution, cheerfulness under every condition, and in *esprit de corps* the officers and men of the 33rd Division proved themselves worthy rivals of the soldiers of Illinois who fought in former wars of the United States. The Commander-in-Chief of the American Expeditionary Forces declared that theirs was a "splendid record while in France. . . . They should go home proud of themselves and of the part they have played, and conscious of the respect and admiration of their comrades throughout the American Expeditionary Forces."¹⁸ Eight months earlier the division had been thanked for its "brilliant successes" on the British front¹⁹ and the French were equally appreciative. In a charming letter of farewell to General Bell, when the command was about to embark at Brest, Monsieur André Tardieu, the French Commissioner-General, wrote: "We shall treasure in memory the exploits of your splendid soldiers. I here tender to them the expression of the gratitude of the Government of the French Republic, which unites in the same thought of thankfulness the living and the dead."²⁰

In the pamphlet history of the *33rd Division, A. E. F.*, the Division Commander, in his brief introduction, declared

that he was "proud to have had the honor and the privilege of commanding such men." What they achieved is chiefly to be attributed to the complete weeding out of those officers and men who were not up to the standard required in war, to the thorough training, the severe discipline enforced, the vigilant supervision, the magnificent spirit instilled into them, and the skill with which they were invariably handled by their admired and beloved commander, Major General George Bell, Jr.

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